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In autumn 2016, construction works on the Princess Beatrix lock started. This monu-
mental lock, dating back to 1938, is one of the largest inland navigation locks in the 
Netherlands. Situated on the Lek canal, this lock is part of the most important and 
only direct waterway connection between the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. 
Because of the increasing number of large ships passing through this lock, it had to 
be expanded and renovated to prevent it from becoming a bottleneck for shipping 
traffic. Widening the Lek canal and adding a new and longer third chamber to the 
lock should future-proof the Princess Beatrix lock (Heijmans, 2019; Rijkswaterstaat, 
2019). In order to realize these changes, the Dutch executive agency of the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Water Management, Rijkswaterstaat, collaborated with private 
construction firms in a public–private partnership (PPP).
The Princess Beatrix lock project is a clear example of a PPP, but it is by no means 
the only one. Nowadays, PPPs are common practice for many public organizations. 
Governments and public organizations use this form of collaboration to realize 
public goods and services (see Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Hodge et al., 2010). The use 
of PPPs requires governments and public organizations to rethink their role in this 
respect. Rather than these entities being the sole deciding actor, the use of PPPs 
raises questions regarding their role in the governance of these partnerships. How 
can public organizations best collaborate with private partners in the realization of 
public services and goods? In an attempt to safeguard public interests and balance 
often competing values, public organizations need to think about how and which 
governance mechanisms to adopt (Koppenjan et al., 2008). What form of governance 
does justice to these partnerships? And how can partnerships be steered in such a way 
as to lead to successful performance? Many governments and public organizations 
struggle to find answers to these questions. They search for the right way to govern 
PPPs. For public organizations, interesting dilemmas are created between control and 
autonomy, between certainty and flexibility, and between risk and potential rewards. 
How much control should the public client exert and how much room should be 
given to the private contractor? How much flexibility should be built into the project 
to allow for new developments, innovations, and stakeholder input, without running 
the risk of losing sight of on-time and on-budget delivery? Perhaps the largest gover-
nance dilemma in this respect is that between control and collaboration.
The original idea of PPP is highly contractual. PPPs are often considered a form of 
contracting out, in which strict contract management is the dominant governance 
mechanism (see Savas, 2000). This also applies to most Dutch PPPs, including the Prin-
cess Beatrix lock project. Albeit that contracts are common practice in PPPs (see Hodge 
& Greve, 2009; Hodge et al., 2010), other ways of governing are not excluded (e.g. Ysa, 
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2007). In PPPs, relational governance mechanisms are also called upon. Rather than 
focusing on enforcement of the contract, project partners try to work together as 
equal partners, and the governance of the project takes place on the basis of open 
communication, sharing knowledge, and emphasizing the shared interests of both 
partners (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Klijn et al., 2007; Smyth & Edkins, 2007; Velotti 
et al., 2012). In practice, this often results in hybrid forms of governance, in which 
elements from different models can be combined (Weihe, 2009; Koppenjan, 2012; 
Hansson, 2013). This is where the quest starts to find the right mix of governance 
instruments to direct and guide these partnerships. This is challenging, as insight is 
sparse about which governance mechanisms are actually preferred and how these 
combinations of mechanisms affect partnership performance. This puzzle is at the 
heart of the research presented in this dissertation. The central issue in this disserta-
tion thus revolves around the governance of PPPs and the way in which these various 
governance mechanisms can be combined to realize successful PPPs. Although it is 
known that various mechanisms can be combined, it is not yet clear what specific 
combinations of governance mechanisms work in PPPs. Unravelling the specific com-
binations of various governance forms is one of the unique contributions that this 
dissertation aims to make to the PPP literature. In doing so, this dissertation also 
addresses the common assumption that good relationships between project partners 
matter in this respect. The quality of the relationship between project partners is 
said to impact the performance of the partnership, as good relationships improve 
collaboration and leave room for flexibility and joint problem solving (Arinõ et al., 
2001, 2005; Van Slyke, 2009). However, empirical studies testing the role of relational 
quality in PPPs are limited. So, to study the effect of governance on PPP performance, 
the role of relational quality therein is be addressed in this dissertation.
The remainder of this introductory chapter first addresses the main theoretical con-
cepts in this dissertation. The next four sections elaborate on, respectively, PPPs, their 
governance, their performance, and the relational quality concept. These sections 
show what knowledge scholars have already gleaned in previous academic studies in 
relation to these main concepts. When one considers previous contributions to the 
research on PPPs, the lacunas that still remain become evident. This chapter then 
turns to the focus of this dissertation, presenting the central research question, the 
design of this study, and the contribution that this dissertation aims to make to both 




1.2. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE
The development, realization, and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, like the 
Princess Beatrix lock, is an important government task. The generally accepted belief 
is that good public infrastructure enhances the accessibility of urban areas, promotes 
safety and mobility, and stimulates economic growth (Aschauer, 1990). With ever-
increasing transport flows, far-reaching technological developments, and growing 
concerns about the ecological consequences of the world’s increased mobility, the 
delivery of public infrastructure has become not only an important but also a complex 
government task. It is therefore not surprising that infrastructure is one of the policy 
fields in which a shift from government to governance is clearly visible. Governments 
and public agencies often collaborate with other actors to deliver high-quality roads, 
railways, and waterways (OECD, 2015; Christensen & Greve, 2018). The process sur-
rounding the realization of public infrastructure is often referred to as infrastructure 
governance. The infrastructure governance concept can be explained as “the processes, 
tools, and norms of interaction, decision-making, and monitoring used by governmental organiza-
tions and their counterparts with respect to making infrastructure services available to the public 
and the public sector” (OECD, 2015: 2). Governments interact in various ways with other 
stakeholders to realize the delivery of public infrastructure (e.g. Christensen & Greve, 
2018).
1.2.1. Defining public–private partnerships
One of these ways in which governments interact with other stakeholders is by engag-
ing in PPPs. The academic debate on infrastructure governance has been dominated 
by the idea of PPPs for several decades (Hodge et al., 2010; Christensen & Greve, 2018). 
PPP is a broad term and much has already been said about its meaning and use (see 
for example Linder, 1999; Hodge & Greve, 2007, 2013). Whereas some scholars define 
a PPP as “a long-term contractual arrangement […]” (see Garvin & Bosso, 2008: 163), others 
opt for a broader definition. Klijn and Teisman (2003: 137), for example, define a PPP 
as a “cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character in which actors 
develop mutual products and/or services and in which risks, costs and profits are shared.” This 
definition refers to a variety of forms of partnership between public and private ac-
tors, ranging from loosely shaped alliances to strict contract-based agreements. Hodge 
and Greve (2013) suggest that the debate on PPPs covers essentially five different 
meanings. In its narrowest sense, a PPP is a single project, used for example to build a 
road. In a slightly broader sense, PPP is an organizational form or a mechanism with 
a specific institutional and financial architecture designed for public service delivery. 
If its meaning is broadened even further, it can be considered a policy preference, i.e. 
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the preferred way of working in a policy domain. Taking the notion of PPP one step 
further, Hodge and Greve describe PPP as a governance tool in the toolbox of modern 
governments. The use of contracts, for example, is a governance tool. Finally, PPP can 
be considered a phenomenon within the context of a broader national history and set 
of cultural assumptions (Hodge & Greve, 2013: 4-5). Hodge and Greve (2017ª) explain 
how the use of PPP is embedded in a country’s historical tradition and can be used 
in a symbolic way to express change. In this dissertation, we focus predominantly 
on PPPs as individual projects. These PPPs are often designed to realize transport 
infrastructure, but they can also be employed to realize social infrastructure (such as 
housing, schools, hospitals, or prisons), urban renewal, or other public products or 
services (e.g. Koppenjan, 2005; Reeves, 2008; Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Whiteside, 
2011; Roumboutsos, 2015).
Although public–private collaboration has been around in one form or another for 
centuries, PPPs as they are currently used date back to the early 1990s. Most PPPs 
nowadays are inspired by the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) originating in the United 
Kingdom (Wettenhal, 2008). A PFI is a form of private involvement in public service 
delivery and infrastructure projects in which private firms are contracted to realize 
and manage public projects. Private investments are used to deliver public sector 
infrastructure according to output specifications defined by the public actor (Ball et 
al., 2000; Broadbent et al., 2003). Many countries have adopted these ideas, resulting 
in a variety of PPPs grouped under the term, long-term infrastructure contracts (LTICS) 
(Hodge & Greve, 2013). These partnerships share a number of key characteristics:
1. First and foremost, LTICs are, as the name suggests, long-term projects. This is a 
key aspect of PPPs. Because of the partnership’s long duration, the focus lies on the 
entire lifecycle of public infrastructure, meaning that, usually, the partnership not 
only covers the design and construction of infrastructures, but also extends well 
into the maintenance and operation phase of the project. Thus, partnerships can 
easily last for 30 years. The integration of the various aspects of the process is an 
attempt to minimize lifecycle costs (Savas, 2000; Hodge & Greve, 2013).
2. To structure the involvement of private partners, PPPs – and in particular LTICs – 
are usually guided by elaborate contracts. These contracts can be used to align the 
interests of the private contractor with those of the public client (Hodge & Greve, 
2013; Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002). Moreover, they are designed to provide clarity 
regarding each actor’s roles, risks, and responsibilities. Often, the contracts also 
include output specifications designed by the public partner as well as agreements 
on monitoring and sanctions (Lam & Javed, 2015).
3. A third important characteristic is the allocation of risks. This is often explicitly 
mentioned as one of the key aspects of PPPs. The underlying principle is that risks 
are allocated to the partner who is best able to mitigate these risks and carry the 
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potential consequences. Risks can be shared between public and private actors or 
are transferred from the public partner to the private partner. Private partners, for 
example, carry risks in the design, the realization, and the operational phase of 
the project to ensure their commitment throughout the project. The relevance of 
this topic is reflected in the vast amount of research on the allocation and manage-
ment of risk (see amongst others Ke et al., 2009; Bing et al., 2005ª; Ng & Loosemore, 
2007).
The integration of different phases of the process and the sharing of risks entail a sig-
nificant involvement of private partners in PPPs. These private partners can become 
involved in the design, construction, and maintenance of the project. In some cases, 
they even become responsible for the finance and the operation phase of an asset. 
Management and payment to the private contractor are based on the provision of 
previously agreed upon services rather than on product delivery, meaning that private 
contractors earn their investment back over the years. When the private partner’s 
involvement includes the operation of a road, the private partner can earn back its 
investments by charging user fees, like the toll on toll roads. In some countries, such 
as the Netherlands, availability payments are used. In the provision of a new road, 
private contractors are involved in the maintenance of the road after its construction, 
but not necessarily in its operation. They earn back their invested money via avail-
ability payments, paid by the public client for the accessibility of the road. If the road 
is closed for maintenance, payments are lower, providing an incentive for the private 
partner to have taken the maintenance into account during the construction of the 
road (Lenferink et al., 2013).
As a commonly used form of PPP, LTICs can come in all shapes and sizes. The dif-
ferent forms are often based on the degree of involvement and responsibilities of 
the private partners. Several forms of PPP refer in their name to the stages of the 
project carried out by the private partner. Compare, for example, a design-build (DB) 
type of PPP, in which a private constructor is responsible for both the design and 
the realization of the infrastructure, with a design-build-finance-maintain-operate 
(DBFMO) type of PPP. In the latter, the private partner is responsible not only for the 
design and construction of the infrastructure, but also for the finance, maintenance, 
and operation for a long period of time after the building of the infrastructure (Hodge 
et al., 2010).
Alliances are a somewhat different form of PPP. To differentiate them from contrac-
tual PPPs like LTICs, the Commission of the European Communities refers to them 
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as institutional PPPs1 (CEC, 2004). In contrast to contractual PPPs, these institutional 
PPPs have a different organizational structure. Rather than a detailed contract be-
ing the only interface between public and private organizations, a new organization 
is established by the joint efforts of all parties in the alliance, in which they share 
authority and collaborate towards the realization of a specific public good or service 
(Andrews et al., 2015). Therefore, institutional PPPs have a different risk allocation in 
which risks are shared rather than transferred between project partners. Moreover, 
partners operate in a horizontal relationship and consider performance obligations to 
be collective (Clifton & Duffield, 2006).
Central in this dissertation, however, are not institutional PPPs, but DBFM(O) proj-
ects. This type of PPP is an LTIC integrating the design, build, finance, maintain, and 
– occasionally – operate phases of the project (see also Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002). 
DBFM(O) is a frequently used form of PPP and is used by many governments to realize 
public service delivery. The presence of this type of PPP in several countries is one of 
the main reasons for selecting this form as the main type of PPP in this dissertation.
1.2.2. Public–private partnerships: A global phenomenon with national 
differences
Nowadays, PPPs are very much an international phenomenon. Besides well-known 
early adopters like the UK and Australia, PPPs are used worldwide, both in Western 
European countries (e.g. Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain) and in Asia (e.g. 
China, Vietnam), America (Canada), Africa (Ghana), and the Middle East (Jordan) (see 
amongst others the work of Adams et al., 2006; Hammerschmid & Ysa, 2010; Mistarihi 
et al., 2013; Mota & Moreira, 2015; Biygautane et al., 2016; Arezki & Belhaj, 2019). De-
spite PPPs being an international phenomenon, international comparative research 
into PPPs has been scarce (for some exceptions see Greve & Hodge, 2007; Petersen, 
2011; Verhoest et al., 2015). The few studies that do exist show that the development 
of PPPs varies significantly across countries (e.g. Petersen, 2011; Verhoest et al., 2015). 
National governments respond differently to PPPs, and macro-institutional factors, 
such as a country’s culture, its economic situation, and its administrative history, af-
fect whether and how PPPs are employed (Verhoest et al., 2015). In a study comparing 
20 countries, Verhoest et al. (2015) show that governmental support for PPPs differs 
per country.
In the Netherlands, there is strong governmental support for the use of PPPs. Par-
ticularly at state level, decisions on the construction of public infrastructure have 
1 The terminology regarding this topic is not consistent. Various terms are used, like alliance, 
institutional PPP, or public–private joint venture. The terminology also differs among coun-
tries (Andrews et al., 2015).
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favoured the use of PPPs. In 1998, the Dutch cabinet rehabilitated PPPs after an initial 
first wave of PPPs stopped consequent to the high cost of these projects. A knowledge 
centre was set up to gather knowledge and expertise on the topic. The use of PPP 
really accelerated in the mid-2000s. A standardized contract was developed, and PPP 
became the standard way of contracting out for Rijkswaterstaat, the executive agency 
of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. Rijkswaterstaat has now put 
over 20 highways and locks out to tender in the form of a PPP. From 2004 onwards, 
the central government real estate agency, nowadays called the Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, 
started putting offices, courthouses, and prisons out to tender using PPPs (Rijksover-
heid.nl, n.d.). Political support for the use of PPP boosted their developments in the 
Netherlands on the national level, and local governments were encouraged to use 
them too. As a consequence of the strong governmental support for PPPs in the past 
two decades, more than 30 public infrastructure projects have been realized using 
PPP, the majority of them since 2008. DBFM and DBFMO are the dominant forms of 
PPPs used by the Dutch national government (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018).
The research in this dissertation is focused predominantly on PPPs in the Neth-
erlands, because of recent developments regarding the governance of PPPs in the 
country. Contractual governance used to be the dominant mode of governance. The 
standardized contract that is still often used is exemplary of this tradition. However, 
Dutch ministries and their agencies have lately displayed a rising interest in relational 
governance and the importance of high-quality relationships in PPPs. This rising 
interest might be explained by a few PPP projects characterized by serious conflicts 
and poor performance (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). Recent debates on infrastructure 
governance in the Netherlands have focused on the potential advantages of relational 
governance in addition to the traditional contract-based governance tools. Similar 
trends can be seen elsewhere, including the United Kingdom (HMTreasury, 2012). 
Illustrative of this trend in the Netherlands is the development of the Marktvisie 
(market vision). This document is designed to outline the way in which public and 
private partners in the Netherlands tend to collaborate in the development, realiza-
tion, and maintenance of public infrastructure. The Marktvisie was developed jointly 
by Rijkswaterstaat, other public agencies, and their private contractors. Together, 
public clients and private contractors address the importance of good relationships 
when working together on the realization of public infrastructure. The Marktvisie 
presents an increased focus on horizontal relationships, characterized by openness, 
respect, and empathy for each other, and suggests the use of relational governance 
mechanisms that might stimulate the building of such relationships (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2016; marktvisie.nu, n.d.). The Marktvisie and its emphasis on relational governance 
to enhance the quality of relationships between project partners and their perfor-
mance has not been developed to replace the use of contracts. In fact, most PPPs in 
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the Netherlands still rely heavily on contracts, taking the form of DBFM(O) projects. 
Rijkswaterstaat works with standardized, elaborate contracts that consist of a variety 
of contractual governance tools. Nevertheless, the slowly shifting focus from one 
governance mechanism to another makes it the ideal setting to study the main topic 
of this dissertation: the governance of PPPs and the way in which various governance 
mechanisms can be combined to realize successful PPPs.
1.3. THE GOVERNANCE OF CONTRACTUAL PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS
Regarding the governance of public–private encounters, the public administration 
discipline provides various theoretical viewpoints on this topic. These viewpoints 
are often clustered into paradigms that are generally accepted and often adopted by 
public administration scholars: traditional public administration, new public man-
agement (NPM), new public governance (NPG), and most recently self-organization. 
Although this is not a definitive clustering or a complete overview of all ideas regard-
ing governance, these paradigms can be used as a starting point for any study on the 
governance of public–private encounters, including PPPs. In relation to PPPs, NPM 
and NPG are particularly useful, as PPPs display elements of both paradigms. This 
section first addresses the core features of both paradigms and demonstrates how 
the idea of PPP fits within both the NPM and the NPG paradigm. Then, it turns to the 
consequences of adopting these different paradigms for the governance of PPPs, pre-
senting a continuum ranging from contractual governance on one end to relational 
governance on the other.
1.3.1. Public–private partnerships: A New Public Management example?
NPM has led to many reforms in the public sector, on the basis that modern busi-
ness practices should be implemented in the public sector (Dunleavy et al., 2006). 
The introduction of competition to allocate resources, privatization, and contracting 
out to reduce the size of public administration, and the focus on performance rather 
than process, indicate the introduction of a new set of values. Values like economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness become paramount in this paradigm. The intend of NPM-
based reforms often was to improve the productivity and performance of the public 
sector (see Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Hence, NPM has a strong focus on 
performance. Important in NPM is also the separation between the design and the 
implementation of policies. Policies are made by governments, but rather than doing 
everything themselves, governments and public agencies outsource tasks related to 
the implementation of the policy to private organizations (Hood, 1991). ‘Steering, not 
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rowing’ is an illustrative quote in this respect (see Osborne & Geabler, 1992). PPPs fit 
very well in this context, as they are a clear example of contracting out and transferring 
tasks from the government to private organizations. In PPPs, the public actor defines 
goals, but the task to realize these goals is given to the private contractor. The latter 
carries both risk and responsibility (Savas, 2000). This relationship can be explained 
by the principal–agent theory (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in which the relationship 
between the public client and the private contractor is strictly governed to prevent 
the agent acting in its own best interests rather than in the best interests of the prin-
cipal. In PPPs, steering by the government takes the form of output and performance 
indicators incorporated in elaborate contracts (Lawther & Martin, 2014). Clearly, PPPs 
are an epitome of the core idea in NPM, which suggests that governments should steer 
but not execute all tasks themselves. In PPPs, the private partner is selected through a 
tendering procedure based on competition, a core NPM characteristic. The tendering 
procedures is designed to stimulate competition among potential providers in order 
to realize the best value for money (Colman, 2000; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004ª; Hueskes, 
2019). Finally, PPPs and the NPM paradigm share a strong focus on performance. In 
PPPs, public partners determine performance criteria for their private counterpart. 
Both the monitoring system and payments are based on these performance criteria.
All in all, PPPs fits very well with NPM, as it explicitly includes several key features 
of this paradigm, such as contracting out, competition, and the use of incentives to en-
sure performance. It is therefore not surprising that studies on PPP are often inspired 
by NPM or closely related theories such as transaction cost theory and principal–agent 
theory (Wang et al., 2018).
1.3.2. Public–private partnerships: following the New Public Governance 
trend?
More recently, New Public Governance (NPG) has received plenty of attention in public 
administration. Just like NPM, NPG emphasizes that governments and public organi-
zations need other actors to contribute in order to realize public services and goods. 
However, in contrast to NPM, this paradigm puts particular emphasis on the role of 
interdependencies between actors (see Osborne, 2010). Given that governments and 
public organizations are not capable of resolving complex policy issues on their own, 
collaboration in networks of various public and private actors becomes crucial to real-
ize the delivery of public services and goods (see the literature on collaborative gover-
nance: e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012, and the literature on network 
governance: e.g. Provan & Kenis, 2008; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). So, NPG postulates 
the idea of a plural state, in which multiple actors contribute to the delivery of public 
services. The interdependencies between these actors implicate that the public actor 
needs to take into account the goals and interests of its partners. As no single actor is 
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able to make all decisions, actors need to collaborate. In theory, the relationship then 
transforms from a principal–agent relationship into a more horizontal relationship in 
which both partners realize that they need each other for the successful realization of 
the project (Dickinson, 2016).
The interdependencies between actors in the realization of public infrastructure 
can lead to the use of both contractual and institutional PPPs. Although contractual 
PPPs hardly seem to fit the ideas behind NPG, a closer look shows how several el-
ements of the design of PPP pair nicely with this governance paradigm. First, the 
relationship between public and private actors in PPPs offers interdependent actors 
the opportunity to avail each other’s resources. Second, PPPs adhere to the ideas on 
collaboration and networks that signify NPG. PPPs can be considered a network of 
public and private actors with a joint focus on realizing public infrastructure. In this 
case, PPPs are a form of enduring inter-organizational relationships, characterized by 
network-like interactions and a shared goal. Thus, PPPs may fit in the NPG paradigm. 
Reaching the goals set in a PPP requires a type of governance that does justice to 
the more horizontal and interdependent relationships between actors (Weihe, 2009). 
Hence, NPG lays emphasis on relational governance mechanisms such as relational 
contracting (Bovaird, 2006; Teicher et al., 2006; Osborne, 2010). Consequently, schol-
ars increasingly espouse the NPG paradigm and closely related perspectives such as 
the network perspective to study PPPs (Wang et al., 2018).
1.3.3. The contract–relationship continuum
PPPs can thus be positioned within both the NPM and the NPG literature. Each, how-
ever, has its own consequences for the governance of these partnerships. On the one 
hand, PPPs can be governed using the principle of control, which aligns mostly with 
NPM. This often translates into the use of performance indicators and contracts. On 
the other hand, building on the ideas of NPG, PPPs can be governed with a focus on 
horizontal relationships, thus using more relational governance mechanisms. Hence, 
there is a distinction between contractual and relational governance. This can be a 
useful tool in our thinking on the governance of PPPs. Just like most distinctions, it is 
not a dichotomy, but rather a continuum in which PPPs can be governed using more 
or less strict contracts and more or less relational governance mechanisms. Here, I 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings of both ends of the spectrum and indicate what 
these mean for the governance of PPPs.
Contracts as the dominant governance mechanism
Examination of PPP approaches in various countries reveals that PPP governance 
seems focused predominantly on contractual governance mechanisms (see for ex-
ample Reeves, 2008). Particularly in contractual PPPs, as the name already suggests, 
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the use of elaborate contracts, performance indicators, monitoring, and sanctions are 
day-to-day practice. The use of these forms of incentivization is strongly inspired by 
economic theories, such as transaction cost theory and principal–agent theory and 
builds upon concepts like rationality and opportunistic behaviour (Akintoye et al., 
2008; Brown et al., 2016). These theories might explain the tendency to use contractual 
governance mechanisms. Both transaction cost theory and principal–agenct theory 
suggest that actors behave rationally and will use situations to their own advantage 
if the opportunity arises. An actor will weigh the advantages and the disadvantages 
of a certain situation and thereby choose whatever results in the greatest benefits 
for himself (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1996). To prevent this kind of op-
portunistic behaviour, contracts can be used. These contracts stimulate the agent to 
align with the goals set by the principal. They include all the rules needed to execute 
the exchange (Brown et al., 2016). For PPPs, this means that the contract includes 
agreements on the responsibilities of both partners and the division of risks. It states 
exactly what the contractor should deliver and what requirements are placed on the 
work of the contractor. Those requirements consist, for example, of technical specifi-
cations with which a tunnel or road should comply; for example, regarding lighting, 
crash barriers, and emergency lanes. The contract also encompasses arrangements 
about how the contractor’s performance will be monitored. These might consist of 
agreements on performance measurement systems and of the public client conduct-
ing regular inspections. In addition, the contract contains formal process agreements 
regarding force majeure and unexpected exceptional circumstances, making changes 
to the contract, or premature termination of the contract (see for example Rijkswa-
terstaat, 2018; Worldbank, 2018). To assist in the arrangement and enforcement of 
agreements, these contracts usually also include the opportunity to apply sanctions 
when performance falls short. This way, actors are provided with steering options to 
make sure that their partners perform and abide by the contract (Savas, 2000). These 
mechanisms reduce the opportunity for either partner to display opportunistic behav-
iour. Given the large risks and (financial) interests in PPPs, the use of such contracts 
has become the go-to governance tool (Parker & Hartley, 2003).
The limits of contractual governance
Despite the importance of contractual governance and the focus on control in govern-
ing PPPs, contractual governance has its limitations. The main disadvantage is that 
such contracts are inherently incomplete (Brown et al., 2016). A contract is not able to 
cover all potential circumstances and foresee future developments (Davis, 2007). In the 
first place, this is due to the complexity of the exchange in PPPs. The complexity of a 
PPP project is hard to capture in a contract. The technical complexity, the involvement 
of multiple stakeholders with different interests, and the interdependencies between 
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partners might all provide challenges with which the contract is not equipped to deal. 
A hypothetical example will clearly demonstrate this issue. Imagine that the national 
government decides to build a new railway line between two medium-sized cities, 
crossing two rivers by bridge and including a tunnel underneath a densely populated 
area. The PPP is designed as a DBFM project, in which the private partner designs, 
builds, finances, and maintains the railway. An elaborate contract including all output 
specifications and performance criteria is used to govern the partnership between 
the public client and the private contractor. The project is technically complex, be-
cause bridges and a tunnel have to be built in residential areas. Simultaneously, the 
complexity of this project stems from the fact that there are several stakeholders 
involved who have different interests. The unforeseen emergence of a protest group, 
complaining that the railway will pass through a nature reserve, new regulations 
regarding nitrogen emissions at building projects, the discovery of soil pollution, the 
sudden involvement of a neighbouring municipality that also wants to be included 
as a stop on the new railway line, and protests from the bus operator who fears stiff 
competition might all be unforeseen events and complications not covered in the 
contract. This raises questions as to who is responsible for dealing with these issues 
and who must carry the corresponding costs and delays.
Now, the complexities of the PPP in the example above refer only to the construc-
tion phase. However, PPPs are long-term partnerships that can last up to 30 years. 
The long-term nature of PPPs makes it even more difficult to consider all future 
developments and potential issues in the contract. Going back to the example of 
the railway project, what happens if in the 30 years during the operationalization 
phase technological developments change the way we travel? What happens if the 
number of train passengers on the new railway line increases significantly and more 
maintenance is needed? Which of the partners will be responsible for the costs replac-
ing the safety mechanism with a new one as a result of European legislation? The 
example clearly shows the incomplete character of contracts. Therefore, potential 
issues or unexpected side effects offer the possibility of discussions about risks, roles, 
and responsibilities. Contractual governance using incomplete contracts also allows 
project partners to act in their own self-interest on issues for which the contract does 
not provide any clear guidelines. In other words, it offers potential for opportunistic 
behaviour (Bertelli & Smith, 2009; Brown et al., 2016). Contractual governance thus 
has limitations in its application to long-term, complex forms of collaboration, such 
as PPPs. Therefore, an alternative way of governing PPPs must be sought.
Relational governance as the dominant form of governance
Relational governance mechanisms present an alternative to contracts. Relational 
governance is a form of governance based on the idea that inter-organizational 
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exchanges, like PPPs, are exchanges embedded in social relationships (Granovetter, 
1985). Many of these exchanges are characterized by interdependencies. Because of 
the interdependencies between actors in the realization of public infrastructure, 
project partners are stuck to each other and to the project. This creates the need 
to achieve goals through collaboration and make joint arrangements. Governance 
emerges from the values and processes in these relationships (see for example 
Macneil, 1978, 1980; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Frequently used mechanisms include, 
for example, information sharing, open communication, and joint problem solving 
(see for example Macneil, 1980; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). These mechanisms safeguard 
against opportunistic behaviour and stimulate partners to fulfil their part of the 
agreement (Ring & van de Ven, 1992; Zheng et al., 2008). Thus, relational governance 
is recognized and emphasized by several theories, including social exchange theory, 
resource dependency, and network governance theory (e.g. MacNeil, 1980; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Schoenherr et 
al., 2015). The network management strategies presented in the latter theory also 
fit very well with the description of relational governance, because they focus on 
the process and try to align partners with different goals, without enforcing strong 
control. Consider, for example, the connecting strategies presented in network gover-
nance theory. These include, amongst others, creating interaction, appointing process 
managers, removing obstacles to cooperation, coalition building, and so on (e.g. Klijn 
et al., 2010). All these examples are strategies developed on the basis of processes that 
emerge in the relationship between actors in a collaboration.
In relational governance, there is no escaping the notion of trust, which is one 
of the most frequently cited concepts. As a core concept in relational governance, 
trust is often seen as an alternative to contracts. Just like contracts, trust can mitigate 
opportunistic behaviour. Trust will lead partners to share information and resources, 
help each other, and invest in the project (Ring & Van der Ven, 1992; McEvily & Za-
heer, 2006). Following this line of thought, in this dissertation, trust is considered 
an important concept underlying the use of relational governance mechanisms in 
public–private encounters. Section 1.4 elaborates further on the role of trust, as an 
important aspect of relational quality, in relation to PPP governance.
Relational governance can be useful in a PPP, because it offers a way to deal with 
uncertainty and complexity in PPPs (see Lousberg, 2012; Bult & van Engen, 2015). Re-
lational governance stimulates cooperation and consequently joint problem solving 
and the search for win-win solutions. Actors jointly determine what needs to be done 
when they encounter an unexpected event. Relational governance also stimulates the 
focus on best-for-project solutions, in which the goals of the cooperation rather than 
the individual goals of the project partners are central. Relational governance might 
help overcome the adaptive limits of contracts, as project partners might adopt a 
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more flexible attitude, rather than being confined to contracts (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). 
Thus, project partners might be safeguarded against risks that are not easily protected 
by a contract (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
The limitations of relational governance
The use of relational governance is often presented as the panacea that cures all prob-
lems with which contractual governance seems unable to deal. It is a remedy against 
opportunistic behaviour, addresses the incompleteness of the contract, provides flex-
ibility, and allows for win-win solutions. However, the use of relational governance 
mechanisms comes with its own challenges (see for example Cao & Lumineau, 2005; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Relational governance mechanisms, like open commu-
nication and joint problem solving, are often very time and resource consuming to 
develop and maintain (Das & Teng, 1998; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Paying attention to the 
collaborative process and creating a shared understanding both require the invest-
ment of time and resources by all partners involved. Moreover, it is not always easy 
for all partners to agree on a common aim or a solution to a problem. The variety 
of organizational agendas, power differences, and the complexity of the underlying 
issue make reaching agreement difficult (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Poppo et al. (2008) 
suggest that relational governance mechanisms do not ensure fully collaborative 
behaviour. The use of relational governance mechanisms requires actors to let go 
and trust their project partner, but this might be hard for some organizations to do. 
Spending too much time on the relational governance mechanisms can take time 
away from core tasks, and time-consuming struggles to reach agreement may lead to 
slow progress and a lack of achievements. Huxham and Vangen (2005) describe this as 
collaborative inertia. Too much attention on the process may result in a partnership 
that is all talk and no action.
1.3.4. Meeting in the middle
The contract–relationship continuum thus provides two different ways to govern 
PPPs: one – contractual governance – based on the ideas of rationality and opportu-
nistic behaviour, resulting in the use of contracts and performance indicators; the 
other – relational governance – based on trust and interdependencies, resulting in the 
use of open communication and joint problem solving. Albeit based on very different 
principles, both forms of governance are designed to align interests between project 
partners and enhance the performance of public–private encounters. Each form has 
its own pros and cons. Presenting contractual governance and relational governance 
as two ends of the spectrum should not lead to the idea that these forms of governance 
are substitutes. In fact, several scholars have shown that contractual and relational 
governance may complement each other in inter-organizational relationships (see for 
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example Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Rather than being on one side of the spectrum, PPPs 
are more likely to be found somewhere in between, making use of both forms of 
governance.
The question then arises as to how contractual and relational governance might 
complement each other. As explained in the previous section relational governance 
might help compensate inherent incompleteness and lack of adaptive ability of 
contractual governance (MacNeil, 1978; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Zheng et al., 2008). 
Moreover, relational governance may promote improvements in the contract. Les-
sons learned in earlier phases of the relationship, stimulated by the use of relational 
governance mechanisms such as information sharing and open communication, can 
lead to revisions to the contract (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Conversely, contracts might 
also complement the use of relational governance, for example in the first, vulnerable 
phases of a project (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Zheng et al. (2008) state that contractual 
governance provides a stabilizing effect in the early stage of the partnership when 
relational mechanisms are still fragile. As the relationship between project partners 
still needs to develop, open communication and joint problem solving might be a 
challenge, because trust and an understanding of each other’s goals and interests 
need to develop over time. The contract holds the expectation of long-term coopera-
tion and therefore stimulates the use of relational governance mechanisms (Zheng et 
al., 2008). These findings suggest that the balance between various governance mecha-
nisms might differ based on the situation, the project phase, and the partnership’s 
complexity and dynamics. However, research has also shown that it can be difficult to 
combine the two forms of governance in practice (e.g. Reeves, 2008). With contractual 
governance still being the dominant mode of governance, these governance mecha-
nisms definitely do not always meet in the middle.
This raises questions about the balance between both forms of governance. When 
do we use which mechanisms? How does the interplay of contractual and relational 
governance in PPPs work out in different situations? And what mix is needed to make 
PPPs a success? Mixing both contractual and relational governance can be a double 
stimulus: for cooperation and against opportunistic behaviour. Consequently, the 
combination of both forms of governance is claimed to lead to better results than 
the use of either one of these mechanisms alone (Klein-Woolthuis et al., 2005; Dewulf 
& Garvin, 2020). However, knowledge about which combinations of contractual and 
relational governance work is limited. Several studies have already indicated that gov-
ernance has a significant effect on PPP performance (see for example Lee & Cavusgil, 
2006; Klijn et al., 2010; Van Gestel et al., 2012; Kort et al., 2016). Ergo, the following 
section addresses PPP performance, which is the dependent variable in this disserta-
tion.
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1.4. PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE
This section addresses the performance of PPPs. First, it elaborates on the promise 
of on-time and on-budget delivery that comes with contractual PPPs. The question 
is whether PPP is able to deliver on its promise in practice. The second part of this 
section discusses some methodological issues in measuring PPP performance in aca-
demic research.
Despite being frequently used, PPPs are not always a success story. When PPPs were 
first introduced, they came with great expectations. Because of their long-term focus 
and the integration of different project phases, they were supposed to minimize 
lifecycle costs, be more efficient, and lead to better performance. The involvement 
of private partners throughout the entire project and the use of private finance were 
supposed to reduce pressure on public sector budgets and lead to better value for 
money, more innovation, stable incomes for private partners, and better on-time 
and on-budget delivery (Hodge & Greve, 2013, 2017ᵇ). Despite these promises, earlier 
studies show mixed results regarding PPP performance (Hodge & Greve, 2009, 2017ᵇ; 
Hodge et al., 2018; Vining & Boardman, 2008). Some studies show an increase in the 
on-time and on-budget realization of public infrastructure (NAO, 2002; MacDonald, 
2002; Pollitt, 2002). Furthermore, the integration of different project phases seems to 
lead to optimizations and lower lifecycle costs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004ª; Eadie et al., 
2013). There are, however, also plenty examples of PPP projects that do not perform 
as well as expected. Using a PPP does not always rule out cost and time overruns 
(Ghobadian et al., 2004; Shaoul, 2005; Boardman et al., 2005; Verweij et al., 2017). 
Some disappointing performances can be traced back to the tender phase, where 
competition forces private partners to put in highly competitive prices and take more 
risks than they are be able to carry. High tender costs and long dialogues in the tender 
phase also affect the project’s efficiency (see Blanc-Brude et al., 2006; Reeves et al., 
2015). Furthermore, research shows that PPP does not live up to its promise of realiz-
ing more innovative projects. Contrary to expectations, the transfer of risks from the 
public to the private partner results in risk-avoiding behaviour by the private partner 
in which it is unwilling to accept the risks associated with innovation (Hueskes, 2019). 
In the Netherlands, construction firms state that the risks in large and complex DBFM 
projects are simply too great (Consultancy.nl; 2019), resulting in lowered enthusiasm 
to participate in such megaprojects. So, despite the many potential benefits of PPPs, it 
is not always easy to make them work in practice.
The mixed results for the practice of PPPs already indicates that, regarding PPP 
performance, multiple dimensions should be taken into account. PPPs need to be on 
time and on budget, but also deliver high-quality public infrastructure. Simultane-
ously, they are expected to deliver in terms of innovation. The existence of multiple 
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relevant dimensions of performance leads to trade-off dilemmas. On-budget delivery 
might lead to slightly lower quality, whereas innovation in the design and construc-
tion might lead to less predictability in the following maintenance period. This makes 
it difficult to measure success. After all, which of these dimensions matters (most)? 
Are partners willing to pay more to take stakeholders’ demands into account? Or 
accept time delays in exchange for better quality? This advocates for using multiple 
dimensions in measuring performance to create a nuanced view of PPP performance. 
Another interesting question regarding the evaluation of PPP performance is for 
whom the partnership should be a success (Hodge & Greve, 2017ᵇ). The public client 
would like to have high-quality for a low price, whereas the private contractor needs 
to make a profit. Transferring risks might make it possible for the public client to 
stay within budget, while the private contractor has to take heavy losses to realize 
the project. With multiple actors and interests, there is no unambiguous measure of 
success in PPPs. Therefore, we follow Verweij (2015) in not using only quantitative 
measures of performance. Instead, the actors’ satisfaction is taken into account, as 
that is a better way in which to address the complex nature of PPP projects (Verweij et 
al., 2013; Verweij, 2015). All in all, in measuring the performance of PPPs, one should 
take into account (a) that this is a multi-dimensional concept with a trade-off between 
the different dimensions and (b) that success is in the eye of the beholder. Different 
actors with different interests might have different perceptions on the performance 
of PPPs; this makes it important to include not only objective measurements, but also 
actors’ satisfaction, in measuring the success of PPPs (see Verweij, 2015).
1.5. RELATIONAL QUALITY: MEDIATING THE RELATION 
BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE?
In the relationship between governance and performance, a third concept plays an 
important role. This third concept is the quality of the relationships between project 
partners. The exchange between public and private actors in a PPP is embedded in 
social relationships. Previous research shows that the control function of contracts 
may reduce the quality of these social relationships between partners and decrease 
the likelihood of continuing collaboration (Malhotra & Luminau, 2011). Contractual 
management focuses predominantly on the outputs that need to be realized and not 
so much on the social relationships between project partners. In contrast, relational 
governance focuses on the quality of the relationship between project partners by 
stimulating communication and joint action.
Social relationships between partners in public–private encounters have been 
receiving increasingly more scholarly attention (see for example Bartels & Turnbull, 
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2020). Yet, the quality of the relationships between actors in an exchange, or rela-
tional quality as it is called in this dissertation, can be a somewhat nebulous concept. 
Therefore, a brief introduction to delineate this concept seems in place. Relational 
quality refers to the state of the relationship between project partners. Relational 
quality is not an act or an activity; rather, it refers to the condition something is in – in 
this case the social relationships between partners in a PPP – and indicates how good 
or bad it is. For example, social relationships can be characterized by different levels 
of trust and respect. Relational quality refers to the degree to which these character-
istics are present. It does not refer to the actions leading to, or resulting from, the 
state of the relationship. Compare this to governance, which refers to acts, such as 
applying sanctions, monitoring a partner’s performance (in the case of contractual 
governance), or joint problem solving or making process agreements (in the case of 
relational governance).
There are surprisingly few studies on relational quality in PPPs. The only exception 
is trust, which has been frequently studied (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998; Klijn et al., 2016ª). 
However, most of these earlier studies have two limitations. First, some of them use 
trust as a proxy for relational governance and consider trust itself to be a governance 
activity, rather than a principle guiding the activity (see for example Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995; Caniëls et al., 2012). Second, trust is often the only indicator 
of relational quality, whereas relationships consist of more than mere trust. Social 
relationships between partners are determined by several relational qualities. Besides 
trust, which is the belief that partners will act honestly and not take advantage of 
each other, even if the opportunity arises (Cummings & Bromily, 1996; Edelenbos & 
Klijn, 2007), respect is another important quality of social relationships. Respect can 
be understood as recognition of someone because of his/her abilities or achievements, 
but it also means that partners are considerate of each other’s opinions and wishes. 
Partners need to respect each other, but also each other’s opinions, interests, and 
efforts (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Alam et al., 2014). Furthermore, openness is an important 
quality of relationships. This refers to a lack of secrecy and suggests that partners 
are transparent and provide each other access, for example to their ideas, opinions, 
or information regarding the project (Pomerantz & Peek, 2016). Openness improves 
communication, allows for the sharing of knowledge, and allows partners to learn 
from each other and their mistakes (Kumaraswamy et al., 2015). Finally, relationships 
are characterized by a certain degree of reciprocity (Thomson et al., 2007). After all, it 
is not without reason that the expression, give and take, is embedded in our thinking 
when it comes to social relationships. A relationship in which one actor only gives and 
never receives, while the other only takes and never gives, is not long-lived.
Although related, relational quality is thus not the same as relational governance. 
Nevertheless, just like governance mechanisms, it is said to affect performance in 
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public–private encounters (Zaheer et al., 1998; Klijn et al., 2016ª) and the use of gov-
ernance strategies might impact the quality of social relationships between project 
partners. After all, relational governance stimulates interaction and the development 
of long relationships (Dong et al., 2017), whereas contracts might provide a solid and 
stable base to start the development of social relations despite the uncertainties and 
dynamics surrounding PPPs. Zheng et al. (2008) hint towards the possibility that rela-
tional quality might be able to partially explain the relationship between governance 
and performance. In their research, they find that the quality of the relationship 
determines whether project partners experience the contract as a sign of trust or 
distrust. This suggests that the quality of the relationship might influence the success 
governance mechanisms used (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Conceptual model
After all, it is not only the use of governance mechanisms, but also the response of 
project partners to these mechanisms, that ultimately determines the success of the 
governance efforts. One could imagine that relational governance mechanisms will 
have less effect if distrust in the relationship means that partners are not willing to 
fully commit to the implementation of such mechanisms. Strict enforcement of the 
contract in an already low-quality relationship might lead to further deterioration of 
the relationship, resulting in rigid attitudes in any discussions about interpretations 
of contract requirements. Conversely, high-quality relationships between project 
partners may lead to acceptance of, and commitment to, the governance strategy 
deployed, making it more likely that the governance mechanisms will achieve their 
intended effect. This study therefore includes relational quality as a mediating vari-
able in the relationship between governance and performance. This brings us to the 
central research question of this dissertation.
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1.6. FOCUS OF THIS DISSERTATION
This dissertation revolves around the governance of PPPs as the central theme. Within 
this broad theme, the focus lies predominantly on the balance between various gover-
nance mechanisms. It aims to study how different forms of governance are combined 
in PPPs and how the mix of governance mechanisms affects PPP performance. To do 
so, the role of relational quality is included as a mediating variable that might be able 
to explain the relationship between governance and performance (see Figure 1.2). 
Therefore, the central research question to be answered in this dissertation is:
How do contractual and relational governance affect the performance of public–private part-
nerships, and what is the role of relational quality therein?
The main research question is supported by four sub-questions. Each of the sub-
questions addresses a core concept or one of the supposed relationships between the 
concepts. To answer the main research question, it is first important to gain more 
insight into the governance of PPPs. The first sub-question therefore focuses on prac-
titioners’ perspectives on PPP governance, asking (1) What are the different perceptions 
of professionals working in public–private partnerships regarding the governance of PPPs? From 
their experience, these professionals are able to indicate the main considerations re-
garding the use of various governance mechanisms and which different, hybrid forms 
of governance might be possible in PPPs. Chapter 2 therefore starts by systematically 
analysing the perceptions of professionals working in PPPs regarding the ideal (hy-
brid) form of governance.
A second concept that needs more clarification to answer the main research ques-
tion is relational quality. Therefore, the second sub-question addresses this concept, 
with the aim of enhancing our understanding about the meaning of relational qual-
ity in PPPs by concentrating on the key aspects of the concept and testing its main 
determinants. Both practitioners and scholars seem to attach great value to good 
relationships between partners in any collaboration, and this sub-question helps to 
understand what good relationships actually mean and how they can be built: (2) 
What is relational quality and which determinants have an influence on relational quality in 
public–private partnerships? Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 aim to answer the second 
sub-question. Chapter 3 provides an overview of what is known about relational qual-
ity in PPPs and offers a first conceptualization of it. Chapter 4 tests the influence of 
several determinants on relational quality in PPPs. It also includes some governance 
mechanisms to test the relationship between governance and relational quality.
Next, it is important to understand the relationship between these two concepts 
– governance and relational quality – and performance, as the dependent variable 
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of this study. Consequently, the next two sub-questions address, respectively, the 
role of relational quality and the effect of governance on PPP performance. The third 
sub-question tests the commonly cited assumption that high-quality relationships 
improve partnership performance. Aside from being relevant in themselves, do good 
relationships really matter for PPP performance? The question therefore is (3) How does 
relational quality affect the performance of public–private partnerships? The last sub-question 
addresses the effect of governance on performance. As PPPs are usually governed by 
elaborate contracts, this sub-question explicitly raises questions regarding the balance 
between relational and contractual governance in successful PPPs. What does the mix 
between both modes of governance look like exactly? This sub-question aims to iden-
tify which combinations of contractual and relational governance mechanisms are 
present in high-performing PPPs: asking (4) How do contractual and relational governance 
relate to each other in successful public–private partnerships? These two sub-questions are 
answered in Chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation. To answer the third sub-question, 
Chapter 5 tests the effect of relational governance and relational quality on the perfor-
mance of PPPs. Chapter 6 focuses predominantly on the balance between contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms. This chapter merges all pivotal concepts in 
this dissertation – relational quality, governance, and performance – into one study. 
In doing so, it not only provides an answer to the final sub-question, but also has a 
crucial role in answering the central research question of this dissertation.
Figure 1.2 shows the core concepts and the supposed relationships between these 
concepts. The circles representing the sub-questions, and the stars representing the 
chapters in this dissertation, indicate how the empirical studies in this dissertation 
aim to contribute to different parts of the model and answer the related research 
questions.
Figure 1.2 Visual representation of the core model, sub-questions, and empirical chapters in this dissertation
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1.7. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH CONTEXT
To answer the main research question and the four sub-questions, this dissertation 
consists of five empirical chapters. The studies in each of these chapters espouses a 
broad range of research methods, both qualitative and quantitative. Therefore, this 
dissertation has a multi-method design. Some of these methods, such as QCA and 
Q-methodology, have been scarcely used in PPP research and thus present a method-
ological contribution to the field. This section addresses the underlying arguments 
for using a multi-method design and elaborates on the use of the studies and the data 
collected for Chapter 2 to 6. In this section, I pay little attention to the specifications 
of the various research methods as those can be found in the respective empirical 
chapters.
1.7.1. Multi-method design
In this dissertation, I adopt a variety of research methods. In each chapter, one 
method is central, except for Chapter 2. There, the use of Q-methodology has been 
combined with a regression analysis. Chapter 3 is based on a systematic literature 
review; for Chapter 4 and 6 I have worked with fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA); and Chapter 5 is based on a quantitative, multi-level analysis (MLA).
The choice of a multi-method design in this dissertation was a conscious decision. 
There are two main arguments for adopting this design. First, the decision regarding 
the methodology was based on the desire to make a methodological contribution 
to PPP as a research area. Most studies on PPPs are based predominantly on small 
N (case) studies. Although these studies provide great in-depth knowledge, they are 
hard to generalize. Therefore, I felt strongly that PPP as a field of study could benefit 
from methods other than case studies, of which there are already so many commend-
able examples. A multi-method design allows for recognizing larger patterns on the 
one hand, while also interpreting them on the other hand. Moreover, using methods 
that are not standard in PPP researchers’ repertoire allows for the creation of new 
knowledge. For example, insights into the ideas regarding PPP governance on a micro 
level – that of individual professionals in PPPs – are scarce. However, this knowledge is 
important, as the actions of the professionals working in a project are guided by their 
ideas on governance. Assuming that they give shape to the governance of PPPs in daily 
practice, their perceptions regarding governance affect the actual use of governance. 
Moreover, a mismatch between their ideas on governance could influence the rela-
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tionship between project partners and their collaboration. Q-methodology allows for 
systematically testing the ideas regarding governance on a micro level, providing new 
knowledge on this topic. In particular, Q-methodology and QCA2 are not yet common 
practice in research on PPPs.
Second, the sub-questions in this dissertation required a variety of methods. The aim 
to further develop the concept of relational quality within PPPs required a method that 
allowed for further conceptualization, whereas testing some common assumptions 
on the relationship between relational quality and performance required a systematic 
test on a larger scale. The suggestion that various forms of governance may comple-
ment each other required a method that allowed for conjunctural causation, i.e. that 
the effect of something does not work in isolation but unfolds only in combination 
with other conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 78). With conjunctural causa-
tion being one of the underlying principles of QCA, this method is very well suited 
to studying the balance between contractual and relational governance mechanisms.
1.7.2. Data underlying the empirical studies
For the empirical Chapters 2 to 6, a large dataset was collected. To perform the Q-
method study in Chapter 2, 119 Q-sorts were conducted by public and private profes-
sionals in three different countries: Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In these 
Q-sorts, respondents were asked to sort statements regarding PPP governance, to 
indicate which of these statements they found most important. The literature review 
in Chapter 3 entailed a quick scan of thousands of scientific, peer-reviewed articles. 
Only 63 of them discussed relational aspects in PPPs and ultimately met the criteria. 
These studies were analysed to study the existing knowledge of relational quality in 
PPPs and solve the fuzziness surrounding the concept. Chapter 4 and 6 built upon the 
same material. Both QCAs contain qualitative and quantitative material, collected in 
collaboration with researchers from the University of Antwerp. This dataset consists 
of 74 interviews and 72 surveys among public and private professionals in PPP proj-
ects in the Netherlands and Flanders. This data collection focused on the construction 
phase, as this is a phase of intense collaboration and frequent communication. The 
relationship between project partners, which starts in the tendering phase, develops 
into a more mature relationship during the realization of the project. That makes it a 
suitable phase to study relationality in these kinds of partnerships. Moreover, at the 
time of the research for this dissertation, there was only a little experience with these 
projects in the maintenance phase. Chapter 5 uses survey material from 2014 to test 
2 QCA is not yet common practice, but interest in this research method is growing. There 
are nowadays some good examples of QCA in PPP studies (see for example Verweij, 2015; 
Soecipto & Verhoest, 2018).
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the relationships between relational governance mechanisms and PPP performance. 
This material consists of 144 surveys completed by professionals working in Dutch 
PPP projects.
In addition to the material used in the specific chapters, several exploratory 
conversations were held with professionals about the main topic of this disserta-
tion. Moreover, between 2016 and 2019, the Princess Beatrix sluice project in the 
Netherlands has been subject of longitudinal case study research. For three years, I 
observed its monthly contract management meetings, had many conversations with 
professionals working on the project, and held 12 interviews about the use of gover-
nance mechanisms during the negotiations regarding contract changes. Although this 
material and the analysis thereof came too late to include it in this dissertation as a 
separate empirical chapter, some of my experiences at the project are incorporated 
in the introduction and the conclusion to illustrate this dissertation’s main findings.
1.8. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS DISSERTATION
This section elaborates on the relevance of this dissertation, showing its contribution 
to both academia and society.
1.8.1. For academia
The contribution of this dissertation to the existing body of academic knowledge lies 
in three domains. First, it responds to a call to pay more attention to relational aspects 
in research on PPPs (Weihe, 2009; Verweij, 2018). Previous research on PPPs focuses 
predominantly on economic assumptions underlying PPPs and closely related topics 
such as risk, contracts, and performance management (Cui et al., 2018; Wang et al., 
2018). This dissertation adopts a different perspective. It contributes to the PPP litera-
ture by focusing on the quality of interpersonal relationships between partners in the 
partnership. In doing so, it offers new knowledge regarding relational quality in PPPs 
and its effect on the relation between governance and performance. A thorough study 
of the role of relational quality has not yet been sufficiently conducted. After all, this 
topic is not often studied in the field of PPP research. It does, however, fit in a recent 
and growing trend of public administration research that focuses on relationality (see 
Bartels & Turnbull, 2020). In this dissertation, I aim to explore this relatively new 
concept by conceptualizing it further and exploring how high-quality relationships 
can be achieved in PPP projects.
Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on combining various gover-
nance mechanisms. It builds upon the ideas of, amongst others, Poppo & Zenger (2002) 
who show that contractual and relational governance mechanisms are not substitutes 
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but complements. This dissertation does not merely confirm their argument but takes 
it one step further. It shows what the balance between both mechanisms should look 
like according to public and private professionals (Chapter 2) and how contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms can be combined in successful PPP projects 
(Chapter 6). In this dissertation, the perspectives of both public and private actors are 
taken into account. This is an addition to the existing literature, as most research on 
PPPs in public administration adopts a predominantly public perspective (see Hueskes 
et al., 2019). By combining different perspectives on governance, this dissertation 
aims to provide new insights on governing PPPs, the role of relational quality therein, 
and its consequences for PPP performance.
Finally, this dissertation aims to make a methodological contribution. Although 
studies into relational quality in PPPs are scarce, the limited studies available sug-
gest that relational aspects, such as trust, do matter in PPPs (e.g. Edelenbos & Klijn, 
2007). Evidence for this often comes from single case studies with low generalizability 
(see for example Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Barretta et al., 2008; Alam et al., 2014). 
This dissertation aims to systematically test these assumptions, while introducing 
methods rarely used in this area, including QCA and Q-methodology. With the use of 
these methods, this dissertation aims to make a methodological contribution to the 
development of more systematic, larger-N-based research on PPPs.
1.8.2. For society
Besides making a scientific contribution to the body of academic knowledge, this 
dissertation also provides valuable insights for society. More and more often, public 
and private professionals meet each other in the public domain to develop public 
policy, public services, and public goods. Despite their interdependence in this pursuit 
because they need each other’s resources and knowledge, those encounters do not 
always result in successful collaborations. Each partner has its own goals, interests, 
and ways of working, and it is often hard to align them. This makes the governance 
of such partnerships all the more important. Given the many differences between 
public and private actors, it is unlikely that their ideas regarding the governance of 
these partnerships are the same. This study aims to provide insight into the different 
perspectives that exist among public and private professionals on the governance of 
PPPs (see Chapter 2), which might provide a suitable starting point in the discussions 
between project partners on this topic.
Second, in emphasizing the importance of relational quality for project perfor-
mance, this dissertation shows practitioners the relevance of relational and informal 
aspects of a partnership. It aims to study what determinants contribute to relational 
quality, hence providing insights that professionals can use to build high-quality 
relationships with their counterparts in PPPs.
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Finally, by extending the governance repertoire beyond the simple idea of collabora-
tion or the use of contracts, this dissertation provides insights for public organizations 
regarding the balance of various governance mechanisms. As PPP projects are often 
still dominated by contracts, this dissertation aims to enhance the understanding of 
the balance between contractual and relational governance mechanisms. More pre-
cisely, it aims to identify several concrete combinations that work in successful PPPs. 
This could inspire public organizations to redesign the governance of their partner-
ships in order to make them more successful.
1.9. OUTLINE OF THIS DISSERTATION
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. This first, introductory chapter presents 
the central theme of this dissertation: the governance of PPPs, its effect on PPP per-
formance, and the role of relational quality therein. Chapter 2 to 6 are all empirical 
chapters and present the studies performed to answer the main research question and 
the accompanying sub-questions.
Chapter 2 studies the perceptions of public and private professionals regarding 
PPP governance. This chapter has been published as an article in Public Administration. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 both dive into the concept of relational quality (sub-question 
2) and are both single-authored papers. Both papers have been submitted to an inter-
national academic journal. The first of these two chapters aims to unravel the concept 
of relational quality. Chapter 4 provides a first test of the conceptualization presented 
in Chapter 3, while studying the combinations of conditions present in high-quality 
relationships. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the relationship between governance and 
performance but use very different methods to do so. Both chapters have been 
published as articles in peer-reviewed, international academic journals, respectively, 
Public Management Review (PMR) and Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
(JPART). Chapter 5 conducts a multi-level analysis to test the effect of both relational 
governance and relational quality on performance. Chapter 6 employs QCA to iden-
tify different mixes of governance mechanisms that result in high PPP performance. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents four core conclusions and the answer to the main research 
question of this dissertation. It also discusses the implications of this research, both 
for academia and for society. Furthermore, Chapter 7 also looks ahead by presenting 
several avenues for further research on the governance of PPPs.
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INTERMEZZO 1.
The existing body of literature on public–private partnerships (PPPs) pays 
ample attention to the governance and management of these partnerships (e.g. 
Caniëls et al., 2012; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004ᵇ; Kort et al., 2016). In this body of 
research, we can identify two ways of looking at the governance of public–
private partnerships, as has been described in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
On the one hand, there is a focus on contracts as the dominant governance 
mechanism. The contract is the starting point of several forms of PPPs, such as 
the long-term infrastructure contract (LTIC) (Hodge & Greve, 2013). Neverthe-
less, more recent studies also suggest the use of relational governance mecha-
nisms, such as trust, horizontal collaboration, and informal communication 
(for example: Parker & Hartley, 2003; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Weihe, 2009). The 
existence of these two different theoretical ideas regarding the governance 
of PPPs raises the question how professionals working in these partnerships 
perceive the governance of the projects they are working in. What are their 
perceptions and preferences regarding the governance of PPPs? Are they more 
focused on contractual governance mechanisms to govern the project? Or do 
they value relational governance mechanisms and strive towards a more hori-
zontal collaboration? These questions formed the starting point for the study 
in Chapter 2. In this study, Q-methodology is used to study the perceptions of 
professionals working in PPP projects, hitherto using a rarely used method 
in PPP research. Although Q-methodology has not been used often in this 
research area, it is particularly suitable to study the perceptions of individual 
professionals. Since PPP is adopted, promoted, and implemented differently 
in different countries, I wanted to adopt a comparative perspective, including 
professionals from multiple countries. Although most research on PPPs in the 
field of public administration is focused on the public side of the partnership 
(Hueskes et al., 2019), this study includes professionals from both public and 
private organizations working in PPPs. As studies on different topics have 
shown that public and private organizations differ in many respects (Jacobs, 
1992; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994; Boyne, 2002), it would be relevant to 
study the perceptions of professionals from both sides actors to identify com-
mon ground and differences in their governance preferences.

Chapter 2
How do professionals perceive 
the governance of public–private 
partnerships? Evidence from Canada, 
the Netherlands and Denmark.
This chapter is published as: 
Warsen, R., Greve, C., Klijn, E.H., Koppenjan, J.F.M. & Siemiatycki, M. 
(2020). How do professionals perceive the governance of public–private 
partnerships? Evidence from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark. Public 
Administration, 98 (1), 124-139. Doi: 10.1111/padm.12626
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ABSTRACT
In public–private partnerships (PPPs), the collaboration between public and private 
actors can be complicated. With partners coming from different institutional back-
grounds and with different interests, governing these partnerships is important to 
ensure the projects’ progress. There is, however, little knowledge about the percep-
tions of professionals regarding the governance of PPPs. This study aims to explore 
professionals’ viewpoints about governing PPPs, and to explain potential differences 
using four theoretical governance paradigms. Using Q-methodology, the preferences 
of 119 public and private professionals in Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark 
are explored. Results show four different viewpoints regarding the governance of 
PPPs. Experience, country and the public–private distinction seem to influence these 
viewpoints. Knowledge of these differences can inform efforts to govern PPPs and 




Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are by now a well-established organizational 
arrangement to provide public goods and services (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004ª). These 
partnerships can be defined as “co-operation between public and private actors with a durable 
character in which actors develop mutual products and/ or services and in which risks, costs, and 
benefits are shared” (Klijn & Teisman, 2003: 137). The most well-known PPP model is 
the long-term infrastructure contracts (LTIC) in which several project phases (design, 
build, finance, maintenance) are integrated. This allows for lower coordination costs 
and optimization gains between project phases (Greve & Hodge, 2013).
PPP is a hybrid arrangement in the sense that it cuts across the public and private 
domain and aims to combine public and private practices that may prove to be hard to 
align. The variety of governance ideas and mechanisms associated with it emphasizes 
its hybrid character (Alam et al., 2014; Quélin et al., 2017). For instance, public–private 
partnerships reflect elements of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm, includ-
ing the strong focus on performance indicators and contracts as safeguard against 
opportunistic behaviour (De Palma et al., 2012). Simultaneously, there are clear 
indications of a collaborative governance paradigm, emphasizing collaboration, trust, 
and horizontal coordination to achieve win-win solutions (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). 
Because of the different governance ideas associated with PPPs, partners in PPPs can 
hold very different views on the most appropriate and desired governance perspective 
and mechanism (Cheung et al., 2010). This may lead to a mismatch of attitudes and 
expectations.
Currently the literature on PPP governance is well developed on a macro- and 
meso-level (Van den Hurk & Verhoest, 2015; Hodge et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018). 
For example, Hueskes et al. (2017) focus on governance instruments to realize sustain-
ability consideration in PPPs. It is also widely identified that partners in PPPs do not 
always share the same expectations and perceptions, which may lead to suboptimal 
performance or straightforward failures (Bowman, 2000; Reynaers & van der Wal, 
2018). However, less systematic research has been done on a micro-level, examining 
the perceptions of professionals regarding PPP governance. Exceptions are Hodge 
et al. (2017) who study how Australian professionals react to PPP governance after 
the contract has been signed and Willems et al. (2017) who asked Belgian profes-
sionals about their perception of PPPs. Yet, a gap exists with regard to systematic, 
cross-country comparative research in this respect. Although the application of LTICs 
is an international practice in which there has been considerable policy transfer and 
emulation between countries, governance ideas and practices have specific effects and 
meanings in different administrative contexts (see Hodge et al., 2017). The research 
presented in this article aims to fill that gap by systematically analysing the percep-
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tions of PPP professionals in three countries with various levels of PPP experience: 
Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark.
The central question of our study is: How do professionals involved in public–private part-
nerships in Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark perceive the (ideal) governance relationship in 
these partnerships? We use Q-methodology which is especially suitable for identifying 
and systematically analysing these viewpoints (Watts & Stenner, 2012).
In the remainder of this article, we first distinguish the four theoretical gover-
nance paradigms used to formulate statements for the Q-methodology. Then, both 
Q-methodology and the respondent selection are explained. Next, the analysis of 
the viewpoints of PPP professionals shows four different profiles. Finally, we address 
important conclusions and limitations and consider avenues for future research.
2.2. GOVERNANCE PARADIGMS AND PPPS: A THEORETICAL 
EXPLORATION
Within the literature on governance and public–private encounters, we can distinguish 
paradigms that share a specific focus on values or governance instruments. In this sec-
tion, we highlight four paradigms that have proven to be recognizable and relevant in 
the view of both academics and practitioners: Traditional Public Administration, New 
Public Management, Collaborative Governance, and a private governance mechanism 
(compare: Christensen & Laegreid, 2011; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Osborne, 2010; Kop-
penjan, 2012). These paradigms are not the only possible way to distinguish ideas on 
governance nor are they mutually exclusive (e.g. Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Hence, 
we do not strive towards a definitive clustering of the governance literature but use 
the paradigms as a heuristic instrument to identify and distinguish the perceptions 
guiding actors involved in PPPs and inform the development of the Q-set.
2.2.1. Traditional Public Administration: safeguarding public values
The first theoretical paradigm to typify the way professionals may think about govern-
ing PPPs is that of traditional public administration (TPA). TPA focuses on governance 
as safeguarding public values and achieving political goals (Wilson, 1989). The primacy 
of politics is an important principle, implying that political decisions are taken by 
democratically elected politicians and that the administration is under formal control 
of political leadership. The presence of impersonal and stable rules shields citizens 
from arbitrariness, power abuse, and personal whims (Hughes, 2018). With regards 
to the relationship with private partners, this implies that interaction should follow 
clear regulations. The explicit standardization of roles, processes, and rules makes 
interaction predictable (Hughes, 2018). Safeguarding public values, like impartial-
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ity, equality, and transparency is key now that private parties are involved in public 
service delivery. The large interests involved and the lack of transparency of PPP-
arrangements may threaten democracy and create risks of collusion and corruption 
(Bowman, 2000). PPP projects should be publicly defined, and politicians maintain the 
freedom to take political decisions. Private parties might have to be compensated for 
new policies or political decisions, even if this limits the effectiveness and efficiency of 
PPPs. This traditional model is now being challenged as rapid changes in society have 
led to the rise of different paradigms, like New Public Management (Hughes, 2018).
2.2.2.  New Public Management: running government like a business
The New Public Management (NPM) paradigm focuses on efficiency and effectiveness 
using (performance) management and competition (Hood, 1991; Christensen & Lae-
greid, 2011). Governments define goals, translate these into output- and performance 
indicators, and then decide through a competitive tendering process who delivers 
the service (Hood, 1991). NPM both had a principal–agent focus (making managers 
manage) and a managerial focus (letting managers manage) (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2011). When governments act as principals towards private partners that are consid-
ered self-interested agents, strict contract management is needed to keep the agent to 
the contract. However, this principal–agent relationship is vulnerable to strategic be-
haviour from both sides (Shaoul, 2005). The principal may impose unrealistic contract 
conditions and the agent will only fulfil the obligations made explicit in the contract 
and will be inclined to cut corners if allowed (Leruth, 2012). In the managerial focus, 
a ‘letting managers manage’ approach may lead to a more balanced relationship 
between both partners. However, business-like control systems are still used to hold 
them accountable for their results.
2.2.3.  Collaborative Governance: managing performance through joint 
interaction
The collaborative governance paradigm in the context of New Public Governance 
focuses on public decision-making and service delivery in networks of mutually 
dependent actors. It emphasizes the importance of interdependencies, collaboration, 
and coordination (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Osborne, 2010). Public goals are defined and 
implemented through a process of interaction and negotiation, aimed at realizing in 
win-win situations (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). Governing PPPs implies collaboration 
and negotiation between actors in a horizontal way and the creation of conditions 
that facilitate these processes. Relationships are less defined as principal–agent rela-
tionships, but rather as partnerships and stewardship relations, in which actors have 
a mind-set that stimulates them to collaborate (Koppenjan, 2012). This requires the 
acknowledgement that interests diverge, the sharing of risks, and a joined effort in 
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managing PPPs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004ᵇ). This paradigm assumes close interaction 
between partners, or even joint activities and joint teams (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). 
In contrast to NPM, the focus is less on contracts and more on relational governance 
and mutual trust (e.g. Alam et al., 2014).
2.2.4. Privatized governance
A fourth paradigm represents the business perspective of PPPs and builds upon the 
ideas of privatization and self-governance. Some scholars consider PPP as a move 
toward privatization (e.g. Savas, 2000). Promises of more efficient and innovative 
service delivery require governments to transfer tasks and risks to the private sector 
(Greve & Hodge, 2013). Governments should leave the daily management of the PPP 
project to the private companies so they can use their expertise, skills, and creativity 
to determine how to execute, manage, and monitor their tasks (Bovaird & Sharifi, 
1998). This paradigm is very much in line with the original principles of PPPs as it 
originated in the Private Finance Initiative in the UK. The initial idea for PPP was to 
let private finance into the project and let the private sector take much of the risks 
and responsibilities. The Private Finance Initiative was very much about tapping into 
private sector expertise, both in terms of acquiring finance, but also for using private 
sector expertise in the design, build, and maintenance (Shaoul, 2005). As such this 
paradigm emphasizes a form of governance that leaves the daily project management 
and the initiative to the private sector after the framework conditions have been 
agreed on.
2.2.5. The four paradigms compared
The governance relationship between government and private parties can thus be 
perceived in very distinct ways. In practice, of course, mixes of these paradigms are 
possible and likely, but each paradigm has a distinct focus and approach to public–pri-
vate partnerships. In this study, we aim to explore and present different perspectives 
on the governance of PPPs, using these theoretical paradigms as a starting point. Table 
2.1 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the four paradigms.
2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY USING 
Q-METHODOLOGY
In this section we will first elaborate on our decision to include professionals from 
Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark in this study, and then provide a general 
overview of Q-methodology and the Q-sort statements we have designed. Finally, we 
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Table 2.1 Four paradigms on governing public private partnerships
2.3.1. Country selection: Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark
By now, PPPs have been adopted by many countries around the world. Given the 
international debate about PPPs (e.g. at the World Bank, the PPP knowledge lab, and 
the European PPP Expertise Centre) and the fact that most countries base their PPPs 
on the British Private Finance Initiative- model, one might expect that the use of PPPs 
is similar in most countries. However, research shows that practices and governance 
ideas of PPPs vary across countries (Hodge et al., 2018). Besides administrative tradi-
tions, the moment of adoption and experience with the PPP-model may influence the 
development of the discourse regarding PPP in a given country. Therefore, this study 
adopts a comparative perspective. Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark all make 
use of the PPP-model, but differ in their experience with PPPs, their use of PPPs, and 
national government support for PPPs. Canada is an early adopter with much experi-
ence with PPPs, while Denmark is a late adopter and has limited experience with the 
PPP-model. The Netherlands is an experienced user of the PPP-model. It shares many 
of its administrative traditions with Denmark (both fit in the Rhineland tradition), but 
in terms of support for, and policy on PPPs, both countries take an entirely different 
approach. So, our study includes two countries (Netherlands and Denmark) that differ 
from each other in terms of active PPP policy, but share the same administrative tradi-
tion, and we have one country (Canada) as comparison with a significantly different 
administrative background (Anglo Saxon).
Canada is considered a global leader in using PPPs. Between the early 1990s and 
2018, over 200 infrastructure projects are or have been developed through PPPs. As a 
result of the constitutional allocation of powers in the country, most PPPs in Canada 
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are led by the provincial governments, resulting in variations in regulatory structures, 
practices, and cultures of PPPs across the country. In general terms, PPPs in Canada 
can be divided into two waves. A first wave of projects beginning in the early 1990s 
that sought to attract new revenue through user fees, transfer significant risk and 
responsibility to the private sector, and faced criticisms about high costs and a loss of 
government control over public assets (Vining & Boardman, 2008). The second wave of 
PPP projects beginning in the early 2000s maintain considerable government control 
over policy setting and asset ownership, while aiming to achieve value for money by 
implementing pay for performance models using availability payments (Siemiatycki, 
2015). Based on this history, it would be expected that Canadian practitioners see 
PPPs within the framework of traditional or new public management approaches to 
governance, where there remain firm delineations between the public and private 
sectors and the PPP is seen as a performance based contract rather than a vehicle to 
govern through collaborative relationships.
Since the late 1990s the Netherlands has proven one of the most committed follow-
ers of the British Private Finance Initiative model. Similar to the Canadian context, 
the initial aim was to attract private investments in public infrastructures. Most PPPs 
in the Netherlands take place on a national level, with the PPP expertise centre of 
the Ministry of Finance leading the introduction of these contractual partnerships. 
However, it took until 2004 until a substantial number of projects were developed. 
In contrast to many other countries adopting PPPs, availability payments became the 
dominant financial arrangement in the Netherlands as existing legislation excluded 
the use of user payments (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). In response to challenges with 
PPPs, the highway and water management agency Rijkswaterstaat and various private 
parties initiated a new approach to PPPs: the so-called Marktvisie. Despite elaborate 
contracts, more attention should be given to developing high-trust relationships 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2016). The expectation would therefore be that Dutch professionals 
attenuate some of the importance of contract-oriented governance mechanisms that 
were originally part of Dutch PPPs and carefully try to combine these with attention 
for trusting relationships between project partners.
Denmark has traditionally been a slow-moving country in implementing PPP 
projects. Only in the first part of the 2000’s did PPPs make their way onto the policy 
agenda in Denmark. The first PPPs were realized by local governments. Officially 
Denmark now counts 47 PPP projects, but only 30 include private finance (Danish 
Competition and Consumer Authority, 2018). To date, the Danish national govern-
ment has not endorsed an official PPP policy or strategy nor is there an official, spe-
cialized governmental PPP unit. Instead, it is up to ministries and local governments 
individually to decide if they want to go ahead with the PPP model. In consequence, 
each PPP is treated as a stand-alone project. Scholars have noted how PPP develop-
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ment in Denmark has been marked by a variety of challenges, most of them created 
internally in Denmark by the government (Petersen, 2011). Nevertheless, the number 
of PPPs in Denmark is rising, especially in the area of social infrastructure as several 
Danish local governments are continuing to explore the PPP option. The expectation 
would therefore be that Danish professionals view PPP from a pragmatic perspective 
of what will work or not, and that the professionals do not have high expectations for 
a systematic and coherent PPP policy framework provided by the government.
2.3.2. Using Q-methodology: designing statements
Q-methodology, introduced by William Stephenson in the 1930s, is designed to 
analyse perceptions of individuals on a specific topic and it is increasingly used by 
public administration scholars (Watts & Stenner, 2012). Participants in the study (the 
P-set) are asked to sort a set of statements representative of the debate on a topic 
(the Q-set) into a distribution of their preference. From this distribution, statistically 
significant factors can be derived and interpreted (Watts & Stenner, 2012). Each factor 
distinguishes a group of individuals who have ranked the statements in a similar 
fashion, and thus share a similar perspective about this topic.
The Q-methodology is done according to a three-step procedure. The first step con-
cerns the design of the Q-set. This set of statements can be designed using interviews, 
policy and media discourses, or academic discourses (Jeffares & Skelcher, 2011). In 
this paper we take the academic discourse as a starting point using four theoretical 
governance paradigms to capture the governance debates among PPP-professionals 
(examples are Durning & Osuna, 1994; Klijn et al., 2016ᵇ; Nederhand et al., 2018). The 
academic discourse also allows us to relate the empirical results to existing theoretical 
debates. The statements in our study stemming from the first three paradigms are 
derived, but somewhat adapted, from an earlier Q-sort study by Nederhand et al. 
(2018). The statements based upon the last paradigm were developed specifically for 
this study. All in all, a total of 24 statements were used (see Table 2.2), which should 
largely cover the debate on governing PPPs.
2.3.3. The P-set: The participants
The second step is to present the study to participants. Potential participants in Den-
mark and Canada were identified by an online search, using LinkedIn, news items on 
specific projects, and websites of organizations involved in PPPs. In the Netherlands, 
invitations were spread among professionals in a Dutch network of PPP practitioners 
to get a representative sample. Given the demographic of our P set, we decided to 
administer our study online using an application called POETQ (Jeffares & Dickinson, 
2016). All selected professionals received an invitation to participate via email. They 
were also invited to forward the invitation to relevant colleagues. Besides an initial in-
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vitation, several reminders were sent out. On average, the response rate was 30.4 per 
cent. In total, 119 public and private professionals from Denmark (40), Canada (44), 
and the Netherlands (35) responded. The data was collected between June – September 
2017 in Denmark, and from May – August 2018 in Canada and the Netherlands. There 
are 77 participants working for the public partner and 42 participants working for the 













1 … to safeguard public 
values like equality, 
democracy and transparency.
5 … that political authorities 
play a significant role in 
formulating the aim and 
direction of the project.
9 … that impartiality and the 
public interest, as the most 
important values, come first.
2 … to reward private 
consortia when they 
contribute to the efficient 
realization of policy goals. 
6 … to define clear 
performance criteria to hold 
private consortia in the 
partnerships accountable. 
10 … to establish a 
performance-based 
relationship between public 
and private partners. 
3 … that collaboration 
takes place on an equal 
basis between public 
professionals, private 
contractors and other 
relevant involved actors. 
7 … for public professionals 
and private partners to 
jointly determine how to 
support each other during 
the project. 
11 … to compose mutually 
agreed rules of behaviour 
so that both partners know 
what to expect. 
4 … that the private partner 
makes its own decisions on 
the realization of the project 
within the scope of the 
contract. 
8 … that the private partner 
is given the opportunity 
to monitor its own 
performance. 
12 …. that the private 
partner is responsible for 
the implementation of 
the project, assisted by 








13 … prevent that the 
functioning of public–private 
partnerships results in 
unwanted situations (like 
exclusion, arbitrariness).
17 … keep a clear view 
of, and control on, what 
happens in public–private 
partnerships.
21 … check if nothing 
happens that might conflict 
with governmental policies 
or the requirements in the 
contract.
14 … apply strict contract 
management and monitor 
the performance of the 
private consortium. 
18 … encourage the private 
partner to be transparent 
about their performances. 
22 … hold private partners 
accountable for delivering 
on the output specifications 
and apply sanctions if 
performance falls short. 
15 … guarantee the 
collaborative process 
between partners and create 
the right conditions to 
achieve synergy between 
them. 
19 …encourage an 
open attitude towards 
intensive collaboration 
and consultation between 
partners in a public–private 
partnership. 
23 … work together with 
private consortia in public–
private partnerships and 
their partners to achieve 
public goals. 
16 …. not prescribe how 
private partners should carry 
out their duties within the 
project. 
20 … remove obstacles and 
barriers encountered by the 
private partner that hinders 
them in doing their job. 
24 … have confidence in the 
private partners to manage 
their own consortium based 
on their own expertise. 
Table 2.2 Statement sampling grid
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operating at a management level in organizations that deal with PPPs. Table 2.3 and 
2.4 show the type of organizations and functions they work in.
Type of organization Number of participants
Central government 36





Table 2.3 Overview of participants based on the organization they work for
Type of profession Number of participants
Project leader 38
Private sector manager 18
Public sector manager 14
Contract manager 10
Legal manager/ advisor 8
Technical manager/ advisor 7
Financial manager/ advisor 6
Consultant 4
Other 14
Table 2.4 Overview of participants according to their profession
The third step concerns the sorting process. This process takes place in three stages. 
First, the participants were asked to state whether they agreed, disagreed, or had a 
more neutral viewpoint towards each of the 24 statements (which were presented in 
a random order). Then, the participants sorted the statements into a grid, ranging 
from ‘most agree’ (+3) to ‘least agree’ (-3) (see Table 2.5). Respondents had to choose 
between the statements, as only a limited number of statements could be placed in 
each pile. It is important to stress that the participants were not presented with the 
theoretical paradigms.
Ranking value -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
Number of items 2 3 4 6 4 3 2
Table 2.5 Forced-choice frequency distribution
In the third stage, participants are shown their fully sorted grid, and given the op-
portunity to make adjustments before confirming the order of the sorted statements. 
This double-check method used in the POETQ program enhances the reliability of 
50
our findings since respondents have to check and confirm their choices. Moreover, 
participants were asked to reflect on their choices for statements at the extremes of 
the grid (-3 and +3). The vast majority of the respondents (107 out of 119) used this 
opportunity to clarify their choices. Finally, as an extra step regarding the robustness 
of the results we performed a linear regression for each profile to check whether the 
perceived differences, between countries and between professionals working for the 
public and the private partner, hold. The results can be found in Appendix IV.
2.4. RESULTS
2.4.1. Four profiles on governing public–private partnerships
The factor analysis, performed with the software package PQ-method (Schmolck & 
Atkinson, 2013) resulted in the extraction of four factors. For the interpretation of the 
factors we used factor interpretation crib sheets (for an example, see Appendix II). 55 
out of the 119 participants are significantly associated with one of these factors (p < 
.01). The total explained variance of 43% is sufficient (Jeffares & Skelcher, 2011: 199). 
Since each factor represents a group of respondents with a certain viewpoint towards 
PPP governance, we refer to the factors as profiles.
Profile 1. Privatized governance within boundaries
Profile 1 has an eigenvalue of 25.15 and explains 10% of the study variance after 
rotation. Eleven respondents are significantly associated with this factor (p < .01). 
According to this profile, private partners should be given room in the realization of 
the project. The notion of ‘giving room’ is based upon one central idea in this view-
point: that in PPPs risks and responsibilities are transferred from the public partner 
to the private partner. To deal with these risks and responsibilities private partners 
need the freedom to realize and manage the project (4: +2; 24: +2).3 This implies that 
involvement from the public partner is undesirable. The public partners should not 
prescribe how private partners carry out their tasks, apply strict contract manage-
ment nor keep a clear view of what happens in the project during the realization 
(16:+3; 14: -3; 17: -2). Professionals in this profile suggest that close involvement of the 
public partner might lead to transferring risks and responsibilities back to the public 
partner, which undermines the contractual control mechanisms. “Not to say the public 
partner cannot support the private partner in a collaborative approach, as long as risk is not 
transferred back to the public partner.” (Respondent 10). Consequently, this profile places 
3 The numbers between brackets refer to: the statement, and the position of the statement in 
the sorting scheme ranging from -3 to +3.
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very little emphasis on close collaboration between both partners (7: 0; 19: 0; 20: -2; 
23: -1) compared to other profiles. The freedom of the private partner is only limited 
by output specifications. If the performance criteria are met or exceeded no additional 
reward is given (2:-3). However, if performance falls short, sanctions should be applied 
(22: +3). Thus, this first profile on PPP governance allows for extensive freedom for 
private partners, as long as they meet the output criteria.
Profile 2. Collaboration is key
Profile 2 has an eigenvalue of 10.01 and explains 13% of the study variance after rota-
tion. 21 respondents are significantly associated with this factor (p < .01). This profile 
places strong emphasis on collaboration. Both partners should be working together 
on an equal basis (3: +2). Professionals associated with this profile stress that it is 
important to jointly determine how to support each other (7: +3), to encourage an 
open attitude towards intensive collaboration (19: +3), and compose mutually agreed 
rules of behaviour (11: +2). In particular the long term nature of PPPs makes collabora-
tion essential: “Often PPPs are long term projects – most lasting 30 years. You cannot optimize 
efficiencies and ensure success for that amount of time without the right synergy.” (Respondent 
35). Due to the long term, there are always unforeseen circumstances that require 
the flexibility a good collaboration provides. This might be beneficial for both public 
and private partners (Respondent 93, 104). With collaboration comes a certain degree 
of trust and confidence (24: +2). Strict control is considered less important than hori-
zontal collaboration (17: -2; 22: -1; 14: -2). This second profile emphasizes the risks of 
incomplete contracts and highlights the role of strong relationships and joint action.
Profile 3. Accountability and performance
Profile 3 has an eigenvalue of 9.62 and explains 10% of the study variance after ro-
tation. Thirteen respondents are significantly associated with this factor (p < .01). 
In this profile, professionals hold the viewpoint that PPPs should be governed as 
performance-based relationships in which the private partner is held accountable on 
the basis of clear performance criteria prescribed by the public partner (10: +3; 22: +2; 
6: +3; 16: -2). For professionals, clarity is a key factor in PPP governance. There have 
to be clear expectations, clear rules, and clear performance criteria defining the roles 
of both partners in the project (Respondents 8, 23, 32). Public professionals should 
not control the process (17: -2). They do however have an important role: “…the public 
sector has to closely monitor and enforce the contract to ensure performance” (Respondent 23). 
Collaboration is possible (23: +2, 11: +2), but within the existing roles and responsi-
bilities of each partner. It is not (only) the public partners’ responsibility to realize 
the collaborative processes or remove barriers and obstacles for the private partner 
(15: -3; 20: -3). Profile 3 thus seems to put strong emphasis on clarity. Collaboration, 
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although possible, is considered less important than the need for performance criteria 
and proper monitoring by public professionals.
Profile 4. The private partner leads the way
Profile 4 has an eigenvalue of 6.49 and explains 10% of the study variance after ro-
tation. Twelve respondents are significantly associated with this factor (p < .01). In 
this profile, PPPs are viewed as independent projects rather than as part of a broader 
public policy. Professionals attach limited importance to the role of political authori-
ties and traditional public values in PPP projects (5: -1; 1: -3; 9: -2). Instead of a strong 
dominating government, professionals prefer managerial freedom for the private 
partner. They should be given responsibility and consequently make their own deci-
sions regarding the realization of the project (16: +3; 4: +3; 12: +2). The private partner 
should be rewarded when they contribute to the efficient realization of policy goals 
(2: +2). Professionals associated with this profile argue that “the private consortium has 
the experience and knowledge to do the job right” (Respondent 22). The dominant role of 
the private partner does not dismiss the public partner from all responsibilities. After 
all, “the ultimate project is still public.” (Respondent 20). There has to be some public over-
sight, and public professionals are supposed to enable private partners by removing 
obstacles that hinder them in doing their job (20: +2). Clearly, this profile leaves the 
initiative to the private partner in findings ways to organize and realize PPPs, using 
their expertise to do so.
2.4.2.  Comparing the four perspectives
The viewpoints presented in the four profiles can be differentiated upon two relevant 
dimensions: the most prominent governance mechanism on the one hand, and the 
degree of managerial freedom for the private partner on the other hand (see Figure 
2.1).
Professionals associated with profile one and profile three attach most importance 
to the accountability of the private partner and suggest that the public partner should 
enforce some form of control. This is especially the case in profile three. The big-
gest difference between these profiles lies in the managerial freedom given to the 
private partner during the construction of the project. This managerial freedom is 
valued most by professionals associated with profile one and profile four. The latter 
viewpoint emphasizes the expertise and managerial freedom of private partners most 
of all profiles. In contrast to profile one, this profile attaches less value to control and 
accountability. Instead, public professionals are considered enablers, helping private 
partners to overcome barriers that hinder them in doing their job. This collaborative 
attitude resonates most with the professionals associated with profile two. In this pro-
file PPPs are viewed as horizontal partnership relations between partners. In neither 
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of the four profiles, statements regarding traditional public administration are highly 
valued. On average, these statements score low in almost every profile.
Figure 2.1 Differences between the four profiles.
2.4.3. Variation across country, project partner, and levels of experience
To explain the viewpoints of PPP professionals, we have run a separate analysis per 
country (see Appendix III) and a linear regression for each of the profiles resulting 
from the analysis presented above (see Appendix IV). Before turning to the results 
of the additional analysis, we stress that in each profile a mix of professionals from 
different countries, with different backgrounds, and different levels of experience is 
present. A profile therefore cannot be attributed to a single country. Instead, within 
each country PPP professionals may hold different views towards the governance of 
PPPs.
However, the results of the additional analysis show that some viewpoints are more 
dominant in one country than in another. These differences can be explained rather 
well on the basis of earlier research scholars have done on PPP in the different coun-
tries and on the country’s administrative traditions. For example, the professionals 
from Canada are often associated with profile three, in which a performance-based 
relationship is valued. The preference for this mode of governance might be explained 
by the publics’ expectation that governments are responsible for maintaining the 
public interest, resulting in a reticence for governments to fully relinquish control. 
The regression analyses show that their Dutch (p < .05) and Danish colleagues (p < .01) 
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are significantly less associated with this profile than the Canadian professionals. In 
comparison the Dutch professionals in this study are significantly more likely to be as-
sociated with profile two (p < .001) and prefer a collaborative form of governance. This 
aligns with the strong Dutch administrative tradition of compromise and horizontal 
working-relationships. This discourse is also reflected in recent developments like 
the Marktvisie (Rijkswaterstaat, 2016). Although the notion of collaboration seems 
dominant, a separate analysis of the viewpoints of Dutch professionals shows several 
Dutch professionals who share the viewpoints of the other three profiles. Finally, com-
pared to their Dutch and Canadian colleagues the viewpoints represented by profile 
four are significantly more likely to adhere to professionals in Denmark (p < 0.01). An 
explanation for this preference might be that, due to the lack of a clear PPP policy, 
the government’s role in Denmark is one of confusion and incoherence. Therefore, 
it might be preferable to leave it to the professionals, and especially the more experi-
enced private partner as local governments rarely have multiple PPP projects and thus 
limited experience. Regarding the first profile, the country has no significant effect on 
professionals’ viewpoints.
The regression analyses also show some differences between public and private 
professionals. Again, both can be found in all four profiles, but private partners are 
significantly more positive about collaboration (profile two; p < .05) and managerial 
freedom (profile four; p < .01). There is also a negative correlation between profes-
sionals working in the private sector and the preference for profile one (p < .05). 
When it comes to the third profile, there are no significant differences between public 
and private professionals. Finally, differences related to experience only occur in the 
fourth profile. Experienced professionals are more positive about managerial freedom 
for the private partner compared to relatively unexperienced professionals (p < .05). 
This makes sense as experience will allow professionals to grow more comfortable 
with doing PPPs. Experienced private partners might feel more comfortable taking the 
lead, while experienced public professionals might have greater willingness to give 
them the lead. The full results of the regression analyses can be found in Appendix IV.
2.5. CONCLUSIONS
This article contributes to more insight in the nature of the diverging governance 
expectations among actors involved in PPP governance setting. Using Q-methodology 
this study shows that professionals hold different viewpoints on the governance of 
PPPs. Finding the right governance form to deal with complexities might be difficult 
for practitioners. Certainly because, as Van den Hurk and Verhoest (2015) state, PPP 
governance should be contingent in order to be effective (2015: 209). The profes-
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sionals prioritize elements of the governance relationship in PPPs differently. Even 
though all respondents value clear performance indicators, mutually agreed rules of 
behaviour, and the opportunity for private partners to manage their own consortium 
to some extent, the priority given to these statements varies significantly. One shared 
viewpoint on PPP governance is that PPP professionals consider less the questions of 
safeguarding public values and the involvement of political authorities. Professionals 
indicate that politicians may determine the scope of the project in the early stages, 
but political influence during the realization of the project is seen as undesirable, 
as politics may be unpredictable, short term minded, and cause uncertainty to the 
project. PPP professionals are firmly focused on the project level (see the different 
levels of PPP in Greve & Hodge, 2013: 4), rather than considering PPPs as policy or 
governance style. This may be quite natural for them, as they are involved in the 
implementation of specific PPP projects and might not have time or energy to focus 
on the broader institutional level.
Given the international character of the PPP phenomenon, the professionals partici-
pating in this study were considered part of one community. Therefore, one overall 
analysis was performed. To a degree, the idea of an international PPP community 
holds, as most perspectives can be found in all countries. Differences only partially 
align with positions, domains, and countries. The international discourse on PPP seems 
to work out only slightly different in each country. Professionals in Canada, which is 
traditionally more oriented towards the Anglo Saxon tradition where NPM fits better, 
are more likely to embrace the idea that PPPs should be governed as performance-
based relationships. In contrast, Dutch professionals are more likely to value close 
collaboration. One can clearly see the Dutch political culture of consensus (Hendriks 
& Toonen, 2001) but also the recent focus on trust and joint responsibility, in the PPP 
discourse (see Rijkswaterstaat, 2016). Danish professionals seem to attach most value 
to managerial freedom for the private partner. This viewpoint may result from the 
less explicit position of the Danish national government towards PPP compared to 
Canada and The Netherlands. So, there are some differences between professionals 
from different countries, but each of the four factors in our analysis still included a 
diverse group of practitioners. This means that the preferences of professionals are 
hard to predict and not solvable in advance.
Reflecting on how our findings impact upon theory, three lessons can be drawn. 
First, our empirical findings show that governance ideas of practitioners are of a 
hybrid nature, combining features of various paradigms. Even though, at first glance, 
the four profiles seem to resemble the theoretical governance paradigms, a closer 
look shows something different. For example, the traditional public administration 
model is almost absent in the viewpoints of PPP professionals. Furthermore, the 
first profile presents a mix of ideas stemming from New Public Management and 
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privatized governance. The third profile resembles many of the main NPM features. 
However, statements suggesting strict control are not preferred by these profession-
als, even though this is one of the core ideas in NPM. Thus, our study shows that 
the viewpoints of practitioners do not neatly follow the delineations and logics of 
the theoretical paradigms as we derived them from the literature. Not all theoretical 
paradigms are present in practice, and the perceptions of PPP professionals consist 
of hybrid ideas on PPP governance. Moreover, different hybrid viewpoints regarding 
PPP governance exist among PPP professionals. In several of the hybrid viewpoints, 
professionals often seem to combine NPM like features with collaborative governance 
features. In many theoretical contributions these two paradigms are presented as very 
distinct, but perhaps we have to reconsider and look at their similarities or at ways 
how they can be combined. Confirming PPP as a hybrid governance arrangement, this 
study presents interesting results on how theoretical paradigms are combined in prac-
tice. This may also inspire theorizing: where theoretical contributions for instance 
emphasize the different governance paradigms, we might focus more on the theoreti-
cal implications of hybrid arrangements that combine features of various paradigms 
(Quélin et al., 2017). Second, our research shows that country, level of experience, and 
the public-private distinction make a difference for the viewpoints of professionals. 
This is a confirmation that governance ideas and governance modes are dependent 
on country characteristics (Skelcher et al., 2011). Finally, our study confirms earlier 
work regarding de-politicization and the technocratic character of PPPs (e.g. Willems 
& Van Dooren, 2016). PPP professionals seem to struggle with politics and strong 
control exercised by politicians. This points towards an interesting research agenda: 
how are politics included in new governance arrangements like PPPs? It raises the 
question how the democratic legitimacy of these new governance arrangements can 
be enhanced?
The practical consequences of our findings can be several. The main implication is 
that, as the viewpoints of professionals may vary significantly, their preferences are 
hard to predict. It also means that professionals with different viewpoints regard-
ing PPP governance might work in the same project, which could result in potential 
misunderstanding, disagreement, and even conflict. Therefore, when implementing 
PPPs, one has to be aware of the viewpoints and potential differences between these 
viewpoints, since these differences can frustrate the forming and implementation 
of PPP projects. Knowledge of the differences between professionals and their gov-
ernance preferences can also foster a dialogue about those differences at the start 
of a project which helps to clarify expectations of professionals on how to govern 
PPPs, and if necessary, discuss (process) rules to deal with them. Dialogue within these 
projects is necessary to prevent misunderstanding, align expectations on governing 
the project, and thus contribute to successful PPP performance.
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Limitations and suggestions for further research
Our results have to be interpreted with care, since only 55 out of 119 respondents are 
associated with one of the factors. This is an important limitation in our study. The 
use of theory to design the statements might pose a risk in this respect, as we might 
miss part of the debate among professionals that is not reflected by the theoretical 
paradigms. However, the biggest issue regarding these factor loadings is the relatively 
low number of statements respondents had to sort. With 24 statements to sort, a 
respondent is significantly associated with a profile if the factor loading is 0.53 or 
higher (Watts & Stenner, 2012). This greatly reduces the number of respondents that 
load on a factor (with a significance of p < .01). Adding more statements might have 
prevented this, but this makes it increasingly difficult for respondents to sort the 
statements, weigh their positions against each other, and argue convincingly which 
statements they agree with most and least. As some respondents already indicated that 
they found it challenging to rank 24 statements and given the fact that the explained 
variance of the study was sufficient, we would not opt for a larger number of state-
ments. Instead, to deal with these factor loadings we would suggest pre-testing the 
statements to make sure that these statements cover the entire debate on the topic 
and resonate with the target group. If the statements are well designed, cover the 
debate, and are recognizable by the participants, this should allow research to have 
sufficiently explained variance without increasing the number of statements beyond 
the point where respondents struggle to explain their sorting of the statements.
Further research on PPP governance could follow up on the results found in this 
study with regard to the differences between professionals’ viewpoints in an attempt 
to better explain and understand differences between the viewpoints of PPP profes-
sionals. After all, our study indicates that the public–private distinction, country, and 
experience do not fully explain the differences between professionals’ viewpoints. For 
example, more international comparative research and widening the set of countries 
with different administrative traditions (e.g. Southern European or Asian countries) 
might prove useful in this respect. Other potential explanatory factors should also be 
included in future research. These could include, but are not limited to, the complex-
ity of PPP projects, the background of the professional, and the different types of 
PPP projects professionals are working on. Furthermore, the different governance 
perceptions of professionals may pose a risk in PPP projects, potentially leading to 
misunderstandings and miscommunication. Further research might focus on how 
partners in PPP projects deal with the different expectations and perceptions of pro-
fessionals regarding the governance of PPPs and try to align the viewpoints of profes-
sionals working in these projects. Finally, the results of this study may inspire further 
research into unravelling the implications of differences in governance perceptions 
among professionals, for example by addressing the relationship between governance 
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perspectives and PPP performance. To what degree do conflicting viewpoints of pro-
fessionals on PPP governance have an impact on the projects’ performance?
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INTERMEZZO 2.
The previous chapter shows that professionals have different preferences 
regarding the governance of public–private partnerships. Some prefer contrac-
tual governance mechanisms and align their governance preferences with the 
juridical (contractual) form of the partnership. Others prefer a more collabora-
tive way of working, resulting in more relational governance mechanisms to 
govern the partnership. The suggestions that public and private partners in 
PPPs might be willing to work together in a more horizontal, collaborative way, 
turns our focus to the role of social relationships. Compared to the attention 
for more formal and contract-based forms of governance, the attention for 
soft and informal governance mechanisms is lacking behind (Verweij, 2018; 
Weihe, 2009). Besides formal and contractual relationships, informal social re-
lationships exist between the organizations and professionals collaborating in 
public–private partnerships. What do we know about these social relationships 
between public and private partners? What is the quality of the relationship 
between project partners? Relational quality is not an often used concept in 
PPP research, but nevertheless it is relevant to know more about the quality 
of the relationship between project partners, in particular if it is to be used in 
the governance of PPPs. To enhance our understanding of relational quality in 
PPP, this idea needs to be further conceptualized and operationalized. Chapter 
3 of this dissertation addresses this lacuna. It aims to provide more insight into 
the social relationships in PPPs by conducting a systematic literature review 
on relational quality in PPPs. If offers an overview of existing knowledge on 
this topic to present a conceptualization of the concept which can be used in 
further research into relational quality of public–private partnerships.
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ABSTRACT
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are often regarded as the solution for time and bud-
get overruns in large infrastructural projects, but not all are successful. This raises the 
question of what really makes PPPs work. Focusing on the role of relational aspects, 
this article examines the degree to which trust and managerial activities correlate 
to the perceived performance and cooperation process in PPP projects. A multilevel 
analysis of survey data from 144 respondents involved in Dutch PPP projects shows 
that both trust and management correlate significantly to the perceived performance 
of these projects. Moreover, trust is associated with a good cooperation process.
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5.1. INTRODUCTION: TRUST AND MANAGEMENT AS 
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PPP
The last two decades have seen a growing trend towards the use of public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) to provide service delivery and realize large infrastructural proj-
ects. The suggestion that PPPs can realize more innovative projects more efficiently 
than traditional procurement forms is at the heart of this trend (Ghobadian et al., 
2004; Hodge et al., 2010). Especially in the transport infrastructure sector – where 
projects are often confronted with time delays and cost overruns (e.g. Flybjerg, 2007; 
Cantarelli, 2011) – PPPs are used frequently. Just like the increased use of PPPs in daily 
practice, the academic interest in this phenomenon has grown.
Much research has been carried out on PPPs, but no generally accepted understand-
ing of the concept exists (Hodge & Greve, 2007). Nonetheless, some aspects, including 
durable cooperation between public and private entities, shared risks, and joint pro-
duction of either services or products, are shared in most definitions (see Savas, 2000; 
Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Hodge & Greve, 2005). Although a variety of definitions of the 
term public–private partnership have been suggested, this article uses the definition 
proposed by Klijn & Teisman (2003, 137), who defined a PPP as a “cooperation between 
public and private actors with a durable character in which actors develop mutual products and/
or services and in which risks, costs and profits are shared.” The variety of definitions possibly 
results from the many forms that PPP may take. From loosely coupled collaborations 
to strict contract-based partnerships, PPPs come in different shapes and sizes. Within 
this diversity, we focus on one of the most discussed forms: the DBFM(O) project. This 
type of partnership is characterized by long-term contracts integrating the different 
aspects of construction projects: the design, building, financing, maintaining, and – 
occasionally – the operation of the project (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002).
Research into PPPs has shown their potential but has also revealed mixed views on 
whether their supposed benefits work out in daily practice (e.g. Hodge & Greve, 2005, 
2007). A much-debated question is what really makes these contract-based partner-
ships work. In much of the literature, the relative importance of the contractual form 
and the incentives within the contract are deemed relevant (e.g. Savas, 2000; NAO, 
2002; Steijn et al., 2011). On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature 
that recognizes the importance of the relationship between contractual partners. 
These scholars highlight the importance of trust and managerial effort in establishing 
successful PPP projects (e.g. Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Kort et al., 2016). In another ar-
ticle, we analysed the impact of contractual characteristics on DBFMO (Design, Built, 
Finance, Maintenance and Operating) partnerships (see Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ᵇ) 
and concluded that they were not significantly related to the (perceived) outcomes of 
partnerships. Using the same data – a survey among PPP professionals in the Nether-
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lands – this article explores the other hypothesis: that the relationship between the 
partners is pivotal in successful PPPs.
Thus, this study sets out to assess the significance of relational aspects, more spe-
cifically the role of trust and managerial effort, for PPP performance. Therefore, the 
central question in this article is as follows: What is the influence of trust among contract-
ing parties in public–private partnership projects and the managerial effort in the project on the 
(perceived) performance of PPPs?
This article first gives a brief overview of the theoretical arguments for the influence 
of trust and management on PPP performance. It then goes on to discuss the research 
design and methodology of our study. The fourth section is concerned with the results 
of the analysis. Finally, we present the conclusions and reflections on the research.
5.2. WHY TRUST AND MANAGEMENT MATTER IN PPP
This section first elaborates on the idea of performance in relation to PPP. It then deals 
with the question of why trust and managerial effort are potentially important for PPP 
performance. It concludes with some hypotheses that are tested against the survey data.
5.2.1. PPP: better performance and more cooperation
PPPs entail assumptions about better value for money and superior performance 
compared to more traditionally tendered projects (see Savas, 2000; Hodge & Greve, 
2005). Nevertheless, the question remains as to how to define good performance. PPP 
performance can be conceptualized in roughly two ways.
On the one hand, a narrow definition of performance includes the achievement 
of particular targets and the efficiency in achieving those targets, such as on-time 
and on-budget delivery and increased efficiency, thanks to lifecycle optimizations. In 
contract-based PPPs, these targets can be found in the contract. The issue with this 
narrow definition is that it provides information on only a small part of the project. 
Scholars argue that project performance can also be conceptualized more broadly 
‘beyond the contract.’ Focusing on the wider support for the project and the durability 
of the solution for the future adds an extra dimension to the concept of performance. 
As various scholars argue, several distinctive criteria are needed to assess PPP per-
formance (e.g. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Skelcher & Sullivan, 2008). We follow 
that line of thought by combining five dimensions in measuring PPP performance. 
These dimensions have often been mentioned by scholars in earlier research (e.g. 
Skelcher & Sullivan, 2008; Steijn et al., 2011) and include effectiveness of the solution 
offered, support, integral character of the solution, robustness (durable solution for 
the future), and cost effectiveness (efficiency).
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It is striking that both the narrow definition and the broader definition focus only 
on the outcome of the project by measuring performance. The crucial argument in 
the ‘grey literature’ (including audit commission pieces, consultancy reports, and 
policy documents) is that long-term contracts and private involvement lead to better 
cooperation and relations between (public and private) partners; this is also relevant 
for good PPP performance (see NAO, 2002; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013). To take into 
account good cooperation as part of PPP performance, this study includes a number 
of indicators that focus on the cooperation between public and private actors (based 
on, for example, Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Skelcher & Sullivan, 2008). These include 
the resolution of conflicts between partnerships, the presence of deadlocks, and the 
gradual course of cooperation between partners during the entire process.
So, performance is not merely about on-time and on-budget delivery. It is a com-
bination of good outcomes and good cooperation that will result in successful PPPs.
5.2.2. Trust in PPPs
One of the most important scholars of neo-institutional theory, an important theo-
retical underpinning of PPP, Williamson argues that trust is a more or less redundant 
concept in economic transactions based on contracts (Williamson, 1996). However, 
a wide and prominent part of the literature on contractual relations and alliances 
contradicts this statement, emphasizing the importance of trust in partnerships. This 
section provides more insight into the trust concept, explaining the concept and its 
relevance for PPPs.
As an intensively studied concept, trust is defined in many ways. In spite of the 
variety of definitions of trust, generally there is agreement on the idea that to trust a 
person is to expect that the other will refrain from opportunistic behaviour, even if 
the opportunity arises (Deakin & Michie, 1997; Deakin & Wilkinson, 1998). The trust-
ing actor assumes that the other will take his/her interests into account, although he/
she can never be certain about it (Rousseau et al., 1998; Nooteboom, 2002). This can be 
perceived as taking a risk, because the partner becomes vulnerable to opportunistic 
behaviour. This risk is taken in the belief that the other party can be trusted. When 
actors communicate openly about their intentions, honour existing commitments, 
or collaborate without misusing each other’s vulnerabilities, trust will develop. Trust 
needs to be actively developed and maintained through interaction. Without interac-
tion, trust will easily diminish (Giddens, 1984; Nooteboom, 2002).
Most authors agree that trust is inextricably related to risk. Without risk, the notion of 
trust is simply unnecessary (Rousseau et al., 1998; Lane & Bachman, 1998; Nooteboom, 
2002). In contractual relations, partnerships, or other cooperative relations involving 
private and public actors, the actors are confronted with various risks. One of the risks 
is that an actor will abuse his power in the project or abandon the cooperation, forcing 
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the other actor to bear the costs. The strategic complexities in PPP make it difficult 
for actors to foresee all the possible contingencies, reason them out, or calculate them 
accurately (Deakin & Wilkinson, 1998; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). If there is trust in 
the partnership, the actors no longer need to calculate all possible negative outcomes, 
because they expect the other party to take their interests into consideration. Trust is 
crucial for partnerships to function properly. Without trust, it is unlikely that actors 
will engage in risk-taking behaviour because it can be ‘punished’ by opportunistic 
behaviour. Therefore, it is more difficult to reach satisfactory outcomes (Rousseau et 
al., 1998; Nooteboom, 2002; Bromily & Harris, 2006; Klijn et al., 2010). So, our first 
theoretical conclusion is that trust is an indispensable concept when studying PPPs.
A vast amount of literature on the role of trust in alliances (e.g. Sako, 1998; Bachman 
& Zaheer, 2006) and collaborative governance (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Ansell & Gash, 
2008) presents several arguments for the importance of trust in partnerships. First, 
trust facilitates cooperation. Because trust creates greater predictability, it reduces the 
risks inherent in transactions and cooperative relations (Sako, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002). 
Trust also reduces the necessity for highly detailed contracts. Thick contracts are costly 
and often inadequate in complex cooperation processes (Miles & Snow, 1986; Grabher, 
1993; Parker & Vaidya, 2001). Therefore, very strict and detailed contracts are counter-
productive for the development of creative ideas. When trust is present, partnerships 
can function with less detailed contracts, leaving more room for creativity (see Parker 
& Vaidya, 2001). The third argument for the importance of trust is that trust solidifies 
cooperation. Trust increases the probability that actors will invest resources like knowl-
edge, time, and energy in the partnership, even when the return on investment is 
uncertain. From an economic perspective, this would constrain actors from investing, 
but the presence of trust creates stability in the relationship. This compensates for the 
uncertainty in partnerships and creates a strong basis for long-term cooperation (Ring 
& Van Der Ven, 1992; Sako, 1998; Parker & Vaidya, 2001). Fourth, trust enhances perfor-
mance. As stated, trust stimulates the exchange of information and knowledge that is 
essential for facilitating the learning process and achieving new solutions (Nooteboom, 
2002). In the literature, there is broad consensus on the idea that a learning process in 
which actors exchange information and learn from one another is critical to develop 
new solutions (Schön & Rein, 1994; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). So, trust can be seen as 
an efficient way to lower transaction costs in collaborations (Parker & Hartley, 2003). 
Trust therefore plays a major role in relational contracting, where formal contractual 
agreements are combined with more informal social mechanisms. At its best, rela-
tional contracting is based on high levels of trust, cooperation, informality, and shared 
problem-solving. Despite the fact that many PPPs (including DBFMO projects) are based 
mainly on transactional contract-based relationships, aspects of relational contracting 
and trust-based relationships may occur in these partnerships (Reeves, 2008).
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5.2.3. The role of network management
Many scholars distinguish between project management (managing given contents 
and goals, and controlling time and budget) and inter-organization management, 
where both the relations between partners and those with the network around the 
project are managed (see Steijn et al., 2011). The latter form of management, often 
referred to as network management, is essential for organizing complex governance 
processes, such as PPP projects (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). 
Because of the complex nature of PPPs, network management activities or strategies 
are critical for achieving good outcomes (see O’Toole, 1988; Steijn et al., 2011; McGuire 
& Agranoff, 2011). This implies the use of internal management activities to manage 
the interactions between partners in the partnership, but also to manage the environ-
ment of the project. This argument builds on earlier research on strategic alliances 
that also emphasizes the importance of managing relational characteristics in order to 
achieve good results in partnerships (e.g. Borys & Jemison, 1989; Niederkofler, 1991).
If we see PPPs not only as an organizational construction but also as a network, the 
literature on network management is especially interesting because it also focuses on 
managing the network in which the project is embedded. In the literature on network 
management, frequently mentioned management and leadership strategies include 
initiating and facilitating interaction processes between actors (Friend et al., 1974), for 
instance, by activating (or de-activating) actors and resources. Moreover, management 
strategies encompass the creation and change of network arrangements for better 
coordination (Scharpf, 1978; Rogers & Whetten, 1982) as well as the realization of 
new content and win–win situations (Mandell, 2001), for example, by exploring new 
ideas, working with scenarios, organizing joint research, and joint fact-finding (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2016ª). Finally, management strategies also include guiding interactions 
(Gage & Mandell, 1990; Kickert et al., 1997). The literature on collaborative gover-
nance and collaborative advantages mentions similar activities. Huxham and Vangen 
(2005) mention activities like mobilizing member organizations, dealing with power 
relations, empowering actors that can deliver collaborative aims, and trust building. 
Ansell and Gash (2008) mention strategies like committing to the process, creating 
shared understanding, and aiming for participatory inclusiveness.
Research shows that two types of network management strategies seem to have 
the most impact: exploring and connecting (Klijn et al., 2010; see, for comparable 
findings, Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Exploring strategies are aimed at creating and 
looking at new solutions, collecting (joint) information, organizing research, and 
combining conflicting points of view. Connecting strategies are aimed at activating 
actors and resources, linking actors together, nurturing inter-organizational relations, 
and dealing with conflicts. We focus on these two strategies in this article.
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5.2.4. Hypotheses about trust and management
The previous arguments lead us to the theoretical conclusion that trust, as an inten-
tion and a perception of actors, is positively correlated with performance in PPPs. 
Trust enables actors to share more information and innovate, and this results in better 
outcomes. Trust will also enhance the cooperation process, seen as cooperative activi-
ties. Actors will invest more in cooperation when the level of trust is higher, resulting 
in better cooperation between public and private actors. This results in the first two 
hypotheses:
H1: PPP projects with a higher level of trust between the public and the private partners will be 
characterized by a higher (perceived) performance.
H2: PPP projects with a higher level of trust between the public and the private partners will be 
characterized by better cooperation between the partners.
Network management strategies are expected to relate positively to both good perfor-
mance and good cooperation. Intensive network management – by connecting actors 
and exploring content – will enhance the possibilities of actors finding satisfactory 
solutions and implementing them (better performance). Network management will 
foster cooperation, because coordination activities are being performed and attempts 
are being made to increase the mutual development of goals and the collection of 
information. We acknowledge that network management and trust could potentially 
influence each other over time. To deal with this issue, respondents were asked to rank 
the level of trust at the time of the survey. Respondents were asked to classify vari-
ous network management activities in the project that had (usually) been performed 
in the past period. So, in our measurement, network management precedes trust. 
There are also theoretical arguments to perceive the relation in this way. Network 
management consists of deliberate, active interventions in the process to facilitate 
and stimulate the project interactions and outcomes, and to improve the relation 
between partners (see Huxham & Vangen, 2005; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2016ª ). So, from a theoretical point of view, this seems to be the most 
logical correlation. Thus, our next two hypotheses are as follows:
H3: The more network management strategies are employed in PPP projects, the better the projects 
will perform.
H4: The more network management strategies are employed in PPP projects, the better the coop-




5.3.1. Survey and variables
The data used in this article stem from a survey (March 2014–June 2014) among 
Dutch practitioners involved in PPPs. In order to identify these practitioners, a list 
was compiled of all officially known PPP projects in the Netherlands by studying 
publicly available PPP databases in the Netherlands. These included databases of both 
ministries and ministerial support bureaus. So, the survey represents approximately 
the whole population of officially known Dutch PPP projects up to 2014. By including 
almost the entire population in our study, we avoid many of the issues with regard 
to representation as described in the total survey error framework (see, for example, 
Groves & Lyberg, 2010 or Lee et al., 2012). Coverage or sampling errors, which arise in 
the process of selecting a sample from a target population, are therefore most likely 
not present in our study. Subsequently, respondents who were directly involved in 
these projects were selected to participate in the study. These potential respondents 
worked mainly for the public commissioning authority or the private contractor, 
for example, as project manager, contract manager, or technical manager. However, 
respondents who were involved in an advisory role – working for consultancy or law 
firms – were also selected. All respondents were closely involved in (a specific phase 
of) one of the PPP projects.
In total, 343 respondents involved in 93 PPP projects received a request to fill in 
the survey. With a response rate of 46.6%, 144 respondents filled in the survey. These 
respondents worked for 68 different Dutch PPP projects, of which the majority were 
DBM or DBFM(O) projects. Consequently, the survey covered 73% of the then existing 
PPP projects in the Netherlands. Because of this response rate, the risk of nonresponse 
error might be less of an issue in this study (Lee et al., 2012). With 144 respondents an-
swering questions about 68 projects, there were multiple respondents per project. In 
the section on ‘Data analysis,’ we discuss the implications of the multilevel structure 
of the data for the data analysis. As stated, the respondents were mainly employed 
in public organizations (45.8%) or private contracting parties (27.1%). The other re-
spondents worked either for consultancy firms (13.2%) or for non-profit organizations 
(11.8%) such as housing associations or resident associations. In small-scale local proj-
ects in particular, these stakeholders are involved in the project. The respondents had 
considerable experience working in complex projects, asserting that, on average, they 
had 14 years of experience with such projects. Some of the respondents were involved 
in multiple PPP projects, and so, each respondent was asked to select just one of their 




The measurement of project performance poses some challenges. First of all, projects 
generally consist of various actors; this means that multiple goals are present within 
a single project. Because of the various actors’ different interests, it is difficult to 
select one overarching goal in which all actors feel represented. Furthermore, projects 
usually have a lengthy time span. Consequently, actors’ goals are likely to change 
over time consequent to a readjustment of preferences as a result of learning or goal 
displacement (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). Additionally, it is not possible to assess 
objective outcomes with surveys that measure respondents’ perceptions. Therefore, 
perceived project performance is taken as a proxy for outcomes. In this approach, 
we follow the work of Klijn et al. (2010). Their measurement scales build on different 
dimensions of project performance, listed in Table 5.1. The mean score for perceived 
project performance, as rated by project respondents, is 4.00 (SD = 0.51) on a 5-point 
Likert scale, indicating a high satisfaction with the performance of their project.
Dimension Term Item
1. Integral nature of solution INT Different environmental functions have been connected sufficiently
2. Effectiveness of solution EFF Solutions that have been developed really deal with the problems at 
hand
3. Effectiveness in the future FUT Developed solutions are durable for the future
4. Support for solution SUP The project solutions are sufficiently supported by the involved 
organizations
5. Relation costs and benefits RCB In general, the benefits exceed the costs
Table 5.1 Measurement of perceived project performance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71)
Cooperation between public and private actors
As stated earlier in this article, the assumption behind PPPs implies that PPPs result 
not only in more efficient outcomes, but also in better cooperation between the part-
ners. Therefore, the performance of PPPs should be measured not only in terms of 
outcomes, but also in terms of process. Therefore, this study includes process criteria 
in order to measure the cooperation between public and private actors in PPPs. As 
performance based on output is substantially different from good cooperation in 
the PPP process, the different indicators used to construct both variables cannot be 
combined. Although the correlation table (see Appendix IX) points towards a medium 
correlation between the variables, an exploratory factor analysis, presented in the 
section on ‘Network management’, clearly shows that performance based on output 
and performance based on cooperation are different concepts and that both are also 
perceived differently by the respondents. Therefore, we include both concepts as two 
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different variables in the analysis. The respondents’ perceptions on output-based 
performance are referred to in this study as perceived project performance, and their 
perceptions of the process are labelled as cooperation. Regarding the process criteria, 
both the presence of deadlocks and the way conflicts are settled during the process are 
used as indicators for the quality of the cooperation between actors. Table 5.2 provides 
an overview of the dimensions used to measure cooperation, which has a mean score 
of 3.40 (SD = 0.76) on a 5-point Likert scale.
Dimension Term Item
1. Managing internal conflicts MIC The actors involved in the network have succeeded in managing 
internal conflicts and disagreements in an adequate manner
2. Presence of deadlocks PDE I did not experience any cumbersome deadlocks during the process
3. Course of cooperation CCO The actors have improved the cooperation process over the past 
years
Table 5.2 Measurement of cooperation between public and private actors (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70)
Trust
To measure trust between the contract partners within the project, a 10-point scale 
was used in which respondents rated the amount of trust varying from (1) ‘There is 
no trust between public and private partners’ to (10) ‘There is a lot of trust between 
public and private partners’. The mean score of this variable is 6.67 (SD= 1.93) on a 
10-point Likert scale.
Network management
This study also focuses on the relation between network management and the coop-
eration within, and the performance of, PPPs. In order to do so, a number of items 
(see Table 5.3) on network management focusing on coordination activities within 
the project are included. Management activities that focus on external stakeholders 
are not taken into account. The mean score for management is 3.87 (SD= 0.57) on a 
5-point Likert scale.
Dimension Term Item
1. Defining principles DPR When information is being collected, the focus is on developing and 
establishing common principles and information needs for both public 
and private actors in the project
2. nvolving partners IPA (Private) Contractors are consulted and involved in project management 
decisions
3. Communication COM Much time is spent on the communication between various actors
4. Aligning interests AIN During deadlocks and problems, the management focuses mainly on 
aligning conflicting interests
Table 5.3 Measurement of management (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70)
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For the three variables consisting of more than one item (performance, manage-
ment, and cooperation), an exploratory factor analysis was used to check whether the 
concepts are valid and reliable and whether the in-between correlations are higher 
than the correlations between the variables. The factor analysis (Table 5.4) shows that 
the items form good constructs and that the variables do not overlap. As theory offers 
clear directions towards the underlying relations between the items, we also employed 
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) – which is generally more strict – to check for the 
validity of the constructs. The CFA showed that most items loaded on their construct 
with a score >0.6, but all of the items displayed scores above 0.4, which is sufficient.
Construct Term Perceived performance Management Cooperation Cronbach’s Alpha
Management DPR .030 .605 .078 0.70
IPA .199 .747 .043
COM .021 .792 .034
AIN .181 .621 .452
Cooperation MIC .296 .132 .699 0.70
PDE .114 -.042 .790
CCO .211 .231 .679
Perceived performance SUP .587 .001 .198 0.71
INT .692 .098 .146
EFF .742 -.059 .339
FUT .713 .213 .284
RCB .576 .333 -.118
Table 5.4 Exploratory factor analysis (principal components approach with Varimax rotationa
a. Principal components analysis assumes that the sample used is the population, which is the case in this 
survey as we included all known PPP projects up to 2014. As it is not the aim of this factor analysis to gener-
alize the findings beyond the data in this survey, the use of principal components analysis seems fit for this 
study. As the different variables are unrelated rather than dimensions of the same concept, Varimax rotation 
is preferred over oblique rotation.
Control variables
In the analysis, three control variables that may be associated with performance and 
cooperation in PPP projects are included (see Table 5.5). These control variables were 
selected on two different analytical levels. On the one hand, we controlled for a vari-
able at project level, namely, project phase. This was measured by asking respondents 
which phases of the project had already been completed, so that we could correct our 
results for project phase. To include this variable, we added a dummy variable called 
‘projects phase.’ All projects that had completed the realization phase and were thus 
in either the maintenance or operational phase, were scored with a ‘1’. All projects 
that were still in the construction phase, or even in the tendering phase, received a 
‘0’. We also tested other dummy variables; for example, we included projects in the 
construction phase in the list of projects scoring a ‘1’. Only projects in the tendering 
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phase then received a ‘0’. However, this did not lead to any significant changes in the 
results of the analysis.
On the other hand, control variables at individual respondent level were taken into 
account, including respondents’ organizational background (public organization, 
private organization, and other). This variable allowed us to control for the fact that 
respondents worked for either the public commissioning authority or the private 
contractor. Again, a dummy variable was used. In the dummy variable, called ‘pub-
lic,’ all respondents working for the project sector scored a ‘1’ and all respondents 
who worked in the private sector, for consultancy firms or other organizations, a ‘0’. 
Finally, the technical complexity of the project was included. Although this might 
seem a variable at project level, we included this variable on the individual level, 
because this variable includes each respondent’s individual perception of the techni-
cal complexity of the project. The respondents’ perception of technical complexity 
varied depending on individual factors, such as their technical knowledge and their 
previous experience with technically complex projects. So, the technical complexity 
of a project may be scored differently by the respondents involved in the project. With 
regard to scoring the technical complexity of the project, respondents were presented 
a 10-point scale on whether the project was characterized by high or low technical 
complexity. The expectation was that, in more complex projects, respondents would 
find it more difficult to cooperate well and achieve strong performances.
Variables Term Item
1. Project phase PPH What activities in the project are already completed?
2. Technical complexity TCO The project is characterized by a high [low] technical complexity
3. Organizational background ORG In what type of organization do you work?
Table 5.5 Control variables
5.3.3. Data analysis
The data have a nested structure because multiple respondents filled out the survey 
per project. The individuals in the survey worked for projects, which themselves had 
characteristics that may influence the study. Consequently, we have a two-level model 
with measurements on person level (n = 144) and project level (n = 68), making it 
likely for the answers of the respondents involved in the same project to be somewhat 
similar. This conflicts with the idea that surveys should result in completely indepen-
dent observations. To account for the fact that there were multiple respondents for 
each of the projects, we performed a multilevel analysis instead of a regular regression 
analysis. As hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) is much better suited to dealing with 
multilevel analysis, HLM was used to test our hypothesis. In order to find a statistical 
justification for running HLM, the null models were provided (see Appendix X for the 
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tests). As the chi-square tests for both dependent variables were significant, there was 
variance in the outcome variable by the level-2 groupings (project level). The results 
of both the test using performance as a variable (x2 (49) = 119.73, p < .001) and the 
test using cooperation as a variable (x2 (49) = 107.36, p < .001) supported the use of 
HLM. Examination of the between-project and within-project variance components of 
the variables also justified the multilevel approach in HLM. The scores of individuals 
within projects were significantly more similar than the scores of individuals between 
the different projects. For perceived project performance, the within-project variance 
was 40%. This result suggests that 40% of the variance in perceived project performance 
is attributable to group membership. Sixty per cent of the variance was at individual 
level. For cooperation, the intercept resulted only in a slightly lower within-project 
variance of 36%.9 These levels of within-project variance justify the multilevel approach. 
To test our hypotheses, the full maximum likelihood procedure in HLM was used.
5.3.4. Common Method Bias
In the survey used in this article, respondents answered questions regarding both 
the dependent and the independent variables. There is therefore a risk of inflated 
relationships between the variables, as a result of the measurement method causing 
variance. This means that there could potentially be a measurement error, one of 
the errors described in the total survey error framework (see, for example, Lee et al., 
2012). In this section, we address some measures in order to deal with the potential 
presence of common method bias.
As most of the variables in this study are based on individuals’ perceptions, our vari-
ables are by their very nature perceptual (George & Pandey, 2017). Although this does 
not imply that common method bias is not an issue, it means that using a survey, even 
though it is a single data source, may still be an appropriate method (Podsakoff et al., 
2012). A few characteristics of our survey limited the possibility of common method 
bias and other survey-related errors. First, by approaching almost the entire population, 
there is no chance of sampling errors in this study. Moreover, some procedural remedies 
were used to minimize potential common source bias (Podsakoff et al., 2012; Lee et al., 
2012; George & Pandey, 2017). These include the use of different scales (both 10-point 
and 5-point Likert scales) and making sure that not all variables are presented on the 
same page of the questionnaire. With regard to common method variance, the cor-
relation table (Appendix IX) shows a medium and significant effect between the main 
variables; this indicates that there is no strong inflation of the existence of common 
method variations to create strong common source bias. Finally, to test whether com-
9 Level 1 intercept variance divided by the total variance: .21086/(.21086 + .37682) = .35880
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mon method bias was a problem, we conducted a Lindell and Whitney’s test, the results 
(see Appendix XI) of which show that common method bias is not an issue in this paper.
5.4. RESULTS
In this section, the results of the analysis are presented. In order to study the role of 
trust and network management, two multilevel analyses were conducted. The first 
analysis used perceived project performance as the dependent variable. The second 
one focused on good cooperation as the dependent variable.
5.4.1. The relationship between trust, management, and perceived 
project performance
First, the role of trust and management with regard to perceived PPP project per-
formance was studied. The results, presented in Table 5.6, show that both trust and 
management are correlated with the perceived performance of PPP projects. The coef-
ficient score indicates that, when respondents score the independent variable one point 
higher, this also has a positive effect on perceived performance of the project – the 
dependent variable. This is true for both trust (p < 0.05) and management (p < 0.01), but 
management in particular is strongly related to perceived PPP performance. Moreover, 
the technical complexity (p < 0.001) of the project is also positively associated with per-
ceived performance at the .001 level. When PPP projects are assessed as more complex 
by respondents, the higher their perceived performance for this project is. This might 
be related to the possible connections between various elements of the project. Techni-
cally more complex projects usually are projects where more different environmental 
aspects are combined. This is what makes the project more (technically) complex, but it 
also provides more possibilities for win–win situations and solving more than one (spa-
tial) problem at once. Thus, these projects have more potential for good performance.
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error p-value
Intercept 2.283 0.231 <0.001
Organizational level
Project phase 0.073 0.102 0.478
Individual level
Technical complexity 0.060 0.017  0.001***
Trust 0.070 0.030  0.024*
Management 0.208 0.074  0.007**
Organizational background -0.083 0.084 0.330
Table 5.6 Multi-level analysis of perceived performance of PPP projects
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
Note: N on project level is 68; N on individual level is 144.
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5.4.2. The relationship between trust, management, and cooperation in 
PPP projects
PPPs are considered successful not only because of the way stakeholders perceive 
their project’s performance, but also because of the way public and private actors 
cooperate during the process. Therefore, this section focuses on the role of trust and 
management in the cooperation between public and private actors in PPP projects. 
The analysis shows a slightly different result than the previous analysis focusing on 
PPP performance. In the first analysis, both trust and management were positively 
associated with the perceived performance of PPP projects. With regard to the co-
operation of public and private actors within PPP projects, only trust is significantly 
correlated (p < .001) to the perceived cooperation in the projects (see Table 5.7). So, to 
ensure a smooth process and good cooperation between actors in PPPs, a high level of 
trust between actors seems to be very important.
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error p-value
Intercept 2.210 0.566 <0.001
Organizational level
Project phase 0.195 0.144 0.182
Individual level
Technical complexity -0.011 0.036 0.773
Trust 0.124 0.036  0.001***
Management 0.120 0.144 0.407
Organizational background -0.207 0.143 0.154
Table 5.7 Multi-level analysis of cooperation in PPP projects
Note: *** p < .001
Note: N on project level is 68; N on individual level is 144.
The analysis also indicates that no control variable (respondents’ organizational 
background, technical complexity of the project, and project phase) is significantly 
related to the cooperation between public and private actors in the project.
More strikingly, the analysis shows that – in contrast to trust – management is not 
associated with good cooperation. As the variable management includes management 
strategies aimed at cooperation between partners, such as involving partners in proj-
ect management decisions, communication between actors, and aligning conflicting 
interests, the result is surprising. In order to clarify the relation between management 
and cooperation, the role of trust herein should be studied more closely. As trust is 
strongly related with the cooperation of actors in PPP projects, management may be 
indirectly associated with cooperation, because the various management activities 
may influence the amount of trust between partners. As stated in the section on net-
work management, building trust is one of the many existing management activities. 
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Therefore, a Pearson’s correlation test of the relation between management and trust 
was conducted; Table 5.8 shows the results. There is a moderate (0.438) yet significant 
(p < .001) correlation between management and trust. This suggests that management 
could indeed be indirectly correlated with the cooperation between actors in PPPs by 
increasing trust between those actors.
Variables Management Trust
Pearson’s correlation 1 .438***
Management Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 121 121
Pearson’s correlation .438** 1
Trust Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 121 121
Table 5.8 Correlation between management and trust
Note: *** p < .001
Finally, a multi-level analysis (see Table 5.9) was run to assess the relationship 
between good cooperation and perceived performance in PPP projects. The analysis 
shows that good cooperation in PPP projects is associated with perceived performance 
of these projects (p < .01). This means that, the higher individuals score cooperation 
with partners, the better their perception of the performance of the PPP project. Both 
the technical complexity of the project and management are positively associated 
with perceived performance, although the level of significance of network manage-
ment differs slightly compared to the original analysis (.05 rather than .01). Note 
that trust is no longer significantly correlated with perceived performance now that 
cooperation is added to the analysis.
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error p-value
Intercept 1.938 0.274 <0.001
Organizational level
Project phase 0.029 0.102 0.780
Individual level
Technical complexity 0.063 0.016  <0.001***
Trust 0.048 0.029 0.101
Cooperation 0.176 0.061  0.006**
Management 0.171 0.065  0.012*
Table 5.9 Multi-level analysis of cooperation, trust, and network management on perceived PPP project per-
formance
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
Note: N on project level is 68; N on individual level is 144.
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5.5. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
From our analysis, we conclude that trust and management are important for both 
the perceived PPP performance and the cooperation between actors in those projects. 
Trust is associated with both perceived performance and cooperation. Network man-
agement is associated only with perceived performance. However, as the correlation 
test shows that management is correlated with trust, it may therefore be indirectly 
related with the cooperation between actors in PPPs via trust. Furthermore, the analy-
sis shows that cooperation is positively associated with performance.
These results show the relevance of relational characteristics, to which limited at-
tention was given at the start of the PPP debate. Initially, attention focused strongly 
on performance indicators, contract characteristics, and performance monitoring 
as important conditions for the success of PPPs. The results of this study, however, 
show that relational characteristics are at least as important and may even be more 
important, because recent research casts doubt on the influence of, for instance, 
contract characteristics (see Klijn & Koppenjan 2016ᵇ). Given the complexity of PPP 
projects and their often strong relation with their environment, and thus other af-
fected stakeholders, this is not surprising however. PPP projects are of long duration, 
and many unexpected things can happen. This means that constant nurturing of the 
partnership, the ability to cope with unexpected events that are not specified in the 
contract, and managing relations are crucial for the project’s success. On the basis of 
this study, this suggestion seems to hold for PPPs.
Of course, this research has its limitations. The study is based on a survey and thus 
on respondents’ perceptions of PPP performance and the influencing factors. This 
also means that we have data on a very large number of projects, which is an asset, 
but we do not have in-depth detailed information about these cases. Also, we now 
know that management matters, but not the type of management strategies that are 
effective, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, as both the dependent vari-
ables (perceived project performance and cooperation) and the independent variables 
(trust and management) are measured using the same survey, common method bias 
might occur. We tested for this with a marker variable, and that showed that common 
method bias probably is not a very big problem. Another issue is that we had only one 
item available for measuring trust, whereas many authors argue that trust has several 
dimensions (see Sako, 1998; Klijn et al., 2010). Finally, we should address the fact 
that the cross-sectional nature of our data implicates that causality and endogeneity 
cannot be ruled out. Although this should not stop researchers from doing this type of 
research, it means that the results of our study should be viewed in terms of correla-
tions between variables, rather than precise effects. Therefore, we suggest the use of 
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longitudinal data or survey experiments to deal with these issues in further research 
into this topic.
Despite these limitations, this article generates some very interesting results that 
contribute to the discussion about the conditions under which PPPs are effective and 
produce good outcomes. It nuances the early PPP literature and sets the stage for 
further research on the relational aspects of partnerships. Further research should 
perhaps focus on the precise interplay between (network) management and trust 
and also on their combined influence. It may very well be that, for instance, one of 
these conditions is very crucial for the other to have effect. Multiple case studies and 
qualitative comparative analysis could provide more precise answers to this question. 
This type of research may gain more in-depth knowledge about the quality of the 
relationships in PPPs and the management strategies that may contribute to this.
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INTERMEZZO 5.
The previous chapter has shown that relational governance mechanisms, in 
particular trust and network management strategies, contribute to better col-
laboration and better performance of public–private partnerships. It thus in-
dicates that high-quality relationships within PPPs are relevant. The outcomes 
of this study are in line with earlier studies that test the effects of trust and 
network management. However, although relational governance mechanisms 
might be important, we cannot ignore the role of contracts in PPPs. They are 
an often used mechanism. Many PPPs in most countries are designed using 
elaborate contracts (e.g. Romboutsos, 2015; Verhoest et al., 2015). Examples are 
the PFI in the UK, and similar long-term infrastructure contracts in Australia, 
Canada and Western Europe (Verhoest et al., 2015). Since the prominent role 
of the contract in most PPPs cannot be ignored, it means that relational quality 
needs to be studied within a contractual context. This raises the question as to 
how contractual and relational governance mechanisms relate to each other. 
Can these mechanisms be combined in PPPs, and if so, how? The study present-
ed in the next chapter aims to provide an answer to this question. Just like in 
the previous chapter, we test some elements of relational quality – in this case 
trust and conflict management – to see how they contribute to the performance 
of PPPs. In contrast to Chapter 5, this time these conditions are not studied in 
isolation, but in conjunction with contractual governance mechanisms such as 
the allocation of risks and the (strict) application of sanctions. Using a fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), Chapter 6 is able to identify specific 
combinations of conditions that are present in high-performing PPP projects. 
As the final empirical chapter, it builds upon the previous studies in this dis-
sertation, combining the relevance of relational quality, the effect of relational 
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ABSTRACT
In explaining public–private partnership (PPP) performance both contractual and 
relational conditions play a role. Research has shown that these conditions may 
complement each other in successful PPPs. However, which specific combinations of 
conditions and how these combinations may influence PPP performance remains un-
clear. Building on the ideas of neo institutional economics, principal–agent theory, re-
lational contracting and governance theories, this article explores the mix and match 
of contractual aspects and relational characteristics in successful PPP projects. A fuzzy 
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of 25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and 
Flanders (Belgium) was used to test how contractual factors, such as the use of sanc-
tions and risk allocation, and relational conditions, such as trust and conflict manage-
ment, jointly shape the performance of public–private partnerships. The results show 
three different combinations of conditions that match with high-performing PPPs. 
These configurations often consist of a mix of contractual and relational conditions, 
which confirms our initial expectation that these factors complement each other, but 




Despite the frequent use of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in many countries, 
there is still no unanimous judgment on the performance of PPPs (Hodge & Greve, 
2017ᵇ). Both the question whether PPPs are a success and the question what makes 
PPPs successful cannot be answered unanimously. Scholars have identified a long list 
of critical success factors for PPP performance (for an overview, see Osei-Kyei & Chan, 
2015) from which two main categories can be distinguished. On the one hand, a wide 
stream of literature emphasizes the importance of contractual conditions: a well-writ-
ten contract, the possibility to impose sanctions, clear performance indicators, and 
the allocation of risks (Pollitt, 2002; Koppenjan, 2005). The main inspiration for these 
factors stems from neo-institutional economics and principal–agent theory, which 
emphasize rational and possibly opportunistic behaviour and the need to control this 
behaviour (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1996). On the other hand, the 
literature on (network) governance and relational contracting has paid much atten-
tion to the process of cooperation, especially to the importance of trust, to make these 
partnerships work (e.g. Ring & van der Ven, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005). Relational characteristics such as trust, informal communication, and 
openness are considered important for PPP performance.
There are various empirical studies on either contractual aspects (Bing et al., 2005ᵇ; 
Da Cruz et al., 2013) or relational partnership characteristics (Smyth & Edkins, 2007; 
Warsen et al., 2018). Other studies propose the idea that PPPs could benefit from a 
mix of contractual and relational conditions (see for example Parker & Hartley, 2003; 
Brown et al., 2016). However, more detailed theoretical notions and empirical studies 
on how specific combinations of contractual and relational conditions influence part-
nership’s performance are hard to find (for an exception, see Kort et al., 2016). This ar-
ticle tries to fill this gap and contributes to the existing literature on PPP performance 
by providing empirical evidence on how contractual and relational characteristics 
mix and match with high-performing PPP projects. Our theoretical contribution lies 
thus in specifying which exact combinations of contractual and relational conditions 
are present in successful public–private partnerships. This way we aim to refine the 
existing theories. To explore how and which contractual and relational conditions 
complement each other in achieving PPP performance, this article focuses on the 
role of two important contractual conditions, namely the allocation of risks and the 
application of sanctions in managing contracts (see Savas, 2000; van Slyke, 2006), and 
of two relational characteristics: trust (Ring & van der Ven, 1992; Sako, 1998; Klijn et 
al., 2010) and conflict management (Omobowale et al., 2010).
To analyse which mixes of conditions actually match with successful PPP projects, 
we conducted a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) using data on 25 
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PPP projects in the Netherlands and Belgium. Assessing the combined impact of con-
ditions is one of the main strengths of QCA.
In this article we first discuss theoretical starting points underlying PPPs and how 
contractual and relational conditions might complement each other in successful 
partnerships. In part two, we explain the research method and the data used in this 
study. Part three focuses on the main results of the QCA. Conclusions and reflections 
on the outcomes of the analysis are provided in the final part of our paper.
6.2. EXPLAINING PPP PERFORMANCE
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) can be found in many varieties (see Hodge et al., 
2010). In this article the focus is on PPPs in the narrow sense, that is, as individual 
projects in which public and private partners jointly work to realize products and 
services and share the accompanying benefits, costs, and risks (Hodge et al., 2010). 
Many of these projects can be considered long-term infrastructure contract (LTIC) 
partnerships, which often include the design, build, finance, and maintenance of a 
specific product or service (e.g. a road, hospital, or school). These contracts are often 
referred to as DBFM(O) contracts (Design, Build, Finance, Maintain, and Operate) 
(Hodge et al., 2010).
6.2.1. PPP performance as multi-criteria phenomenon
Despite using a narrow concept of PPP, assessing the performance of PPPs remains a 
challenge. The existence of different views towards PPP performance is not only due 
to the different conceptions of PPP, but it is also the result of the multi-actor character 
of the partnership. Each partner joins the public–private partnership with their own 
interests and perspectives on the goals of the project. These goals may differ between 
partners and can even be conflicting at times. At the same time, partners need each 
other for the realisation of these goals. This mutual interdependency between part-
ners (and relevant actors in the network around PPP projects) requires them to take 
these various goals into account (Bertelli & Smith, 2009; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). 
Goals agreed upon in the contract, however, do not necessarily reflect the actual ob-
jectives of the involved actors. Moreover, partners will not necessarily use these goals 
as points of reference for their assessment of the performance of the partnership. 
In addition, the goals set at the beginning of a PPP project may change over time. 
Especially in long-term contract-based PPPs where years of tender and construction 
are followed by an even longer maintenance and operational phase the likelihood of 
changing goals is high (Parker & Hartley, 2003; Bertelli & Smith, 2009).
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Rather than considering a single ‘objective’ goal as the ultimate yardstick for as-
sessing PPP performance, the different goals that various actors pursue in the project 
should be taken into account (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). This can be done by includ-
ing the notion of ‘satisfaction’ as one of the criteria to assess PPP performance (e.g. 
Verweij, 2015). Establishing to what extent and why partners consider the partnership 
to be successful allows for the inclusion of multiple, contradictory, and dynamic goals.
6.2.2. Contractual and relational success factors for PPP performance
To assess PPP performance, scholars have tried to explain success and failure of PPP 
projects by determining critical success factors (e.g. Li et al., 2005; Jefferies, 2006). 
Several of these success factors are derived from relevant theories such as transac-
tion cost theory, principal–agent theory, and literature on complex contracting and 
(network) governance.
 The importance of well-written contracts and more specifically the role of perfor-
mance indicators, sanctions and risk allocation in PPPs is strongly inspired by transac-
tion cost theory and principal–agent theory. In these theories opportunistic behaviour 
plays an important role; hence, the rational behaviour of actors will lead them to use 
any situation to their own advantage. Especially when the exchange between parties, 
or more specifically between principals (clients) and agents (contractors), is character-
ised by incomplete information and information asymmetries, parties may use these 
asymmetries strategically (Williamson, 1979; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To deal with 
this opportunistic behaviour, contracts are used to structure the exchange between 
principals and agents so they can both benefit from its win-win potential (Brown et al., 
2016: 295). These contracts consist of both products’ rules, specifying the features and 
functions of the product, and exchange rules, specifying what is needed to execute 
the exchange (Brown et al., 2016), such as agreements on performance, risk alloca-
tion, payments, and sanctions.
Two conditions that are included in the contract with the aim of preventing op-
portunistic behaviour are agreements on the allocation of risks and the possibility to 
employ sanctions (see Hodge & Greve, 2007; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Akintoye et al., 
2008). The literature on PPP emphasizes that the strength of a DBFMO contract lies 
in the requirement for private consortia to invest in the project, as a result of which 
risks are transferred from the public to the private partner (Bing et al., 2005ª; De 
Palma et al., 2012). This adjustment in property rights creates strong incentives for 
the private partner to perform. Inspired by transaction cost theory and the principal–
agent theory, the PPP literature considers sanctions to be a crucial ingredient of the 
contract governing the partnership. The possibility of applying sanctions provides the 
principal with steering options to make sure that the agent performs and abides by 
the contract. Without sanctions, principals would not have the means to mitigate op-
140
portunistic behaviour by contractors and the latter might not perform up to standard 
(Savas, 2000; Hodge & Greve, 2007). Thus, the possibility of employing sanctions, to 
keep contractors in line in projects where the contractor does not have all the neces-
sary information, is crucial for good performance. Both risk allocation and sanctions 
fit in as mechanisms to prevent opportunistic behaviour and keep contractors in line.
However, the exchange between partners in these projects is usually rather 
complex. This makes it impossible to write down all product and exchange rules, 
because neither client nor contractor can foresee and regulate all contingencies that 
may impact the realisation of the project upfront (Bertelli & Smith, 2009; Brown et 
al., 2016). This results in incomplete contracting. Combined with uncertainty and 
specific investments in the project, this may lead to a complex contracting challenge 
(Brown et al., 2016). To fill the gap left by incomplete contracts, relationships are 
pivotal in ensuring good performance. The role of ‘soft’ or ‘relational’ conditions is 
highlighted in literature about collaborative governance, network governance, and 
relational contracting. The latter theory builds on neo-economic institutionalism, but 
acknowledges the incomplete nature of contracts. Rather than making the contract 
more extensive and detailed, relational contracting gives room to social relationships. 
Partnerships are embedded in social relationships. In these social relationships mu-
tual trust and norms of flexibility, solidarity and sharing information are pivotal in 
ensuring good performance (Granovetter, 1985; Deakin & Wilkinson, 1998; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002; Zeng et al., 2008). They allow partners to respond to exogenous shocks 
and enable partners to improve the formal arrangements in the contract (Bertelli & 
Smith, 2009). Literature on governance is often inspired by sociological institutional-
ism, acknowledging that actors do not exclusively behave according to the principles 
of economic rationality and following the logic of consequences by basing behaviour 
on cost-benefit calculations (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Instead, 
actors are also seen as intrinsically motivated, sensitive to expectations about role 
performance, social pressures, and norms and values like reciprocity, fairness, and 
legitimacy. Behaviour is based on a logic of appropriateness; actors behave according to 
what they see as appropriate and assess behaviour of others likewise (March & Olsen, 
1984; Hall & Tayler, 1996).
Trust stands out as a core concept in all these bodies of literature, including theories 
about collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008), network governance (Provan 
et al., 2009; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª), and relational contracting theories (Deakin 
& Wilkinson, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Trust can be defined as “the expectation of 
an actor A that another actor B will abstain from opportunistic behaviour when the opportunity 
for it arises” (Klijn et al., 2010: 196; see also Rousseau et al., 1998). If parties mutually 
trust each other, they are convinced their partners will not behave opportunistically. 
Therefore, they will be prepared to invest their resources in the joint collaboration, 
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share information and make investments in innovative, uncertain activities. Trust is 
then seen as a facilitating condition for performance in the sense that it mitigates 
opportunistic behaviour, facilitates the flow of information, and stimulates partners 
to invest in the project (see Ring & van der Ven, 1992; Sako, 1998; McEvily & Zaheer, 
2006).
Both the collaborative governance and governance network literature also empha-
size the importance of process management activities to manage the relationship 
between partners. Even despite high levels of trust or well-written contracts, conflicts 
are likely to emerge since actors have different perceptions and interests (Bertelli & 
Smith, 2009; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016ª). In contrast to transaction cost theory, which 
tends to deal with conflict through contracts and sanctions, the governance literature 
tries to solve conflicts using conflict management (see also Huxham & Vangen, 2005; 
Ansell & Gash, 2008). Conflict management includes the extent to which public and 
private partners adequately know how to mitigate and handle conflicts that arise 
during the project implementation, and prevent the escalation of these conflicts us-
ing conflict management strategies: bringing partners together, bridging differences 
by mediation and arbitration (Koppenjan, 2007). Conflict management implies the 
design and application of conflict regulation mechanisms beyond formal juridical 
procedures that are often lengthy, costly and inaccessible. It also implies identifying 
potential conflicts in a proactive way and taking measures before negative emotions 
and the rise of adversarial strategic positions turn disagreements into conflict (Fisher 
et al., 1997).
6.2.3. Which combinations matter?
Based on underlying theories on the exchange between public and private actors, 
complex contracting, and (network) governance we identified four core conditions 
that might be important for successful PPP performance. Research has shown that 
contractual and relational conditions are not mutually exclusive, but complement 
each other (see for example Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012). There-
fore, we now turn to the question of how these conditions may complement each 
other.
Using the idea that it is the combination of contractual and relational aspects that 
make PPPs successful, we expect that the presence of either risk allocation or the 
strict application of sanctions is necessary for outstanding performance, just as the 
presence of either trust or conflict management is necessary. The question then is 
how these conditions can be combined, and which combinations are sufficient for 
good PPP performance.
First, the combination of both contractual conditions, risk allocation and a strict 
application of sanctions, is not sufficient for good PPP performance, because contracts 
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are incomplete and lack the flexibility to deal with unforeseen events (Williamson, 
1979; Bertelli & Smith, 2009; Brown et al., 2016). A well-balanced risk allocation to for-
mally record each partners’ responsibilities forms a strong incentive for both partners 
to perform, and thus certainly contributes to good results, but it is unlikely that it will 
be able to cope with all possible uncertainties. So, the agreements on the allocation of 
foreseeable risks made at the start of the project have to be complemented by a condi-
tion that can help deal with unforeseen circumstances during the project. Both trust, 
which would stimulate the exchange of information on these new emerging issues, 
and conflict management, as a constant way to monitor and deal with potential issues, 
could do so. They can facilitate the process to reach consensus on how to deal with 
unforeseen events and align both partners. This would suggest that a combination of 
risk allocation and trust, or a combination of risk allocation and conflict management 
are sufficient for good PPP performance.
Second, if we look at the governance network and collaborative governance litera-
ture, trust could almost be regarded as a necessary condition. This literature high-
lights the existence of high levels of trust as the way to cope with external shocks, 
unexpected events and the complexity of projects (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn et al., 
2010). Although many governance scholars consider trust as pivotal for collaborative 
processes, a combination of solely relational conditions seems also unlikely as trust 
needs time to develop and grow. Certainly in the first phases of a project, high levels 
of trust are not likely to be present. Formal agreements are then needed to realize 
the exchange between partners. The expectation, therefore, is that trust alone is not 
sufficient to achieve good PPP performance. Besides, previous research has shown 
that a successful partnership in the absence of trust is possible (Cook et al., 2005). This 
means that we expect trust not to be a necessary condition for successful public–pri-
vate partnerships. It is also unlikely that conflict management on its own will be a 
sufficient condition, because the transaction costs of conflict management are high, 
especially in the absence of trust or any pre-defined contractual agreements on the 
role and responsibilities of the partners in the project.
That is not to say that trust and conflict management are not important in explain-
ing the success of PPPs. If trust is lacking, the need for managing the relations will 
be very high to cope with uncertainty and unexpected events. This reinforces our 
expectation that either trust or conflict management is necessary for successful PPPs.
Based on the previously discussed theories, both sanctions and trust are mecha-
nisms to enforce compliance, but they are rooted in very different ideas on how to 
deal with opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty (see for instance Lane & Bachman, 
1998; Nooteboom, 2000). Whereas the transaction cost theory and the principal–agent 
theory primarily focus on the use of sanctions, governance theories opt for a more 
soft approach through the use of process management, emphasizing trust building 
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or conflict management. In this respect, the combination of a strict application of 
sanctions and trust seems unlikely as the implementation of sanctions has a risk of 
damaging trust (Ring & van der Ven, 1992). This means we may further specify our 
expectation that a combination of risk allocation and trust is sufficient for good PPP 
performance. Based on the above argument, the combination of risk allocation and 
trust, combined with the absence of sanctions, is expected to be sufficient for success-
ful PPPs. Since sanctions, trust and conflict management might be able to replace each 
other as mechanisms to enforce compliance and deal with opportunistic behaviour, 
our expectation is that neither one of these conditions is a necessary condition for 
good PPP performance. The question then is if the remaining condition, risk alloca-
tion, is a necessary condition for successful PPPs. Is it possible to have well-performing 
PPP projects without a clear risk allocation? One could argue that this is possible, for 
example, when the risks do not occur during the project. This would lead us to expect 
that risk allocation is not a necessary condition for good PPP performance.
6.3. A FSQCA OF 25 PROJECTS IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 
BELGIUM
To test how contractual and relational characteristics jointly affect PPP performance, 
25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and Flanders were studied. In this section we first 
elaborate on the empirical setting and the data collection. Next, the focus is on fuzzy 
set QCA, the analytical tool used in this study. Finally, we turn to the operationalisa-
tion and calibration of the conditions.
6.3.1. PPP projects in the Netherlands and Belgium
The data used to study the combined effect of contractual and relational aspects on 
PPP performance stems from 25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and Belgium (Flan-
ders) that were examined in the period between June 2016 and April 2017. All projects 
can be categorized as long-term infrastructure contractual partnerships and include 
the design, build, and maintenance of a product or service. Most projects also include 
a private finance component (only a few projects use public financing), and in about 
half the projects, the operation of the service is incorporated as well. The projects are 
a balanced reflection of the existing PPP projects in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
including both transport infrastructure projects (roads, railways, and sluices) and 
social infrastructure projects (swimming pools, prisons, and government buildings) 
ordered by national and local governments. To be included, projects should be close 
to finishing the construction phase, in which case all important decisions with regard 
to the construction were made and most risks were mitigated, or in the operational 
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phase for less than 5 years. This allowed respondents to describe the course of the 
project and the performance thus far. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the selected 
projects ranged by country, type of project, and the level at which these projects are 
realized.
Country Type of PPP Level
The Netherlands (13) Transport infrastructure (7) National (7)
Local (0)
Social infrastructure (6) National (3)
Local (3)
Belgium (12) Transport infrastructure (6) National (6)
Local (0)
Social infrastructure (6) National (2)
Local (4)
Table 6.1. Characteristics of selected PPP projects
The data were gathered using different data collection methods. In total, we con-
ducted 71 semi-structured interviews with 74 public and private professionals who 
are or have been closely involved in the particular projects. Prior to the interviews, 
respondents were asked to fill out a survey about the project. Of the respondents, 72 
complied with this request. After the data collection, all interviews were transcribed 
and coded using Nvivo. Furthermore, we used official progress reports from the Dutch 
and Flemish government to check on time delivery of the projects.
6.3.2. Set-Theoretic Methods: a fsQCA
In this article, a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), which is a set 
theoretical method, is used to analyse the data. Set theoretic methods have a few 
defining characteristics. First of all, the relations between social phenomena are 
modelled in terms of set relations (Ragin 2000). Cases – which could be, for example, 
individuals, projects, or countries – are perceived as members or as non-members of a 
set. The processed data about the different cases reflect the membership of each case 
in a set. Thus, it establishes qualitative, rather than quantitative, differences between 
cases, which is a second characteristic of set theoretical methods. Finally, the results 
stemming from set theoretic methods emphasize the existence of causal complex-
ity. Often there are several combinations of conditions that are able to produce the 
outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In a fsQCA, relations are discussed in terms 
of necessity and sufficiency. When a condition is necessary, the outcome cannot be 
produced without the presence of that condition. Hence, every time the outcome is 
present, the necessary condition has to be present as well. Sufficiency means that the 
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presence of a condition always results in the outcome. However, the outcome may 
occur without the condition being present (see e.g. Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
The two main parameters of fit used to analyse results of a fsQCA are consistency and 
coverage. The first refers to the degree in which the empirical evidence supports the 
relations found. The latter explains how well the available empirical data is explained 
by the conditions, or in other words how many cases are covered by a single solution 
term (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
We choose to use a fsQCA for our analysis for several reasons. First, as stated above, 
a fsQCA is highly suitable for systematically analysing combinations of conditions 
(so-called configurations), which is congruent with the aim of this paper (Ragin, 2000). 
Furthermore, a QCA is applicable to use for a medium number of cases (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012). Unlike statistical analysis or comparative case studies, a QCA 
allows for the use of both in-depth case knowledge and identifying commonalities 
between cases by systematically comparing them (Verweij & Gerrits, 2013). Finally, 
a fuzzy set QCA is preferred over a crisp set QCA because, rather than only using 
dichotomous sets, fsQCA allows for different degrees of membership in sets. They in-
clude more nuanced information than crisp sets, distinguishing between differences 
in cases both in kind and in degree. This results in a higher content validity (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012).
6.3.3. Calibrating the conditions
In a fsQCA, conditions and outcomes are considered sets. During the so-called calibra-
tion process, each case will receive a score between 0 and 1 displaying its membership 
in each of the conditions and the outcome. Important in this process is the cross-over 
point of 0.5. Scores higher than 0.5 indicate that a case is “more in than out” a set, 
whereas scores below 0.5 mean that a case is “more out than in” that particular set 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This process results in qualitatively different cases. In 
this article, we used a fuzzy set scale with four scores ranging from full membership 
(1) via scores of 0.67 and 0.33 to full non-membership (0).
The calibration process requires in-depth case knowledge gathered by the research-
ers and theoretical knowledge about the conceptual meaning of the condition and 
its potential effect on the outcome. The calibration process is an interplay between 
theoretical reasoning and in-depth case knowledge (see for example Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). This results in strong links between theory and data and thus cre-
ates high content validity. Scholars from the Netherlands and Belgium shared their 
expertise about the 25 cases to ensure a careful calibration process. In addition to this 
case knowledge, robustness tests (see Appendix XIII) helped to control for potential 
measurement errors (Skaaning, 2011). In this article, we study outstanding perfor-
mance in PPP projects, using risk allocation, the application of sanctions, conflict 
146
management, and mutual trust between partners as conditions. In this section, we 
elaborate on how the four conditions and the outcome are calibrated (see also Table 
6.2 and Appendix XII).
Condition Components Main data source Principles guiding the calibration
Performance 
(OP)
-  On time delivery
-  On budget delivery
-  Value for money
-  Satisfaction with 
performance
Survey data -  Different goals, so different 
indicators included.
-  Project should be a success for both 
partners. Disagreement in assessing 
performance results in lower set 
membership scores.
-  Qualitative interview data is used to 
adjust and check the scores.
Risk allocation 
(RA)
-  Risk allocated to private 
partner
-  Risk allocated to public 
partner
-  Size of risk
Interview data -  Risks are formally allocated 
according to contract.
-  The underlying assumption is that 
partners should be able to carry the 




-  Consistently imposing 
obligatory sanctions
-  Consistently imposing 
optional sanctions
-  Opportunities to discuss 
the application of sanctions
Survey and 
interview data
-  Sanctions should be applied 





-  Nature (formal/ informal)
-  Focus (prevention/ control)
-  Timing (proactive/ reactive)
-  Attention for potential 
sensitive issues
Interview data -  Use of informal mechanisms indicate 
extra effort to deal with conflicts.
-  In conflict management there should 
also be attention given to preventing 
conflict.
Trust (T) -  Honouring commitments
-  Giving partners the benefit 
of the doubt
-  Taking into account each 
other’s interests
-  Intentions of partners
-  Use of efforts for their own 
gain.
Survey data -  Trust should be mutual. If one of 
both partners should experience 
little trust, there is no high level of 
trust within the project.
-  Respondents might have been 
hesitant to give low scores on this 
sensitive topic.
Table 6.2 Overview of calibration method
Performance
In this article we have defined successful PPPs as projects with outstanding per-
formance (OP). To measure performance a combination of classic performance 
measures (on time delivery, on budget delivery, and value for money) and a softer 
operationalisation of perceived performance (satisfaction) was used (see Table 6.2). 
These four indicators are measured using survey statements with a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’. Each indicator was 
calibrated separately. Based on the idea that a partnership should include benefits for 
both partners, we considered projects only to be successful if both public and private 
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partners state that the results of the project are good. Projects scored a full member-
ship score of 1 when both public and private partners agreed with a positive state-
ment regarding performance. Differences in opinion resulted in lower scores (0.67 for 
minor differences, 0.33 for major differences). If both partners agreed on insufficient 
performance, the project got a score of 0 for that specific indicator. Projects that were 
still under construction received a score of 0.51 (just ‘in’), because – at the time of the 
data collection – the projects run according to planning and had no budget overruns 
so far. Moreover, there were no indications of expected delays of budget overruns 
that would potentially justify a score below the cross over point of 0.5. Projects under 
construction which already had severe time- and budget overruns were given a score 
below 0.5.
Afterwards, the calibrated indicators were combined to determine a score for the 
condition ‘outstanding performance’. If a project had one or more negative scores 
on the ‘objective’ measurements of performance (i.e. ‘on time delivery’, ‘on budget 
delivery’, and ‘value for money’), then the project received a score below the cross 
over point (see Appendix XII for the results of the calibration process). The item ‘satis-
faction’ was used to determine the final score. Very low scores on satisfaction resulted 
in the lowering of the project score, while high satisfaction scores could lead to an 
increase of the performance scores. If the assessment of the ‘traditional’ performance 
measures and the satisfaction of the partners showed substantial differences, qualita-
tive interview data was used to study the justification for these scores.
Risk allocation
One of the main principles behind risk allocation (RA) in PPPs is that risks should 
be allocated to the partner who is best able to carry or mitigate these risks (Bing et 
al., 2005ª). Although many standardized contracts seem to suggest that most risks 
are to be transferred to the private partner, the unique context in which the project 
takes place, the perspectives of partners on risks, and the capabilities of partners to 
carry risks may result in different risk allocations for different projects. Therefore, in 
calibrating the condition risk allocation, we focus on the question whether the risks 
are divided between the public and the private partner (score > 0.5), or whether the 
private partner carries all the risks (score < 0.5). The underlying assumption is that 
risks should be assigned to the partner who is best able to control and carry them, 
resulting in a distribution of risks between both partners. Projects in which multiple 
substantial risks were divided between the public and the private partners scored a 1. 
A score of 0.67 was assigned to a project if only a few yet substantial risks were divided 
between the partners. A score of 0.33 was given when most risks were assigned to the 
private partner, while the public partner carried barely any risks, or only risks with 
a rather low risk profile. Finally, projects were given a set membership score of 0 
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when all risks were assigned to the private partner, regardless of whether the private 
partner was capable of carrying these risks or not.
Strict Application of Sanctions
Sanctions (S) are included in the contracts underlying PPP projects. The public partner 
is obliged to impose some of these sanctions on the private partner, for example, 
when the infrastructural project is not available. Besides these ‘obliged sanctions’, the 
contract includes a number of penalties which can be imposed, but where an alterna-
tive is also offered: the private partner is – instead of a sanction – given a recovery 
time by which the problem should be fixed. Membership scores are based on the use 
of both types of sanctions, using both qualitative data and quantitative data on the ap-
plication of sanctions (see Table 6.2). Moreover, room for discussion between partners 
about the application of sanctions is taken into account. It might occur that partners 
within a project disagree on whether or not sanctions are imposed. They might have 
different situations in mind when answering the question, lack a complete overview 
of all imposed and not-imposed sanctions, or they might have a different opinion 
on when one ‘deviates’ from a rule. In these cases, the interview data on situations 
in which sanctions are (not) imposed is used to decide the membership score of the 
project.
Conflict management
In the calibration process of the condition ‘conflict management’, multiple dimen-
sions of conflict management (CM) were included. First, the nature of the agreements 
on conflict management was taken into account. Having both formal and informal 
mechanisms instead of merely formal mechanisms indicates that extra efforts were 
made to manage potential conflicts. Second, the focus of conflict management mecha-
nisms can be on preventing, controlling, or solving conflicts, or a combination of 
these. Conflict management should not only consist of measurements to solve conflicts 
after they arise; it should also include preventive measurements to manage difference 
of opinion so that these differences do not turn into conflicts. A third dimension is 
the timing of these agreements. Early implementation of agreements about conflict 
management points toward the recognition of the relevance of conflict management. 
It shows that the partners in the project anticipate the possibility that differences 
of opinion might end up in conflict. When agreements are drafted after an incident 
occurs, this is a sign of reactive behaviour, indicating that partners did not take suf-
ficient precautions early on in the project. Finally, we focus on signals that indicate 
early attention for potential sensitive issues. Do managers bring up these issues at an 
early stage to leave enough time to discuss them? The qualitative interview data on 
the above dimensions is supplemented with quantitative data. By using the Generic 
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membership Evaluation Template (GMET) of Tóth et al. (2017) the data are calibrated 
(for an example, see Appendix XII). This template allows scholars to systematically 
evaluate cases on a single condition using predominantly qualitative data. A score of 
1 was given if all dimensions were evaluated positively. The more dimensions were 
scored negatively, the lower the calibrated score.
Trust
In determining the set membership score for the condition trust (T), we used quantita-
tive survey data of five indicators, each with a 10-point answering scale (see Table 6.2 
for an overview, and for an extended explanation Appendix XII). These indicators are 
used and tested in prior research (see e.g. Klijn et al., 2010; Warsen et al., 2018) and 
form a fairly stable measurement to test trust. The condition trust was calibrated by 
adding up the scores of the five indicators for each respondent, resulting in scores be-
tween the minimum of 5 and the maximum of 50. Considering the mutual character 
of trust, we selected the lowest score on trust per project as the basis for a projects’ 
set membership score in trust. This score was transformed into a membership score 
between 0 and 1, using the Tosmana thresholdsetter to gain insight into the clusters 
that exist in our data (Cronqvist, 2017). The thresholds suggested by the threshold set-
ter are 24.75, 30.5, and 36.25. However, as these thresholds separate cases that, based 
on the empirical data, should be given similar scores, we adjust the scores slightly. 
The thresholds used in calibrating the condition of trust are therefore 25.01, a cross-
over point of 30.5, and 40.01. The cross-over point is higher than the middle score of 
25, as earlier research has shown that trust is a sensitive topic and respondents might 
be hesitant to give extremely low scores on this topic. Moreover, the relationship 
between public and private partners is an ongoing relationship in all PPP projects. 
Therefore, even though respondents who participated in this project are guaranteed 
anonymity, the prospect of an ongoing relationship might play a role in assessing the 
statements. Finally, since this condition is about high levels of trust, one might debate 
whether scoring half of the maximum number is considered a ‘high’ score.
6.4. RESULTS: WHICH CONDITIONS MATTER MOST?
The analysis was performed using the QCA and SetMethod packages in R (Medzihor-
sky et al., 2016; Dusa, 2017). A first step was to perform an analysis of necessity to 
test whether a single condition was necessary for outstanding performance in PPP 
projects. Following Ragin (2000), the minimal consistency benchmark for necessity 
is set at 0.9. As Table 6.3 shows, none of the four conditions (neither in its absence or 
presence) is a necessary condition for the presence of good PPP outcomes. Based on 
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our theoretical expectations, we also tested whether either risk allocation or sanc-
tions (RA+S) or either trust or conflict management (T+CM) are necessary. The analysis 
shows that the latter is true.
Condition Consistency Coverage RoN
Trust (T) 0.865 0.761 0.766
Risk allocation (RA) 0.676 0.757 0.840
Conflict management (CM) 0.675 0.658 0.741
Strict application of sanctions (S) 0.619 0.545 0.633
Absence of trust (~T) 0.483 0.542 0.736
Absence of risk allocation (~RA) 0.539 0.474 0.599
Absence of conflict management (~CM) 0.486 0.485 0.665
Absence of strict application of sanctions (~S) 0.622 0.697 0.808
Trust or conflict management (T+CM) 0.920 0.679 0.608
Table 6.3 Analysis of necessity for the outcome ‘outstanding performance’
Next, we turned to the analysis of sufficiency. A distinction (see Table 6.4) is made 
between cases with a set membership score in the outcome above the cross-over point 
(0.5) and those with a membership score below the cross-over point.
Outcome # cases Cases
0 13 P1NG, P2BG, P3NTI, P4NG, P5BTI, P6BTI, P9NG, P10BTI, P11NTI, P12BG, P13BG, P16NG, 
P17BG,
1 12 P7NTI, P8NTI, P14NTI, P15NTI, P18NTI, P19BTI, P20NG, P21BTI, P22BTI, P23NG, P24BG, 
P25BG
Table 6.4 Set membership scores of cases in the outcome ‘outstanding performance’
The truth table is then constructed (see Table 6.5). The truth table displays all logi-
cally possible combinations of conditions (configurations) and assigns the empirical 
cases to one of these configurations. For the truth table we selected a consistency 
threshold of 0.8. This is well above the required level of 0.75 (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012) and coincides with a gap in consistency scores visible in the data (see Vis, 2009). 
Given the limited number of cases, we use a frequency threshold of 1 (based on Ragin, 
2008).
Initially, this leaves us with eight configurations for the analysis. However, further 
study of Table 6.5 shows that a number of logically contradictory truth table rows exist 
with a consistency score above the threshold of 0.8 (e.g. row 12 and 16). The empiri-
cal material shows that the configuration presented by that specific truth table row 
produces both the presence as well as the absence of the outcome. Despite attempts 
to solve these contradictory truth table rows prior to the analysis (e.g. by adding 
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conditions and recalibrating the conditions and/or the outcome), the contradiction 
remains. Therefore, we deal with these rows during the process of logical minimisa-
tion (see Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 120-123). In deciding which rows to include 
and exclude from the analysis, we plot each truth table row against the outcome to 
see whether there are deviant cases consistency in kind (true logical contradictions). 
Two truth table rows, row 12 and 10, only include deviant cases consistency in kind 
(respectively P13BG and P9NG). The consistency level would allow us to include the 
row, but the only empirical case assigned to this configuration is not a member of the 
outcome. The consistency value is only driven upward by cases that are not members 
of the truth table row. Therefore, we declare these rows insufficient for the outcome 
‘outstanding performance’. Truth table rows 14 and 16 also include deviant cases 
consistency in kind (respectively P10BTI and P11NTI). However, the decision here is 
less clear cut since the other cases assigned to the truth table rows are consistent 
members of both the row and the outcome. Thorough study of the qualitative data 
on P10BTI and P11NTI shows that these cases perform quite well, and just fall out of 
the set of outstanding performance because one of the partners went over budget to 
realize the projects. On all other aspects of the outcome, the projects score fairly well. 
Therefore, we decide to include the truth table rows 14 and 16 in the minimisation 
process. This means six configurations are included for the analysis, namely row 15, 
8, 14, 16, 11 and 13 (see Table 6.5).
Row T RA CM S Outcome N Incl. PRI Cases
15 1 1 1 0 1 3 0.929 0.859 P7NTI, P14NTI, P18NTI
8 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.909 0.801 P20NG
14 1 1 0 1 1 2 0.898 0.796 P10BTI, P23NG
16 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.865 0.714 P11NTI, P15NTI, P24BG
10 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.855 0.596 P9NG
11 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.847 0.602 P8NTI
12 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.844 0.596 P13BG
13 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.834 0.752 P22BTI
6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.798 0.596 P6BTI
9 1 0 0 0 0 5 0.713 0.556 P5BTI, P12BG, P19BTI, P21BTI, P25BG
3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.614 0.166 P1NG
2 0 0 0 1 0 5 0.546 0.179 P2BG, P3NTI, P4NG, P16NG, P17BG
1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - -
4 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - -
5 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - -
7 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - -
Table 6.5 Truth table for the outcome ‘outstanding performance’
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Then, the six remaining configurations were minimised into solution formulas 
that explain which configurations are sufficient for the outcome. The conservative 
solution term in Table 6.6 shows three different configurations which may lead to 
outstanding performance in PPP projects. Each of the configurations explains at least 
one truth table row, which is not explained by the others.
Configurations → Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
T*RA RA*CM*S T*CM*~S
Consistency 0.845 0.823 0.901
Raw coverage 0.594 0.377 0.485
Unique coverage 0.109 0.028 0.135
Solution consistency 0.823
Solution coverage 0.757
Table 6.6 Solution for outstanding performance10
The consistency scores for each single configuration and for the entire solution 
term are rather high. In fact, 82.3 percent of the empirical evidence is in line with 
the solution term. Moreover, 75.7 percent of the outcome ‘outstanding performance’ 
is covered by one or more of the three configurations. The intermediate solution 
term11 is identical to the conservative solution term presented above, while the most 
parsimonious solution term only shows minor differences (see also Appendix XIII).
The first configuration consists of the combination trust and good risk allocation 
(T*RA). It suggests that after a clear risk allocation has been determined mutual 
trust between partners throughout the project is sufficient to result in outstanding 
performance. The second configuration (RA*CM*S) combined two ‘hard’ conditions 
(risk allocation and strict application of sanctions) with one ‘soft’ condition (conflict 
management). If there are fair and clear agreements regarding risk allocation, which 
are enforced (through strict application of sanctions), and there are agreements on 
how to proceed in case of disagreement or conflict, high levels of trust are not es-
sential. Finally, the third configuration (T*CM*~S) is all about relational aspects, thus 
combining ‘soft’ conditions such as trust and conflict management, with the absence 
of strict application of sanctions. This configuration indicates that relational aspects 
are very important for the success of PPPs. When partners trust each other and have 
10 Note: The ~ before a letter refers to the absence of a condition. So, in path 2 the S refers to the 
presence of strict application of sanctions, while in path 3 ~S indicates the absence of strict 
application of sanctions.
11 The intermediate solution term (T*RA + RA*CM*S + T*CM*~S) includes the expectation that 
all conditions have a positive effect on the outcome. The most parsimonious solution term 
(T*RA + RA*CM + T*CM*~S) shows minimal differences from both other solution terms.
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a well-organized conflict management with early attention given to sensitive issues, 
the absence of strict application of sanctions is necessary to provide partners with 
the opportunity to propose a solution based on their good relationship. The flexibility 
implied by the absence of strict application of sanctions is used to create solutions 
that enhance PPP project performance. Mutual trust ensures that this flexibility does 
not lead to opportunistic behaviour from either one of the partners.
Closer study of the configurations shows that only project P19BTI, P21BTI and 
P25BG are not explained by this solution formula. These projects display high levels 
of trust, but are not in the set for any of the other conditions. Although these cases 
have an outstanding performance, two other PPP projects (P5BTI, P12BG) with the 
exact same set membership scores in the conditions fail to deliver. Four of the other 
projects with outstanding performance are uniquely covered cases, meaning that they 
hold a membership value higher than 0.5 in only one sufficient path (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). For the first path (T*RA), these are P22BTI and P23NG. Case P20NG 
is only covered by path 2 (RA*CM*S), and case P8NTI only holds a membership value 
over 0.5 in path 3 (T*CM*~S). As a result, the unique coverage is rather low, especially 
in path 2. Only 2.8 percent of the outcome is explained specifically by this path, 
because three of the four cases covered by path 2 also display high levels of mutual 
trust (T). These cases are therefore also covered by path 1, so the three paths partially 
overlap. Several cases hold a membership value higher than 0.5 in multiple paths 
(e.g. projects P7NTI, P14NTI, and P24BG). These cases are always explained by path 
1 (as a combination of path 2 and 3 is impossible). As a result, path 1 consists of a 
mix of different projects where there usually is both a decent relationship between 
partners and well-considered agreements on the execution of the project. The dif-
ference between all cases covered by path 1 might be explained by the way projects 
deal with the use of sanctions. In some projects, it is commonly accepted to impose 
sanctions strictly as it is in line with earlier made agreements. Applying sanctions 
consistently thus results in clarity and predictability and therefore is not considered 
to be negative. These projects are not only covered by path 1, but also by path 2. 
Projects that are covered by both path 1 and path 3 are inclined to be less strict in the 
application of sanctions as a token of good will, for example when an issue does not 
cause any hindrance to the project partners or other stakeholders. Furthermore, path 
3 stands out as it is the only path that does not display a combination of contractual 
and relational aspects. Instead, it builds on both relational conditions, trust and con-
flict management. The case that is uniquely covered by this path is very conscious of 
the importance of good personal relations between partners. Therefore, it pays a lot of 
attention to the relationship between the partners and organizes activities to build up 
and maintain good relations and high levels of mutual trust. This is much less the case 
for the project that is uniquely covered by path 2. The focus is predominantly on the 
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final product. The relationship between client and contractor is not so much a ‘we’ll 
work it out together’- attitude, but more business-like. Although a good relationship is 
possible, this is not the main focus of the partners working in the project.
Moreover, as the cases in our study consist of different types of PPP projects in two 
different countries, we tested the outcomes for the existing clusters in our data to see 
if the results vary over the different clusters (see also Appendix XIII). It is noticeable 
that there seems to be little difference across countries or project types. The analysis 
shows no signs of strong differences across country or between project types. There 
is only a small degree of heterogeneity between country and project type for the path 
RA*CM*S. Finally, we did a cluster analysis for differences between cases on a local 
and national level. The analysis shows no sign of differences between these clusters.
6.5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The aim of this article was to study how contractual and relational aspects comple-
ment and strengthen each other in successful PPP projects. The analysis shows three 
different mixes of conditions that match with high-performing projects, indicating 
that there are multiple ways to achieve successful PPPs. In two of the three pathways 
contractual and relational conditions are combined. This applies to path 1, which 
suggests a mix of trust (T) and risk allocation (RA), and path 2, which combines risk 
allocation (RA), conflict management (CM), the strict application of sanctions (S). 
These configurations are in line with the theoretical expectations in earlier studies 
(for example Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012) and show that contrac-
tual and relational conditions can indeed function as complements. The third path 
(T*CM*~S) puts more emphasis on the importance of relational aspects. Our findings 
confirm our expectations that no single condition alone is necessary or sufficient for 
outstanding performance. A mix of different conditions is needed. Moreover, there are 
several combinations that form a good match in successful PPPs. This seems to us an 
important theoretical contribution to the scientific debate. Various causal pathways 
are possible, and we need to further deepen our knowledge on these pathways and 
our understanding of how they work.
Comparing the results to our earlier theoretical expectations, a few things stand out. 
First, the theory of incomplete contracting holds. Our analysis shows that contractual 
aspects have to be complemented by relational aspects. So, this study confirms our 
expectation that RA*S is not sufficient for the outcome. Simultaneously, at least one of 
the relational conditions (T+CM) is necessary for outstanding performance. In path 1 
trust complements the allocation of risks, and in path 2 conflict management comple-
ments both contractual conditions. We also find the expected combination of RA*T 
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in the study. The combinations RA*CM is only sufficient combined with the strict 
application of sanctions. A second issue that stands out is that, although contractual 
aspects need to be complemented with relational aspects, our study also suggests that 
a mix of both is not strictly necessary. Path 3 attaches far greater importance to rela-
tional aspects (T*CM*~S). The flexibility that occurs when partners refrain from strict 
application of sanctions can – if combined with high levels of trust and good conflict 
management – result in outstanding performance. This means that our initial expec-
tation that either risk allocation or strict application of sanctions (RA+S) is necessary 
for outstanding performance is refuted. One of the main theoretical contributions of 
this paper thus relates to the role of relational aspects. Relational aspects do not only 
complement contractual aspects, but a combination of only relational conditions can 
be sufficient to achieve successful public–private partnerships. Third, our theoretical 
expectation that trust and a strict application of sanctions are incompatible does not 
hold. The three paths do not rule out the combination of trust and strict application 
of sanctions, despite our earlier expectations (see also Ring & van der Ven, 1992). For 
example, some cases covered by the combination of path 1 (T*RA) do apply sanctions 
strictly (S) and while other cases covered by path 1 are more lenient (~S). Therefore, 
the conditions S is removed in the process of minimisation. The same applies with 
trust in path 2. So, there are several successful PPP projects that display high levels 
of trust and apply sanctions strictly. Perhaps, strict but consistent application of sanc-
tions makes partners predictable, which might lead to more trust. We could also argue 
that high levels of trust help to accept sanctions, as one would not believe that their 
partner would impose sanctions just for their own gain. Finally, this paper includes 
important theoretical lessons on the role of trust in PPP performance. Two out of three 
configurations include trust as a so-called INUS condition12, and the path without trust 
(RA*CM*S) has only limited unique coverage. In our study, only one project (P20NG) is 
explained exclusively by this path. This confirms the important role scholars attach 
to trust in PPPs (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn et al., 2010). However, our results 
also show that trust is not a necessary condition for outstanding performance. There 
are alternatives; if trust is lacking, other mechanisms have to be inserted to manage 
uncertainty in the project.
As with any study, this study also has its limitations. In the first place, there are 
some limitations in assessing outcomes for PPP projects. One limitation concerns the 
uncertainty and dynamics in these complex public–private partnership projects. As 
the projects are still ongoing (most in the operationalisation phase) their performance 
as assessed in this study is not their final performance. Things might change over time, 
12 An INUS conditions is an insufficient, but necessary part of a conditions which in itself is 
unnecessary but sufficient for the occurence of the outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
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which might result in a different set membership in the conditions or the outcome. 
This QCA analysis only provides a snapshot of the projects and thus provides no guar-
antee for future performances of these PPP projects. Another limitation concerns the 
risk of reversed causality. Especially given the reciprocal relationship between trust 
and performance, reversed causality might be possible in our study. After all, theoreti-
cal arguments about the relationship between performance and trust can be made 
both ways. In the formulation of the questions to the respondents we tried to limit 
the risk of reversed causality. For example, our questions about performance refer to 
performance at this very moment, whereas the questions referring to trust suggest a 
longer time span. These questions are supposed to be answered with the construction 
phase in mind and aim to measure trust over the past period. More importantly, even 
in case of reversed causality, the conclusions of this study hold. Trust, here analysed 
as an important condition for outstanding performance, after all remains important, 
even if trust is caused by previous performance. Nevertheless, reversed causality 
remains a risk we are not able to completely exclude in this study. A third limitation 
is that we have not been able to explain all empirical cases with outstanding perfor-
mance. Moreover, there are two cases which are deviant consistency in kind. They are 
more out than in the set of ‘outstanding performance’, but, nevertheless, display a 
promising combination of conditions. This probably means that there are other condi-
tions beyond the scope of this article that potentially contribute to the explanation of 
PPP performance. Due to the restrictions of the QCA method, our analysis of 25 cases 
can only include a limited number of conditions. Discussing possibilities for future 
research should include adding different conditions to the test that could potentially 
contribute to a fuller explanation of PPP performance and further in-depth case study 
to deepen our knowledge about the configurations that are present in successful PPPs.
Despite its limitations, this study has important theoretical and empirical implica-
tions. Theoretically, this study contributes by providing specific combinations of con-
tractual and relational conditions. These combinations provide new insights into the 
dynamics between contractual and relational governance, and the role of trust herein. 
These findings also have important implications for practice, namely that no simple 
clear-cut roads to outstanding performance exist. The dynamics and uncertainty in 
public–private partnerships might require different configurations of conditions, and 
these configurations might change during the project’s lifecycle. This implies that 
decision makers and managers need to be reflective and should understand what is 
needed given the conditions present. Project managers should therefore have the 
capabilities and skills to alternate between various types of management, without 
becoming unpredictable and untrustworthy to their partners. Despite the dynamics 
and uncertainties in PPP projects, a good relationship and a shared understanding on 
agreements regarding the realisation (and maintenance) of the project might help 
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dealing with the issues partners face in public private partnerships. Projects that 
are able to realise one of the different combinations stemming from the ‘mix and 




Putting the pieces together: hybrid 






The public and private professionals engaged in Princess Beatrix sluice project work 
according to ten ‘golden rules’ that they called the Pact of Vreeswijk. These process 
rules are not dictated to them by any contract; rather they were designed at the start 
of the project to embody the project partners’ commitment to a good collaboration, to 
reflect what this project would mean to them: a shared undertaking. Both public and 
private partners participated, carrying their own risks, responsibilities, and tasks, but 
still there was a mutual goal and the intention to help each other achieve this goal as 
best they could. If I asked these professionals what the ten rules are exactly, I wonder 
if they would be able to list all ten of them. For many, these rules became so common 
that they lived by these rules without giving them too much thought. More than mere 
process rules, the Pact of Vreeswijk became a way of working; a way of working in 
which it was common to inform each other early regarding potential issues, even if 
the contractual risk was clearly assigned to only one of the actors; a way of working in 
which face-to-face communication was preferred over sending emails or letters, and 
in which partners made an effort to understand each other.
The formal contract between both project partners did not require this intense col-
laboration in the Princess Beatrix sluice project, but it played a significant role none-
theless. Despite the horizontal and intensive ways of working in which public and 
private actors addressed issues together, risks and responsibilities were still clearly 
assigned to only one actor. The private partner made allowance for costs to mitigate 
risks assigned to it. There were debates between the public client and the private 
contractor regarding the interpretation of contract demands. Project partners did not 
always see eye to eye. Notwithstanding the formal, contractual agreements that were 
made, project partners would always try to understand each other’s line of reasoning, 
even if that did not necessarily mean that they would come to agree on issues. After 
all, even in the best relationships, partners do not always agree on everything.
The balance that the project partners found in this case between contractual agree-
ments and more relational ways of working is illustrative of the empirical findings in 
this dissertation. It suggests that, although guided by strict contracts, public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) are more than a mere form of contracting out. Established bod-
ies of literature on themes like incomplete contracting, relational contracting, and 
trust have already pointed in this direction (e.g. Brown et al., 2016; Bertelli & Smith, 
2009; Klein-Woolthuis et al., 2005). The governance of PPPs takes place not only via 
strict contracts, but also via social relationships between project partners and the 
interactions between the professionals that make up the project teams on both sides 
(see Granovetter, 1985; Weihe, 2009). This dissertation set out to study the balance 
between contractual and relational governance in PPPs. Its unique contribution is 
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twofold. First, it identifies specific combinations of contractual and relational gover-
nance mechanisms in high-performing PPPs. Second, it addresses the role of relational 
quality in the relationship between governance and performance. Therefore, the main 
research question in this dissertation was: How do contractual and relational governance 
affect the performance of public–private partnerships, and what is the role of relational quality 
therein?
This chapter provides the main conclusions of this dissertation. It is structured as 
follows: section 7.1 first provides an answer to the four sub-questions. By connecting 
the results of the empirical chapters, it then responds to the main research question. 
Next, in section 7.2 the limitations of this study are presented. Section 7.3 considers 
the conclusions of this dissertation in light of broader theoretical developments. The 
relevance of this dissertation for existing fields of study is elucidated. The societal 
relevance of this dissertation is presented in section 7.4. Finally, section 7.5 offers an 
agenda for future research based on this dissertation’s outcomes, limitations, and 
relevance.
7.2. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION
This section presents the answers to the four sub-questions posed in Chapter 1 and 
formulates an answer to the main research question. Before doing so, it provides a 
brief synopsis of the empirical chapters presented earlier in this dissertation.
This thesis started by investigating what public and private professionals work-
ing in PPPs consider the ideal way to govern PPPs. The Q-method study in Chapter 
2 presents four different profiles. Each profile holds a specific viewpoint regarding 
the governance of PPPs. These viewpoints vary in the degree of managerial freedom 
for the private contractor and have different positions on the scale between control 
and collaboration as the core governance mechanism. These viewpoints seem to be 
influenced by the professionals’ experience, the country in which the profession-
als work, and the public–private distinction. Next, to dive a little deeper into our 
knowledge of relational quality in contract-based PPPs, Chapter 3 offers an overview 
of research focusing on relational quality in PPPs. It shows that research on this topic 
within the PPP research area is both limited and subject of conceptual vagueness. 
With the help of related strands of literature, including those of collaborative gov-
ernance and relational marketing, Chapter 3 proposes a first conceptual model to 
study the quality of relationships within PPPs, highlighting five core characteristics 
of social relationships: trust, communication, commitment, respect, and openness. 
Chapter 4 builds on the previous chapter, as it tries to test part of the proposed model, 
studying how high-quality social relationships can be built within PPPs. Using fuzzy 
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set QCA, it shows that experience, a fair risk allocation, and network management 
activities are, in various constellations, present in projects that managed to build 
high-quality social relationships. These social relationships in PPPs are characterized 
by frequent communication, high levels of trust, and openness. Chapter 5 continues 
studying the relevance of relational characteristics by asking what makes PPPs work. 
It tests the effect of both relational governance and relational quality on PPP perfor-
mance. A multilevel analysis of survey data from 144 respondents involved in Dutch 
PPP projects shows that both trust and network management are important for PPP 
performance. Trust also enhances cooperation, which in turn is positively associated 
with performance. Chapter 6 finally returns to the original purpose of this dissertation: 
to study the balance between contractual and relational governance and its effect on 
PPP performance. A QCA study of 25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and Flanders 
shows that there is often a mix of relational and contractual elements in successful 
PPPs. Contractual and relational aspects complement each other. Although there is 
no clear-cut road to outstanding performance, projects that are able to realize one 
of the combinations presented in this chapter are taking a step in the right direction 
towards high-performance. The four sub-questions can be answered on the basis of 
these findings.
7.2.1. Governance as a hybrid
The first sub-question addresses the different perceptions of professionals working in 
PPPs regarding the governance of these partnerships. The empirical findings in Chap-
ter 2 show that four different profiles can be distinguished: clusters of professionals 
working in PPPs that share similar viewpoints regarding the preferred governance of 
these partnerships. These viewpoints presented in the profiles differ in terms of the 
managerial freedom for private partners and of their preference for either control or 
collaboration as the dominant form of governance (see Figure 7.1). The first profile 
allows for much managerial freedom for the private partner. The guiding principle 
in this profile is that the risks are transferred to the private partner, and with them 
also the responsibilities. There is therefore very little emphasis on public involvement 
or collaboration. The private partner is limited only by the output specifications set 
at the beginning of the project. Governance takes the form of sanctions if perfor-
mance falls short. The second profile is the opposite of the first profile. Professionals 
associated with this profile place strong emphasis on collaboration and supporting 
each other. Governance is designed to enhance relationships by encouraging open-
ness and building trust. Strict control is less important. The third profile focuses on 
performance and clarity when it comes to governance. Clear agreements and output 
criteria are needed. The public partner monitors the project, and the private partner 
is held accountable. Each partner has its own tasks. Collaboration is possible as long 
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as the boundaries, in terms of roles and responsibilities, do not start to blur or shift. 
The fourth and final profile acknowledges the dominant role of the private partner. 
This results in much managerial freedom for the private partner. The public partner 
plays a facilitating role. The preferred governance mechanisms in this perspective are 
focused predominantly on monitoring and enabling the private partner to do its job.
Figure 7.1 The four profiles of professionals working in public–private partnerships.
The four different, sometimes even conflicting, profiles regarding the ideal gover-
nance of PPPs can be partially traced back to the dominant theoretical governance 
paradigms in the public administration literature. The focus of governance on 
performance, control, and monitoring in the first and third profile is in line with 
the ideas underlying New Public Management (NPM). The focus on supporting each 
other and collaboration between public and private actors resembles some features 
of the New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm. Furthermore, the idea of  freedom 
for the private partner corresponds with the idea of self-governance underlying the 
private governance paradigm. Note that Traditional Public Administration (TPA) is not 
reflected in the preferences of public and private professionals. Comparison of the 
preferences of public and private professionals with the theoretical paradigms reveals 
that professionals’ viewpoints do not correspond exactly to the theoretical paradigms. 




Each of the four profiles is adopted by a mix of professionals with different cultural, 
organizational, and personal backgrounds. Nevertheless, the empirical findings in 
Chapter 2 show that some profiles are more dominant in one country than in another. 
In contrast to many of their international colleagues, Dutch PPP professionals tend 
to be more inclined to focus on the collaborative effort involved in PPPs and espouse 
relational governance mechanisms that favour openness and mutual support. Cana-
dian professionals are more likely to use governance mechanisms that focus directly 
on performance, such as output criteria, monitoring, and clear agreements regarding 
roles and responsibilities. Finally, the Danish professionals prefer to give room to the 
private partner. So, culture might play a role in the choice of governance and the way 
in which relational and contractual governance mechanisms are combined. Clearly, 
culture seems to matter when it comes to governance, but so does professionals’ 
experience and their position in the project. Regarding the latter, there are some dif-
ferences between the perceptions of public and private partners. Private professionals 
lean more towards governance based on cooperation or managerial freedom. They 
attach relatively little importance to contractual governance mechanisms. Regarding 
experience, compared to professionals with limited experience in PPPs, highly experi-
enced professionals tend to be keener on managerial freedom for the private partner. 
This applies to both public and private professionals.
So, in answer to the question: What are the different perceptions of professionals working 
in public–private partnerships regarding the governance of PPPs?, this dissertation shows that 
the viewpoints held by professionals working in PPP regarding their ideal way of gov-
erning PPPs are of a hybrid character. They combine elements from most theoretical 
paradigms. The four profiles vary in the degree of managerial freedom for the private 
partner and the degree of cooperation. The culture of the country in which a profes-
sional works and the professionals’ experience seem to influence the professionals’ 
preferences in terms of PPP governance. The implications thereof are twofold. On 
the one hand, it is more difficult to compare professionals’ governance preferences. 
On the other hand, an opportunity is provided to learn from the experiences and 
viewpoints of professionals in different countries.
7.2.2. Building good relationships in public–private partnerships: 
network management, risk, and experience
The second sub-question focuses on relational quality, asking: What is relational quality 
and which determinants have an influence on relational quality in public–private partnerships? In 
this dissertation, the assumption that the quality of the relationship between actors 
affects PPP performance is tested. Previous research into relational quality in PPPs has 
been limited, and the concept still suffers from conceptual vagueness. PPP research 
can, in this respect, learn from existing literature on related topics, such as social 
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capital, relationship marketing, and collaborative governance. Based on a systematic 
literature review, Chapter 3 therefore provides a first conceptualization of relational 
quality in PPPs.
It concludes that relational quality is about the state of relationships, which can 
be defined as long-term, interpersonal, social ties between actors. This relationship 
is determined by more than mere trust, although trust is an important characteristic 
of relational quality. Chapter 3 distinguishes several relational aspects that are all 
features of high-quality social relationships between project partners. Openness, 
communication, respect, and commitment are other relevant characteristics of high-
quality relationships; this might prompt us to broaden our studies beyond measuring 
trust. The five abovementioned elements of relational quality do not work in isola-
tion. Rather, there are reciprocal and complex relationships between the elements, 
in the sense that, for example, trust might affect openness and vice versa. Moreover, 
relational quality is a dynamic concept, as the state of the relationship may change 
over time. This presents challenges in the measurement of relational quality.
The literature review identifies various determinants that might impact the quality 
of the relationship. These determinants can be categorized as individual determinants 
and determinants on project and organizational level. On an individual level, earlier 
research discusses the importance of experience and personnel turnover, whereas at 
project and organizational level determinants such as leadership and management, 
and shared standards, shared values,  and shared goals, are said to influence relational 
quality. Some of these determinants are tested in Chapter 4. The empirical findings of 
this chapter show that network management, risk allocation, and experience matter 
when it comes to high-quality relationships. These three determinants have a com-
bined influence in various constellations:
1. The first combination of conditions mixes network management with experience.
2. The second combination of conditions found in high-quality relationships in PPPs 
is that of a fair risk allocation and experience.
3. Finally, the combination of network management and risk allocation is present in 
PPP projects with high relational quality.
A few conclusions can be drawn from these three configurations. First, it is clear that 
well begun is half done. Both experience and risk allocation highlight the importance 
of a good starting point of the relationship. Both confidence and a fair risk allocation 
might give partners a certain sense of confidence in their relationship. Experience can 
lead to trust, an important element of relational quality. Experienced project partners 
know what to expect during the project and are able to keep their calm at critical 
junctures. Second, network management is an important condition for relational 
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quality; this shows that relationships need to be carefully nurtured during the project. 
This study also shows that governance affects relational quality. After all, the use of 
network management strategies, especially those geared towards connecting actors, 
can be considered a form of relational governance. Simultaneously, the allocation of 
risks is embedded in the contracts guiding PPPs and is thus regarded as an example of 
contractual governance. This indicates that relational governance has a positive effect 
on relational quality in PPPs. The same applies for contractual governance, provided 
that the risks are not completely transferred to the private partner. Instead, both 
partners carry some of the risks according to the principle that risks are assigned to 
the partner who is best able to mitigate these risks. Finally, the third path shows that 
contractual governance – in the form of risk allocation – and relational governance – 
in the form of network management – do not work in isolation but may complement 
each other in realizing high relational quality in PPPs.
So, relational quality describes the state of interpersonal, social relationships 
between actors and can be characterized by trust, openness, communication, com-
mitment, and respect. There are several determinants of relational quality, including 
experience, network management strategies, and the allocation of risks. Our empiri-
cal findings emphasize that governance, both relational and contractual, matter for 
relational quality.
7.2.3. Do good relationships really matter?
The previous sub-question addressed the concept of relational quality and the way in 
which high-quality relationships can be built. This sub-question – How does relational 
quality affect the performance of public–private partnerships? – establishes the connection 
between relational quality and PPP performance. From the empirical evidence pre-
sented in this dissertation, a first conclusion is that relational quality might affect PPP 
performance (see Chapter 3, 5 and 6 of this dissertation). Earlier studies already show 
the potentially positive effect of relational quality on performance (Kumaraswamy et 
al., 2007; Jones & Noble, 2008; Roehrich & Lewis, 2014). They stress the positive effect 
on efficiency and effectiveness, transaction costs, and a better collaborative process. 
This dissertation confirms the positive effect of relational quality on both coopera-
tion and perceived project performance (see Chapter 5). Thus, it focuses on a broader 
measurement of performance than just financial performance. It includes elements 
such as the integral nature of the solution, its effectiveness, its financial performance, 
and the involved project partners’ support for the solution.
Besides a significant positive relationship between relational quality and collabora-
tion and between relational quality and perceived performance, Chapter 5 also pres-
ents indications of the mediating role of relational quality in the relationship between 
governance and performance. Network management, as an element of relational 
168
governance, is not directly correlated with collaboration. However, there is a clear, 
positive correlation between governance and relational quality (measured by the ele-
ment of trust). As stated earlier, given the significant correlation between relational 
quality and cooperation shown in Chapter 5, this could indicate that relational quality 
acts as a mediating variable between relational governance and performance. This 
seems likely, as network management strategies have been shown to increase trust, 
which is known to contribute to cooperation (e.g. Klijn et al., 2010; Zaheer et al., 1998; 
Pennink, 2017).
All in all, the main conclusion with respect to how relational quality affects PPP 
performance is that relational quality does indeed seem to affect the performance 
of PPP projects. Using trust, an important characteristic of relational quality, this 
dissertation shows a significant and positive effect on both collaboration and on 
performance, measured in terms of effectiveness, durability, support, and cost-benefit 
balance. These findings emphasize the importance of studying relational quality in 
PPPs.
7.2.4. Balancing contractual and relational governance: Three different 
paths
Regardless of the importance of relational quality and the potential benefits of rela-
tional governance mechanisms such as trust, neither the public client nor the private 
contractor will engage in a PPP without a legal form of certainty. The sheer size, 
risks, and budgets involved in the infrastructure projects studied in this dissertation 
are too large to commit to such a project without the use of a contract. This fourth 
sub-question therefore concerns the balance between contractual and relational 
governance in PPPs: How do contractual and relational governance relate to each other in 
successful public–private partnerships?
The fact that hybrid forms of governance are preferred by professionals working 
in PPPs suggests that it is not necessary to choose either contractual governance or 
relational governance. The empirical findings in Chapter 6 confirm that, rather than 
being substitutes, contractual and relational governance complement each other in 
various ways. These findings make it clear that, although successful PPP projects often 
display a mix of governance forms, in some projects, some aspects of governance seem 
to replace others. Not all contractual and relational governance mechanisms need 
to be present. This dissertation presents three specific combinations of governance 
mechanisms that can be found in high-performing PPPs:
1. The first path is a combination of trust and risk allocation. Risk allocation is an 
important element of contractual governance, and trust is used to represent re-
169
Chapter 7
lational governance. Hence, this path displays a combination of contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms.
2. The second path is that of risk allocation, strict application of sanctions, and con-
flict management. Again, with the first two mechanisms referring to contractual 
governance and the latter being an example of relational governance, this path 
shows a combination of contractual and relational governance.
3. The third path is that of trust, conflict management, and the absence of strict 
application of sanctions. This path points towards the importance of relational 
governance, as it does not include any specific contractual governance mecha-
nisms. It does not, however, point towards the total absence of contracts.
A few conclusions can be drawn from these three combinations of conditions, or 
paths. The first conclusion is that contractual and relational governance function as 
complements. The findings presented in this study in Chapter 6, and in particular 
the first two paths presented above, provide clear evidence towards this idea. The 
second conclusion is that clear agreements are very important for enhancing PPP per-
formance. They reduce uncertainty and provide guidelines when the going gets tough. 
Whether they are established using contractual or relational governance mechanisms 
might be of less importance, as both the agreements laid down in a contract – such 
as agreements on the risk allocation – and those established via relational control 
mechanisms – such as conflict management – can be found in projects with high 
levels of performance. The third conclusion is that the strict application of sanctions 
as a governance mechanism is equivocal. Paired with a fair risk allocation and conflict 
management, the application of sanctions is part of a configuration displayed by well-
performing PPP projects. In contrast, in the third path, which consists of relational 
governance mechanisms, it is only the absence of the strict application of sanctions 
that contributes to good performance. In this path, the strict application of sanctions 
seems to clash with the use of relational governance mechanisms. So, the effect of the 
strict application of sanctions on performance is not clear-cut. This suggests that the 
use of a specific governance mechanism should match with the other mechanisms 
used in the governance of PPPs. A last conclusion is again drawn from the third combi-
nation of conditions, as this path consists solely of relational governance mechanisms. 
Although the explanatory value of this path is small, it seems to suggest that good 
performance can be achieved using only relational governance mechanisms. This 
highlights the important role of relational governance in PPP performance.
All in all, in answer to this question it is clear that relational and contractual gov-
ernance mechanisms perform predominantly as complements, resulting in a hybrid 
form of governance. Contractual governance mechanisms enforce previously made 
agreements regarding roles, risks, and responsibilities, providing clarity to the project 
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partners. Relational governance mechanisms are designed to increase partners’ will-
ingness to take into account the unique circumstances of the project, empathy for 
their project partner, and mutual consideration of each other’s needs and interests. 
The exact balance between contractual and relational governance mechanisms is 
subject to change. Some professionals consider contractual governance the dominant 
governance mechanism, allowing only for relational governance as long as it does 
not detract from the agreements in the contract (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
Others prioritize relational governance mechanisms. The combination of relational 
governance mechanisms presented in Chapter 6 suggests that the effect of rela-
tional governance should not be underestimated. Clearly, although contractual and 
relational governance are, in most cases, complementary forms of governance, the 
balance between them can be subject to change due to the dynamics within a PPP. The 
relevance of studying the dynamics within PPPs is addressed in greater depth later in 
this chapter.
7.2.5. Putting the pieces together: The right mix between contractual 
and relational governance in public–private partnerships
From the answers to the sub-questions discussed previously, it is now possible to for-
mulate an answer to the central research question. The central question in this study 
was: How do contractual and relational governance affect the performance of public–private 
partnerships, and what is the role of relational quality therein? The main conclusion of this 
dissertation is that contractual and relational governance function as complements 
in high-performing PPPs. In some cases, relational governance mechanisms even 
seem to be the dominant governance mechanism. None of the high-performing PPP 
projects in our study uses only contractual governance mechanisms, and there are 
some that build predominantly on relational governance (as shown in Chapter 6). 
This emphasizes the importance of relational governance for PPPs. This is confirmed 
in Chapter 5, which provides evidence of the positive relationship between relational 
governance and PPP performance, in terms not only of performance measured as 
efficiency, but also of the balance between costs and benefits, the integral nature of 
the solution, and the satisfaction of all partners involved in the project. Moreover, re-
lational governance is positively correlated with relational quality. As relational qual-
ity – measured using the important characteristic of trust – influences performance in 
the form of a good collaborative process, this leads to the conclusion that: relational 
governance has (a) a direct, positive effect on PPP performance and (b) an indirect, 
positive effect on collaboration. The quality of the relationships in PPPs therefore 
mediates the relation between relational quality and performance. Relational qual-
ity has a significant, positive effect not only on collaboration, but also on perceived 
performance. Overall, there is a significant relationship between relational quality 
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and PPP performance. Governance plays an important role in building relational qual-
ity. Both network management and a fair risk allocation are present in high-quality 
relationships. This means that both relational governance – in the form of network 
management – and contractual governance – characterized by a focus on risk alloca-
tion – matter for building good relationships. For the latter, this only applies if not all 
risks are transferred to the private partner. As long as the risk allocation is considered 
fair, contractual agreements can also lead to more openness, more trust, and more 
respect.
All in all, relational and contractual governance have a joint effect on PPP perfor-
mance and function as complements. Relational governance is at least as important as 
contractual governance. The quality of the relationship mediates this relationship. It 
has a positive effect on performance but is in turn affected by the governance of PPPs.
7.3. LIMITATIONS
This section addresses the main limitations of this dissertation, focusing on limitations 
that apply to the dissertation as a whole. The limitations of the various sub-studies are 
discussed in their respective chapters.
The first limitation concerns the dynamics of PPP projects. After all, PPPs are dy-
namic partnerships. They change over time. Events that take place in the project 
may lead to an alternating increase and decrease in the quality of the relationship. 
At times, collaboration runs smoothly, but large financial and technical setbacks may 
cause tensions. As every relationship has its ups and downs, it is unlikely that the 
quality of the relationship between project partners in a long-lasting PPP will remain 
stable throughout the entire project (Pennink, 2017). This dissertation uses a number 
of research methods that either take a snapshot of the relationship at a certain point 
in time or ask respondents to give their overall impression of the relationship in the 
construction phase of the project. Other phases, such as the following maintenance 
phase, in which partners collaborate for years to come, are not included, nor are the 
relationships between public and private partners in PPPs tracked over time.
The second limitation is a consequence of the methodological decisions made in 
this dissertation. The choice of methods like QCA and Q-methodology might indicate 
a lack of causal inference. However, these methods are relatively new to PPP research 
and provide interesting and new insights into the balance of different forms of gov-
ernance in PPPs. Nevertheless, they do not offer statistically significant results, and 
the generalizability of the findings is not always optimal. Also, the methods used are 
not designed to make an overall assessment of the framework in one go. After the 
first three empirical chapters dug into governance and relational quality, Chapters 
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5 and 6 addressed the relationship with performance. Each chapter examines part 
of the proposed model. In consequence, albeit several relationships from the model 
have been studied in this dissertation, the scope of this dissertation limits the range 
of knowledge regarding the causal relationship between hybrid forms of governance 
and relational quality. Instead, this dissertation presents different perspectives on the 
governance of PPPs, reveals various hybrid forms of governance in which contractual 
and relational mechanisms are combined, and gives an indication of the importance 
of relational quality in PPPs.
Finally, a third limitation of this dissertation is its focus on how contractual and 
relational governance can be combined in PPPs. New insights are offered into the 
balance between the two forms of governance, presenting specific combinations of 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms, but the way or when questions 
cannot be explained. Why these combinations work so well in high-performing PPPs is 
unclear, as well as when, in which situation, which combination is used. The different 
paths presented by the QCA in Chapter 6 do raise questions regarding the role of time 
and context. Which combination is used at what time? The long-term, dynamic, and 
complex character of PPPs raises the question of whether the balance between various 
governance forms changes over time. The research methods used in this dissertation 
do not sufficiently take into account the context in which governance mechanisms 
are used to determine when and why specific combinations of governance might have 
the intended effect.
7.4. THEORETICAL RELEVANCE
In this section, I address some of the implications of the empirical findings in this 
dissertation for PPP theory. I first discuss the relevance of combining an institutional 
economic perspective on PPPs with a relational perspective. Then, I turn to the theo-
retical implications of relational governance in PPPs on four different levels.
7.4.1. Combining an economic rationale with a governance rationale
There is no such thing as a PPP theory. Rather, PPP has to be considered from different 
angles. Two dominant takes on PPP adopt either an economic angle or a governance 
angle. From an economic perspective, building upon theories such as transaction cost 
theory and principal–agent theory, PPPs need to be governed in order to prevent op-
portunistic behaviour. From this perspective, PPP governance, is based on control. The 
use of output specifications, monitoring, and the possibility to impose sanctions are 
the preferred mechanisms to steer actors’ behaviour in the desired direction. In con-
trast, governance theories focus predominantly on the complexity of PPPs, addressing 
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the interdependencies between actors and the potential to collaborate to realize 
win-win solutions. Governance here focuses on connecting actors, aligning interests, 
and creating shared norms and values; this suggests the use of relational governance 
mechanisms. This dissertation proves that there is added value in combining both 
perspectives. Combining insights from both perspectives helps to gain insight into hy-
brid forms of governance. Moreover, it can unravel and explain the mixes of contrac-
tual and relational governance used in PPPs. To understand the rationale behind the 
various hybrid forms of governance, it is not sufficient to choose either an economic 
or a governance perspective. Combining both perspectives provides the opportunity 
to join the recent trend regarding relationality in public administration. Bartels and 
Turnbull (2020) argue for an increased focus on relationships and relational processes. 
Not only are these relationships important in governing networks and collaborations, 
these relationships and the relational processes also have value in themselves (e.g. 
Bartels & Turnbull, 2020; Vandenbussche, 2020). A relational approach, which consid-
ers social reality as a process that is relationally constructed, analysed, and understood 
(Bartels & Turnbull, 2020: 15), may help to enhance our understanding regarding the 
functioning of PPPs and the way in which these partnerships are governed.
7.4.2. Cross-cutting research on public–private partnerships
A second contribution of this dissertation lies in demonstrating the importance of 
relational governance. The theoretical implications can be found on various levels. 
Although this dissertation has focused predominantly on relational governance on 
project level and its effect on project performance, the use of relational governance 
in PPPs has consequences on levels other than just the project level. The following 
levels are involved: (a) the level of individual (public) professionals and the teams they 
function in, (b) the project level, (c) the organizational level, and (d) the institutional 
level (focused on national policies, culture, and so on). Here, I briefly address the 
consequence of relational governance on each level, before making the argument 
that the theoretical implication of studying relational governance lies in research that 
connects these levels, rather than studying only its consequences within each level.
To build upon the principles of relational governance, even in difficult or unex-
pected situations, these principles must be embedded in PPPs on various levels. First, 
relational governance calls upon individual professionals to commit to this way of 
working. Professionals from both sides need the right skillset to do so, but it is also 
paramount that they share the conviction that a relational way of governing is useful 
for PPP and sometimes might even work better than a unilateral focus on strict con-
tractual forms of governance. The findings presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
have shown that this is not always the case. Relational governance is not embedded 
in the preferences of all practitioners working in PPPs. In fact, there are major differ-
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ences between professionals’ views regarding the governance of PPPs. These profes-
sionals have some discretion to shape PPP governance in everyday life. This makes the 
behaviour of individual professionals an interesting research avenue (see for example 
Weißmüller, 2020, for a behavioural focus on PPPs). In order to understand what hap-
pens if professionals do not share the same governance perceptions, research into 
PPPs should pay more attention to the way in which professionals perceive and shape 
the governance of PPPs. This calls for the study of PPPs on an even more micro level. 
Hodge & Greve (2013) suggested five different levels on which to study PPP, of which 
PPP as projects was the narrowest. However, this research suggests that a new level 
is required, that of PPPs as collaborative processes between individual professionals. 
Studying inter-team collaboration might elucidate the collaborative processes that 
take place within PPPs on a micro level.
Second, on a project level, the governance of PPPs could benefit from strategies 
that are arranged in such a way as to leave room for – or even stimulate – the use of 
relational governance mechanisms. Network management strategies are particularly 
useful in this respect. The study in Chapter 5 shows a positive effect of network man-
agement on PPP performance. Network management strategies are geared towards 
connection actors, aligning interests, and exploring content (Klijn et al., 2010). This 
includes process management strategies (e.g. Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009) such as conflict 
management. These strategies stimulate continuous interaction and an open dialogue 
regarding project partners’ motivations, needs, and wants. This continuous interac-
tion is crucial in developing joint actions – such as joint problem solving – which is 
central to relational governance (Claro et al., 2003). Given the importance of process 
management, theory building on process agreements should be much more embedded 
in PPP research. So, this dissertation confirms the importance of theories like network 
governance and collaborative governance for studying PPPs, even for contract-based 
PPPs such as long-term infrastructure contracts, but it also calls for more attention in 
PPP research on theory on the building of process agreements.
Simultaneously, there are theoretical implications that poses new challenges to such 
theories. PPP projects take place within an existing environment of organizations. 
It is important to realize that project team members, who work in PPPs on a daily 
basis, are also members of their respective organizations. Decisions made and actions 
taken in PPPs by project teams (which can be considered the inner circle) need to be 
approved and supported by their own organization (the outer circle). It is likely that 
the outer circle may influence the behaviour of project teams (the inner circle) and 
thus the performance of the PPP. Professionals explain that they have to ensure there 
is a strong support base within their organization. The result of negotiations between 
project teams needs to be accepted by their respective organizations. For the public 
client for example, it is important that the decisions made in relation to the project 
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fit into the organizations’ policy. Therefore, for relational governance to be applied 
consistently in PPPs, it needs to be embedded in the organizations and not merely the 
project teams. This implies that, in PPP research, scholars should not focus merely 
on the partnership as a stand-alone entity. Rather, PPP theories should address the 
connections between actors in the project and actors outside the project. The focus 
should not lie merely on what happens within the project, but also on what happens 
between the professionals working in the project and their respective organizations. 
This calls for theory building that focuses on explaining the interactions between the 
different levels.
Finally, PPPs are often institutionalized and part of national procurement policies. 
Hodge & Greve (2013) addressed this as one of the broadest levels of PPP. This implies 
that it is a political choice whether a country opts to use PPPs. It is also a political 
choice to frame the use of PPPs as a form of contracting out – using elaborate con-
tracts to govern the partnership – or as a form of horizontal collaboration – promoting 
a more collaborative attitude, which might imply the use of relational governance 
mechanisms. Although PPPs are often considered an international phenomenon, the 
findings in this dissertation imply that research in PPPs should be more sensitive to 
the institutional context of these projects. The governance of PPPs is also determined 
by institutional frameworks. How much attention and support do national govern-
ments give to PPP? What does national policy say about PPP? What are the main 
political drivers of PPP? Is there a shared culture among contractors that stimulates 
the use of PPPs? When it comes to the governance of PPPs, and in particular the 
balance between various governance mechanisms, the policy and culture of a country 
might affect its governance. Earlier studies have already provided some indications 
towards this (e.g. Verhoest et al., 2015). This implies that theory on PPPs needs to 
acknowledge the effect of national differences and gain more insight into how these 
differences affect the governance and performance of PPPs. Theoretical frameworks 
regarding the functioning of PPPs cannot be applied blindly to every PPP, regardless of 
institutional context. Research into PPP needs to pay more attention to the generaliz-
ability of its empirical findings and address the differences in PPP across countries in 
new comparative research.
The findings in this dissertation suggest that the mix of governance mechanisms has 
consequences beyond the level of PPP projects. Rather, it has consequences on indi-
vidual, project, and organizational level. Some of the implications addressed here are 
translated into suggestions for further research in section 7.6. However, this section 
also suggests that attitude and behaviour on individual, project, and organizational 
level are intertwined. This calls for a theory that is able to (1) cross the boundaries 
between these different levels and (2) explain how these different levels interact.
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7.5. SOCIETAL RELEVANCE
Based on the dissertation, the following insights might be relevant for public and 
private organizations collaborating in PPPs.
7.5.1. Individual level
This dissertation provides insight into the mix and match of relational and contrac-
tual governance. It addresses the hybrid character of the governance preferences that 
exist among PPP professionals. On an individual level, it is important that profes-
sionals understand that contractual and relational mechanisms complement each 
other. Moreover, it is vital that they understand each other’s governance perceptions 
to prevent this becoming a subject of conflict during the project. Furthermore, profes-
sionals need the skills to apply and combine both governance forms. Whereas most 
of them are familiar with contractual governance, the use of relational governance 
requires different skills, such as flexibility, conflict management, and the ability to 
build open relationships (e.g. Dickinson & Sullivan, 2014).
Combining contractual and relational governance mechanisms can create dilemmas 
for managers. On the one hand, managers need to be able to use various governance 
mechanisms, combine them, and select the right balance for a particular situation. 
At the same time, they need to provide clarity to the involved partners regarding the 
governance of the project. Project partners’ expectations of project partners regard-
ing the governance of the project need to be aligned, so they know what to expect. 
There seems to be a thin line between flexibility and predictability in this respect. 
Managers thus should have the skill to facilitate a dialogue about the use of gover-
nance mechanisms and to combine various governance mechanisms. Q-methodology, 
which has proved its use as an instrument to ascertain professionals’ perceptions and 
preferences, could also be a useful tool for practitioners in this respect. Information 
derived from a Q-study may provide a starting point for a dialogue on governance and 
the balance between contractual and relational governance in PPPs.
7.5.2. Project level
Given the long duration of the project, the use of governance mechanisms needs to 
be embedded in the project. With contracts being a core feature of contract-based 
PPPs, contractual mechanisms are usually rather well institutionalized. However, 
this might not be the case for relational governance. As this dissertation stresses the 
importance of using relational governance mechanisms, this is a point for attention. 
One suggestion regarding the implementation of relational governance mechanisms 
would be to design process agreements, such as the Pact van Vreeswijk, designed by 
project partners in the Princess Beatrix sluice project. At the start of the partnership, 
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partners should agree not only upon technical requirements and formal roles and 
responsibilities, but also, prior to their collaboration, on process agreements and dis-
cuss questions like: How does one treat the each other if the other makes a mistake? 
What should be done if an unanticipated issue is encountered? What process should 
be followed in the event of disagreement about roles, responsibilities, or the interpre-
tation of specific contractual requirements? These process agreements do not neces-
sarily need to take the place of a contract. Instead, both can co-exist alongside each 
other. To determine how the balance between contractual and relational governance 
should look in a contract, serious games and simulations can be useful as intervention 
methods. They help project partners to think about governance in complex situations 
and stimulate project partners to develop some awareness of each other’s position 
and interests.
To embed the use of relational governance mechanisms in a project, these mecha-
nisms need to be safeguarded throughout the process. Over time, project partners 
will develop a collective memory. This shared pool of knowledge and information not 
only contains technical specifications, but also addresses the way of working within 
a project, the way in which professionals interact, collaborate, and solve problems. 
This collective memory needs to be secured, to ensure that the built-up trust and 
gained learning experiences are not completely lost in event of personnel turnover. 
Mechanisms such as role protocols, transfer points, and project follow-ups can be 
useful instruments to safeguard collective memory in a project.
7.5.3. Organizational level
Managing expectations regarding the governance of a project does not apply only to 
the project teams involved in the project; it stretches to their respective organiza-
tions as well. How do organizations respond to the use of a mix of contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms in PPP projects? Does it fit in their organizational 
culture? Is there support for the use of relational governance mechanisms? This re-
quires a dialogue on a level that surpasses that of individual projects. It calls for an 
organization-wide debate on how a public organization wishes to collaborate with 
private partners, and what that means for the organization itself. The Dutch Markt-
visie, a document in which various public and private organizations expressed their 
intention to look beyond the contract in managing large infrastructural projects, is a 
first step towards such a dialogue. However, the intentions expressed in the Markvisie 
should echo through in each of these organizations. After all, mixing governance 
mechanisms into a hybrid form requires autonomy and support for project managers, 
so that they can choose the balance between contract and relationship that works 
best for their project at that juncture. Organizational support for using hybrid forms 
of governance should stretch across departments.
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7.5.4. Institutional level
The call for more relational governance in the governance of long-term infrastructure 
projects might be hindered by a strong focus on contractual governance at national 
level. The political issues of the day do not necessarily stimulate the use of relational 
governance. The political climate and attention on megaprojects that face long delays 
in their realization and exceed their budgets make governments incline towards a 
more controlling approach. A clear example of the preference for contractual gover-
nance is the 2013 report of the Dutch Court of Audit, in which it was argued that the 
contract should ensure performance over time. It identified a few problems, including 
the fact that public organizations did not always monitor the performance of private 
partners optimally and the fact that sanctions were not always strictly applied. Strict 
contract management was clearly the dominant discourse. However, the results of 
this dissertation highlight the usefulness of relational governance and attention on 
the relationships between project partners. Changing the national discourse is not 
so easy. Nevertheless, PPP evaluations should not only consider hard performance 
indicators such as on-time and on-budget delivery. Rather, they should adopt a 
broader measure of performance and allow more space to learn from experiences 
with different forms of PPP governance. In particular given, the long duration of PPPs, 
relational governance can be a useful tool, because it helps to build and maintain 
good relationships between project partners and reduces the chance of dysfunctional 
conflicts (Lousberg, 2012).
7.6. AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
To conclude this dissertation, I would like to make some suggestions for further 
research into this topic. The conclusions presented in this chapter suggest several 
research avenues that might help to further deepen and broaden our understanding 
of the governance of PPPs and its effect on relational quality. These new research av-
enues address this topic on various levels. Hence, I propose the following suggestions.
1. Maintaining high-quality relationships in public–private partnerships
This dissertation has confirmed the importance of relational quality in PPPs. Further 
research, using a variety of research methods, is, however, necessary to create a more 
solid base of evidence and to answer some of the questions that remain: How can 
good relationships be maintained in public–private partnerships? Earlier studies have 
already shown that relational quality is dynamic. The level of trust, for example, 
changes over time, creating a trust cycle (see for example Pennink, 2017). To further 
understand how relationships can be built and maintained, Pennink addresses the 
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key factors that contribute to the building-up and the breakdown of trust, including 
willingness to share information and resources, reputation and qualifications, and 
shared norms and values (Pennink, 2017). Despite these earlier studies and the con-
tribution made by this dissertation, the question remains as to how relational quality 
is affected by stress or success in a project. It might be easy to be transparent and to 
trust one’s project partner if the project runs smoothly and there is enough money to 
realize the project. If both partners are on a strict budget and have to be careful not 
to exceed their budget, it might be harder to admit mistakes and support a partner 
who is facing challenging issues. Occasionally, PPPs are under pressure, for example 
when severe accidents happen on the construction site. How do such events affect the 
relationship between project partners? So, what happens to the quality of the rela-
tionship between project partners when the project is under pressure? A connection 
with the recent literature on relational public administration (see Bartels & Turnbull, 
2020; Vandenbussche, 2020) might provide new insights into relational quality and 
how social relationships function in public–private encounters under pressure.
2. Shifting the governance balance in dynamic public–private partnerships
This dissertation presents three specific combinations of contractual and relational 
governance. In response to these findings, the question arises as to when each of 
these hybrid governance forms occurs in PPPs. In what circumstance do PPPs need a 
specific hybrid form of governance? Are there, for example, different combinations of 
governance mechanisms being used in different phases of a project? What happens to 
the balance between governance mechanisms when a PPP moves from one phase to 
another? The transition from the construction to the maintenance phase comes with 
challenges related to personnel turnover and new tasks for both project partners. 
What does this mean for the governance of the partnership? It is crucial to learn 
more about the way in which contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
interact in various circumstances and how the balance might shift over time. What 
trade-offs are made between contractual and relational governance mechanisms in 
various phases in the project or when the project is under great pressure? The use 
of longitudinal data and process tracing methods (such as event sequence analysis, 
see Spekkink, 2015) to capture the dynamics of PPPs and the changes in the balance 
between contractual and relational balance might be a good starting point to address 
this issue in further research. Furthermore, to further unravel the balance between 
contractual and relational governance in different situations, experiments and seri-
ous games might be an intriguing option to study professionals’ use of governance 
mechanisms (see for example Benitez Avila, 2019).
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3. Coping strategies for combining contractual and relational governance
Choosing to combine governance mechanisms into hybrid governance forms raises 
questions about the decision-making process that precedes these choices. Given the 
vast number of different contractual and relational governance mechanisms, not all 
these mechanisms can be used simultaneously. Therefore, trade-offs have to be made. 
How do public organizations and public managers decide about the mix of gover-
nance mechanisms? What strategies do they use to balance contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms? The literature on coping behaviour might be of use in this 
respect. Thacher and Rein (2004) and Stewart (2006) have identified several coping 
strategies that can be used to explain what happens in a value conflict. Although 
the use of various governance mechanisms is not similar to a value conflict, it does 
represent a trade-off, and the different strategies might help to explain how public 
organizations and managers behave when deciding about the use of one or more 
governance mechanisms. Do they use different governance mechanisms sequentially 
over time (cycling), favour some forms of governance over others (bias), or assess the 
use of governance mechanisms case-by-case (casuistry)? Further research could dive 
into the trade-offs made when deciding about a specific combination of governance 
mechanisms.
4. Boundary spanners in public–private partnerships
Although this dissertation focuses on PPPs as projects, the institutional context in 
which these projects take place might be crucial for the development, use, and mix 
of governance in them. Hence, an important suggestion for further research would 
be to study the effect of a public organization on the governance and the functioning 
of PPP projects. Institutionalized behaviour and organizational culture influence the 
behaviour of public professionals representing the organization in PPPs and most 
likely also affect their choices regarding the governance of partnerships in which they 
work. Professionals willing to use other forms of governance might experience a lack 
of support from their own organization. The rationale behind the use of a specific mix 
of contractual and relational governance in PPPs might be better understood if further 
research takes into account the modus operandi and culture of public organizations 
and addresses the interplay at organizational and project level. In addition, a connec-
tion with the literature on boundary spanners (e.g. Noble & Jones, 2006; Van Meerkerk 
& Edelenbos, 2018) could reveal more about professionals who try to bridge the gap 
between their own organization, the project team, their project partners, and the 
challenges that they face in PPPs. Boundary spanners might help to bridge profes-
sionals’ different perceptions as well as the different, and sometimes contradictory, 
perceptions on governance that exist within the inner circle (project teams) and the 
outer circle (their respective organizations).
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5. International comparative research
Further research should address the differences in PPP governance that might arise 
in different cultures. The empirical findings in Chapter 2 show that governance per-
ceptions diverge between professionals from different countries. Dutch professionals 
are more inclined to use relational governance mechanisms in contract-based PPPs, 
whereas Canadian professionals tend to favour contractual governance. This suggests 
that a country’s culture and its approach to PPP play a role in determining the balance 
between contractual and relational governance. More research is required to better 
understand what role these institutional factors (macro level) play in determining the 
actual governance of PPP projects (meso level).
6. Enhancing methodological richness in research on public–private partnerships
Earlier studies have shown that PPP research is dominated by either small N case 
studies or survey research (e.g. Roehrich et al., 2014; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). These 
findings are confirmed by the review presented in Chapter 3, which shows that case 
studies are the most common method in PPP research. Although case studies can be 
useful, and sometimes even necessary to answer some research questions (see for 
example my suggestion for longitudinal case study research to capture the dynamics 
of PPPs), this dissertation has proved that PPP research might benefit from a broader 
array of methods. Different methods may accommodate research questions on dif-
ferent levels. Q-methodology or discrete choice experiments are designed to unravel 
individual preferences, and their use might help to understand professionals’ gover-
nance preferences of professionals’ behaviour in (re)negotiations or decision-making 
processes. QCA might help to transfer from small N case studies to larger N studies to 
enhance the generalizability of important research findings. Moreover, it allows the 
combined effect of conditions to be studied. To study strategy and behaviour within 
PPPs, experiments and serious games might be useful instruments to understand be-
haviour in PPPs (see the recent trend in Behavioural Public Administration, which also 
makes ample use of experiments: James et al., 2017). These are just a few suggestions, 
demonstrating how more methodological variation might unlock new knowledge 
about PPPs. So, this final suggestion for further research is a plea to enhance the 
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 2.
APPENDIX I
Results of overall factor analysis in chapter 2.
This appendix includes the results of the overall factor analysis of the Q-sort of all 
respondents from Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark. First, table A1.1 provides 
the factor loadings of each respondent all four factors (or profiles as we call them in 
the results of our study). Next, table A1.2 provides the factor arrays for the four factors 
(i.e. profiles), indicating how the statements are scored in the different profiles.
Table A1.1 Factor loadings on all four factors
Factor matrix with an X indicating a defining sort
Q-sort
Loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1 1MJAO6NH 0.0750 0.3352 0.4947 0.1490
2 LTGLIRZO 0.3580 0.1072 0.0702 0.1218
3 GEPXMI32 0.2831 0.5279 X 0.2840 -0.2665
4 HDUVWIHR 0.6552 X 0.2306 0.2245 0.2141
5 2DOXFHES 0.0565 0.0982 -0.1772 0.6850 X
6 IFGG8VAC 0.2931 0.5505 X 0.1037 0.1962
7 EYLRS9UP -0.0623 -0.1397 0.4802 -0.0234
8 OYKKTBD9 0.1618 0.0922 0.5507 X 0.2994
9 PQQ04LDM 0.5409 X 0.2495 0.3990 0.1426
10 AXG0BHYL 0.5280 X 0.0656 0.1840 0.0330
11 MPA3THHX -0.0341 0.4836 -0.2179 0.1902
12 MWTCKGIC 0.4360 0.5726 X -0.2653 0.2126
13 ENN6A3XB 0.0997 0.4228 0.1688 0.5077
14 SRWLBSHY -0.3970 0.2190 0.5133 -0.0997
15 KVGTDVUM 0.0658 0.7562 X 0.1336 -0.4996
16  S8EX1ZRB 0.2811 -0.3051 0.4060 0.5483 X
17 D0HB5L1A 0.1326 0.1418 0.4899 -0.1189
18 1O6NQ5K9 -0.1013 0.0462 0.6338 X -0.1822
19 PHZ4WD9B 0.4548 0.3638 -0.0835 0.4687
20 DHCDNRRQ -0.0449 -0.2124 0.1810 -0.8315 X
21 E8K3FPSF -0.4467 0.2259 0.0378 -0.0705
22 0ODV6JNC 0.2406 0.0677 0.0054 0.6254 X
23 WJXXW5IQ 0.3730 -0.2744 0.5680 X -0.1186
24 L9JYDR8H 0.3979 0.3384 0.2191 -0.0255
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Table A1.1 Factor loadings on all four factors (continued)
Factor matrix with an X indicating a defining sort
Q-sort
Loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
25 ZAWRBJMD 0.1253 0.1860 0.1599 0.7078 X
26 TX6UXN7F -0.0084 0.1489 0.5978 X -0.2268
27 78VXZCWM 0.0267 0.4132 0.4576 0.3125
28 MOB87VO2 0.0560 0.5414 X 0.4898 -0.1380
29 PG1MX0JE 0.4132 0.0764 0.2669 0.0969
30 IXFLVF3Y 0.4689 0.3329 0.0928 -0.1877
31 IRWL3ZMT 0.2224 0.4840 0.2414 0.2818
32 RFSPE9TK 0.1852 0.2809 0.6084 X 0.2202
33 QDZQOYS7 -0.0693 0.3892 -0.1153 0.3239
34 T5DCFUBI 0.1383 0.3320 0.1611 0.2688
35 YAELR2BU 0.3253 0.6768 X 0.1208 0.0102
36 6UO5BPRR 0.4035 -0.0646 0.3798 -0.0253
37 P1JFXU28 0.1171 0.4036 0.6747 X 0.0325
38 LKBAGY8D 0.2598 -0.1594 0.2425 0.0208
39 APU6039W 0.3949 0.2615 0.3819 0.2253
40 T21LID4P 0.1453 -0.1799 0.5536 X -0.0919
41 RUIVNBKZ 0.1634 0.2478 0.8016 X 0.0910
42 1QN2S8PJ 0.0955 0.1233 0.5557 X 0.0681
43 WISGHYZV 0.4997 -0.0035 0.7052 X 0.0866
44 D7YKCJTK 0.3871 0.0789 -0.1350 -0.0163
45 BKJSU9UQ 0.0160 0.1437 0.1024 0.5559 X
46 RWN16OSM 0.6418 X 0.2877 0.1151 0.2466
47 SDBRNJC6 -0.4003 0.2267 0.2382 0.4216
48 ZCBDYZYF 0.5068 0.0616 -0.0043 0.0615
49 93AQDFRO 0.4894 0.1140 0.2268 0.5859 X
50 OX67KDJD 0.0345 -0.0011 0.6387 X 0.3453
51 WDTPU5AQ 0.6977 X 0.0720 -0.0294 0.4540
52 IDZSCF7S 0.3240 0.2336 -0.3273 0.4778
53 O7NVX24T -0.0091 0.1355 -0.0825 -0.4010
54 FBGKLOTZ 0.5278 X -0.0589 0.1628 0.3461
55 SVMPADXE 0.5361 X -0.0534 0.3850 0.5120
56 6CDKRN3S 0.2689 -0.0781 0.1857 0.1916
57 OIR3JPNJ 0.4344 -0.2644 -0.0123 -0.2440
58 H2XYIDZ3 0.5066 0.1107 0.3754 0.6545 X
59 K0HQTEXX 0.2476 0.4751 0.1594 0.1871
60 4VTQYYWJ 0.2765 0.2854 -0.1683 0.4392
61 MMBQDXUV -0.0823 -0.2259 -0.2183 -0.2429
62 JXU0LSMZ 0.5761 X 0.0146 0.2964 0.3193
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Table A1.1 Factor loadings on all four factors (continued)
Factor matrix with an X indicating a defining sort
Q-sort
Loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
63 FXUNB2WC 0.2101 0.3002 -0.0161 0.2624
64 J9XIWF2A 0.3474 -0.0002 0.0279 0.4355
65 YNOK5ZO7 0.3535 0.1107 -0.0136 0.7691 X
66 WDMN9EQP 0.2571 0.0535 0.5138 0.0131
67 Y9K4BXLU 0.5116 0.0868 0.1533 -0.1058
68 YZHDKE4S 0.2761 0.4897 -0.1585 0.3156
69 MMZWFHU4 0.1643 0.4917 -0.0211 -0.3465
70 1ZCQJ3BA -0.0646 0.1986 -0.1560 0.6313 X
71 MYEKLCF8 -0.0373 -0.1390 0.5069 0.0887
72 4HYIVU3J 0.4690 0.1808 0.0542 0.1582
73 2LJUNDHY 0.1825 0.1717 0.0089 -0.5180
74 2FNPRPLM 0.2771 -0.1217 0.6161 X 0.2089
75 83K49IN6 0.0932 0.3437 0.1054 -0.0132
76 NPWCMUOZ 0.2564 0.2032 0.1446 -0.0615
77 R8DHAEMH 0.2748 0.2402 0.3951 0.4539
78 GPBYTXBV -0.0005 0.2909 0.2177 0.6237 X
79 4LSWZPRE 0.0775 0.4134 0.1293 0.2348
80 BOOV214T 0.5693 X 0.1070 0.2560 0.4007
81 1IN7SELH 0.4379 0.2834 0.1677 -0.0923
82 KBZRTQ2B 0.6913 X 0.0617 0.1052 0.5214
83 PKUQCZ7Q 0.0893 0.0949 0.5302 X 0.0102
84 PSUQOPE0 -0.1615 0.6339 X 0.2126 0.3712
85 LBHD1FKV -0.0056 0.8064 X -0.1261 0.1449
86 PACSUQ49 -0.0017 0.4314 0.5105 -0.1026
87 WXTIU62N 0.4291 0.3785 0.3638 -0.0739
88 P13S9TPS 0.2636 0.6413 X 0.2125 0.3115
89 QD0MCWB1 0.4613 -0.1200 0.3275 -0.2078
90 1KQTN3C6 -0.0355 0.6548 X -0.0360 0.4950
91 MX9WEFN6 0.3915 0.4834 -0.0988 0.3061
92 UY8DIR1Z 0.1615 0.0863 0.3408 -0.3902
93 A7LDGEO4 0.0607 0.5311 X 0.0981 0.0882
94 Y9ASYI5Z 0.3833 0.4953 0.3307 0.0198
95 3ACKVGFE 0.5175 0.1119 0.0937 0.0839
96 ORDHLJG8 0.5676 X 0.4166 -0.0537 0.2749
97 TDAJSGVZ -0.3465 0.2607 0.3129 0.0530
98 P2ESHAYY 0.3480 0.2214 0.2850 0.3347
99 RHJDYOE2 0.1755 0.3878 0.4042 0.2175
100 4NIDCBNH -0.2153 0.6390 X 0.3024 0.1033
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Table A1.1 Factor loadings on all four factors (continued)
Factor matrix with an X indicating a defining sort
Q-sort
Loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
101 TQIMRAO6 0.3364 0.2110 0.1717 -0.2296
102 AQOBUKET -0.0812 0.4807 0.0865 0.0705
103 KKRFC1BN 0.3107 0.6697 X 0.1045 -0.0733
104 1HFS0CED -0.0984 0.6520 X -0.1695 0.2571
105 YMF4B3VO 0.2234 0.1115 0.2205 0.2095
106 6E2IDZ97 -0.1298 0.6155 X 0.3593 -0.0306
107 PELIVSMB -0.2074 0.3870 -0.0740 0.6343 X
108 XCV0SWRH 0.0752 0.6659 X 0.0884 0.3671
109 6SEUJUFL 0.1311 0.5886 X -0.1738 -0.0307
110 UEJR7SAC 0.4314 0.0457 -0.1294 0.1341
111 4I3LZZFW 0.2330 0.3048 0.2124 -0.1754
112 P3YDXLDT 0.2121 0.5795 X -0.0641 0.1335
113 NLISLTWP 0.4006 0.4409 0.2225 0.3834
114 J7W9PT5I -0.0208 0.6970 X -0.0027 -0.1347
115 SKYTJGIB 0.2605 0.2212 0.2705 -0.0234
116 RALS2QNK -0.2351 0.7106 X 0.3417 0.2406
117 Z0FVWTA2 -0.2452 0.2790 0.0844 -0.1153
118 9BLNEO2I 0.0291 0.5638 X 0.0242 0.1295
119 QMWF2APH 0.2350 0.2153 0.2526 0.2383
Explained variance 10% 13% 10% 10%
Respondents associated with this profile 11 21 13 12
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Table A1.2 Factor arrays for our four study factors
Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1 -1 0 0 -3
2 -3 0 0 2
3 0 2 0 -1
4 2 1 0 3
5 1 -3 0 -1
6 2 1 3 0
7 0 3 1 0
8 0 1 -1 0
9 -2 -2 -1 -2
10 0 -1 3 1
11 1 2 2 1
12 1 -1 1 2
13 0 -2 -2 -1
14 -3 -3 -1 -2
15 -1 0 -3 0
16 3 1 -2 3
17 -2 -2 -2 -3
18 1 0 0 -2
19 0 3 1 1
20 -2 0 -3 2
21 -1 -1 -1 -1
22 3 -1 2 0
23 -1 0 2 0
24 2 2 1 1
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APPENDIX II
Example of the factor interpretation crib sheets used in chapter 2.
This appendix includes an example of the factor interpretation crib sheet that was 
used to interpret each factor (i.e. profile) stemming from the original analysis, and the 
separate analysis per country.
Table A2.1 Factor interpretation crib sheet (example)
Factor 2
Statements ranked at +3
19. The public professional must encourage an open attitude towards intensive collaboration and 
consultation between partners in a public–private partnership.
7. In public–private partnerships it is important for public professionals and private partners to jointly 
determine how to support each other during the project.
Statements ranked higher in factor 2 array than in other factor arrays
3. In public–private partnerships it is important that collaboration takes place on an equal basis 
between public professionals, private contractors, and other relevant involved actors. (+2)
11. In public–private partnerships it is important to compose mutually agreed rules of behaviour so 
that both partners know what to expect. (11: +2) (with factor 3)
15. The public professional must guarantee the collaborative process between partners and create the 
right conditions to achieve synergy between them. (0) (with factor 4)
1. In public–private partnerships it is important to safeguard public values like equality, democracy 
and transparency. (0) (with factor 3)
8. In public–private partnerships it is important that the private partner is given the opportunity to 
monitor its own performance (+1)
Statements ranked lower in factor 2 array than in other factor arrays
10. In public–private partnerships it is important to establish a performance-based relationship 
between public and private partners. (-1)
12. In public–private partnerships it is important that the private partner is responsible for the 
implementation of the project, assisted by public professionals where required. (-1)
13. The public professional must prevent that the functioning of public–private partnerships results in 
unwanted situations (like exclusion, arbitrariness and so on). (-2) (with factor 3)
22. The public professional must hold private partners accountable for delivering on the output 
specifications and apply sanctions if performance falls short. (-1)
Statement ranked at -3
14. The public professional must apply strict contract management and monitor the performance of 
the private consortium.
5. In public–private partnerships it is important that political authorities play a significant role in 
formulating the aim and direction of the project.
Additional items
17. The public professional must keep a clear view of, and control on, what happens in public–private 
partnerships. (-2)
24. The public professional must have confidence in the private partners to manage their own 




Results of separate factor analysis per country in chapter 2.
This appendix includes the results of the factor analysis of the Q-sorts per country. It 
shows how each statement is scored in the different profiles that resulted from the 
analysis per country.
Table A3.1 Factor arrays for analysis of the Cana-
dian Q-sorts
Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 0 -3 0
2 -1 0 -3
3 2 -1 -2
4 0 3 1
5 -2 -2 -2
6 3 1 3
7 1 0 0
8 0 1 -1
9 -1 -3 -1
10 2 0 2
11 2 1 1
12 0 0 1
13 -1 -1 -2
14 -2 -1 2
15 0 2 -1
16 -3 3 2
17 -3 -2 -1
18 1 -2 0
19 3 2 0
20 -2 2 -3
21 -1 -1 0
22 1 0 3
23 1 0 0
24 0 1 1
Table A3.2 Factor arrays for analysis of the Dutch 
Q-sorts
Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 0 -1 0
2 1 -3 -3
3 1 2 -2
4 0 1 3
5 -3 -3 -1
6 2 2 2
7 3 2 1
8 0 1 0
9 -1 -2 1
10 0 1 0
11 2 0 2
12 -1 0 1
13 -1 -1 0
14 -3 0 -3
15 0 -1 -2
16 0 1 3
17 -1 -2 -1
18 -2 -1 1
19 3 0 2
20 1 -2 -2
21 -2 0 -1
22 -2 3 0
23 1 0 -1
24 2 3 0
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Table A3.3 Factor arrays for analysis of the Danish Q-sorts
Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 -2 -2 0
2 -1 2 -1
3 1 -2 1
4 1 3 0
5 2 0 2
6 3 -1 0
7 -1 0 3
8 0 0 -1
9 -2 -3 -2
10 0 1 0
11 0 3 3
12 2 0 1
13 0 -1 -1
14 -3 -2 -3
15 -1 0 -3
16 1 1 2
17 -3 -3 -2
18 0 -1 1
19 1 1 1
20 0 2 -2
21 -2 -1 -1
22 3 0 0
23 -1 1 0
24 2 2 2
APPENDIX IV
Results of the additional linear regression analyses in chapter 2.
This appendix includes the results of the multiple linear regression analysis conducted 
as a robustness check, to test if the results of the Q-sort holds.
To perform a linear regression, we used the factor scores for each profile as the 
dependent variable. The analysis was performed for each profile (model 1 refers to 
profile 1, model 2 to profile 2, and so on). The difference between professionals work-
ing for the public partner or the private partner, the country these respondents come 
from, and their experience are included as independent variables, using dummies to 
test them. Each model is linear and has a normal distribution. The analysis shows that 
all models are significant. The results of the multiple linear regressions can be found 
in the table below.
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Table A4.1 Linear regression analyses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ꞵ Sig. ꞵ Sig. ꞵ Sig. ꞵ Sig.
Public versus private professionals (Public professionals as reference)
Private partner -.255 .011* .204 .024* -.151 .120 .301 .002**
Country (Canada as reference)
Netherlands -.160 .140 .427 .000*** -.253 .018* .125 .221
Denmark .089 .401 -.072 .457 -.272 .010** .322 .002**
Experience (< 1 year as reference)
1-3 years .005 .971 .068 .574 .121 .355 .212 .093
3-5 years -.032 .812 -.037 .762 .303 .023* .328 .011*
5-10 years .042 .786 -.052 .710 .357 .019* .321 .028*
> 10 years -.071 .664 .109 .458 .222 .163 .374 .016*
* p < .05; ** < .01; *** p < .001
ꞵ: Standardized Coefficients Beta
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3.
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 4. 
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APPENDIX IX
Means, standard deviations and correlations (n= 94) for the analysis in 
chapter 5.
Table A9.1 Means, standard deviations and correlations (n= 94)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. perceived performance 3.98 0.49 1
2. cooperation 3.39 0.75 0.46*** 1
3. management 3.89 0.58 0.37*** 0.30** 1
4. trust 6.71 1.95 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 1
5. technical complexity 7.31 2.13 0.30** 0.02 0.04 0.08 1
6. project phase (1 = building finished) 0.36 0.48 0.27** 0.23* 0.13 0.20 0.02 1
7. organizational background (1 = public partner) 0.48 0.50 -0.16 -0.15 -0.03 0.05 -0.18 -0.10 1
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
APPENDIX X
The intercept only
The intercept only with the outcome variable ‘perceived project performance’ (PER1)
Summary of the model specified:
Level-1 Model
    PER1ij = β0j + rij
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Level-2 Model
    β0j = γ00 + u0j
Mixed Model
    PER1ij = γ00  + u0j+ rij
Final Results
σ2 = 0.14642
Standard error of σ2 = 0.02613
τ
INTRCPT1,β0      0.09961
Standard error of τ
INTRCPT1,β0      0.03724
Table A10.1 Intercept only ‘perceived project performance’
Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
INTRCPT1,β0 0.552
The value of the log-likelihood function at iteration 8 = -7.179775E+001









    INTRCPT2, γ00 3.997710 0.060063 66.558 49 <0.001









    INTRCPT2, γ00 3.997710 0.060057 66.566 49 <0.001







INTRCPT1, u0 0.31561 0.09961 49 119.73308 <0.001
level-1, r 0.38264 0.14642      
The intercept only with the outcome variable ‘cooperation’ (SAM1)




    SAM1ij = β0j + rij
Level-2 Model
    β0j = γ00 + u0j
Mixed Model
    SAM1ij = γ00  + u0j+ rij
Final Results
σ2 = 0.37682
Standard error of σ2 = 0.06858
τ
INTRCPT1,β0      0.21086
Standard error of τ
INTRCPT1,β0      0.08733
Table A10.5: Intercept only ‘cooperation’
Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
INTRCPT1,β0 0.503
The value of the log-likelihood function at iteration 17 = -1.172110E+002









    INTRCPT2, γ00 3.373292 0.091571 36.838 49 <0.001









    INTRCPT2, γ00 3.373292 0.091564 36.841 49 <0.001







INTRCPT1, u0 0.45919 0.21086 49 107.36216 <0.001
level-1, r 0.61386 0.37682      
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APPENDIX XI
The Lindell and Whitney test
The Lindell and Whitney test uses a theoretically unrelated construct as a marker 
variable to adjust the correlations between the principal constructs. Any high cor-
relation among these items would be an indicator of common method bias. We used 
a survey variable that is not used in this study to answer our research question as a 
marker (to what extent are societal groups involved?). Table A11.1 shows the correla-
tion coefficients and the R-squared between variables in the model and the marker. 
The highest value corresponds to the perceived performance variable. The R-squared 
of this correlation coefficient shows the maximum percentage of variance shared 
between factors. If common sources bias were a concern, we would obtain high levels 
of dependency between factors and the marker. In our study however, a low level of 
common source effect is shared between constructs (R2=0.025).
Table A11.1 Correlation and R2 between variables and marker
Variables in the model Pearson’s coefficient R2
Cooperation  0.128 0.016
Perceived performance  0.158 0.025
Management  0.034 0.001
Trust  0.056 0.003
Organizational background - 0.111 0.012
Project phase - 0.127 0.016
Technical complexity  0.073 0.005
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 6.
APPENDIX XII
The calibration procedure used in chapter 6.
This appendix provides further details about the calibration of the four conditions 
(risk allocation, the application of sanctions, conflict management, and trust) and the 
outcome (outstanding performance).
Outstanding performance
In this article, we have defined successful PPPs as projects with outstanding perfor-
mance (OP). In an earlier attempt, successful PPPs were defined as ‘good performance’, 
but many projects scored reasonably well, leading to too little variation between the 
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projects. Therefore, we raised the bar, wondering what distinguishes exceptionally 
good projects from poor or reasonable performing PPP projects. Outstanding perfor-
mance was calibrated using four conditions:
· On time delivery
· On budget delivery
· Value for money
· Satisfaction
The first three conditions are calibrated individually for each project. A score of zero 
means that respondents agree that the criteria have not been met (e.g. no on time 
delivery, or no on budget delivery). If respondents agree that the criteria have been a 
scores of one is given. When respondents partially agree with the statement, or if there 
are minor differences of opinion (e.g. one actor totally agrees that value for money has 
been delivered, while the other only partially agrees), the project will receive a score 
of 0.67. Large differences of opinion between partners (e.g. the public partner agrees 
that the project was delivered on budget, but the private partner strongly disagrees 
with this statement) will result in a score of 0.33.
The initial score for the project is then determined according to the following 
scheme:
Table A12.1 Calibration of individual indicators for ‘outstanding performance’
Situation Calibration OP
All three conditions are calibrated with a 1 1
All conditions have a score above the cross over point, but at least one of them scores 0.67 0.67
One out of three conditions scores below the cross over point. The other two score above. 0.33
Two or three out of three conditions score below the cross over point. 0
These initial scores are corrected using the indicator satisfaction. Satisfaction is 
calibrated in the same way as the other three conditions. Satisfaction scores can be 
used to adept the initial score. If the difference between the assessment of the ‘tra-
ditional’ performance measures and the satisfaction of the partners with the project 
is substantial, qualitative interview data are used to provide information on whether 
respondents merely try keeping up appearances by giving a high satisfaction score or 
whether they have other reasons to be satisfied with the project performance. This 
finally results in the ‘final score’ for outstanding performance.
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Table A12.2 Calibration of ‘outstanding performance’






Initial score Satisfaction Final score
P1NG 0.51 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00
P2BG 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.00
P3NTI 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.00
P4NG 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00
P5BTI 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00
P6BTI 0.51 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33
P7NTI 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.67
P8NTI 0.51 0.51 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67
P9NG 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33
P10BTI 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33
P11NTI 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33
P12BG 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33
P13BG 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33
P14NTI 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.67
P15NTI 0.51 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67
P16NG 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.33
P17BG 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.33
P18NTI 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00
P19BTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P20NG 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67
P21BTI 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67
P22BTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P23NG 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67
P24BG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P25BG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Risk allocation
For the calibration of the condition risk allocation, we used a relatively straightfor-
ward method, determining the scores on the number and type of tasks that were 
transferred to the private partner or deliberately remained a responsibility of the 
private partner. We limited ourselves to the formal risk allocation. However, we also 
tested a calibration using a combination of aspects on risk allocation, namely the 
formal risk allocation and the perceptions on the fairness of this allocation. However, 
this way of calibrating the data leads to very paradoxical scores. In projects where 
partners pay attention to a proper risk division, the partners are also well aware of 
the fact that partners are sometimes unable to carry the risks they have been given. 
In projects where only limited attention was given to risk division, and the private 
partner carried most of the risks, both partners were less worried about the question 
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whether partners would be able to deal with the consequences of these risks. This 
resulted in lower scores for the first group on ‘proper risk allocation’, and higher 
scores for the second group, which does not reflect the basic theoretical assumptions 
underlying this condition.
Strict application of sanctions
In the calibration of this condition data stems from the survey data, using the state-
ment: ‘We sometimes deviate from the sanctions as described in the contract in order 
to maintain a good relationship between the partners involved in the project.’ Fur-
thermore, qualitative interview data is used to distinguish the reasons for imposing or 
remitting sanctions in order to determine the set membership score on the condition 
‘strict application of sanctions’. If there is a strict application of sanctions, sanctions 
will always be applied if the monitoring process shows that performance does not live 
up to the required standards. If there is no strict application of sanctions, sanctions 
are not always applied. Sometimes sanctions are cancelled due to circumstances or 
because the shortcomings are beyond the power of the partner to prevent them. A 
project with a full membership score of 1 in the set ‘strict application of sanctions’ 
can be defined as ‘a project in which obligatory sanctions are imposed without any exceptions. 
The optional sanctions are usually imposed, unless there are very compelling reasons not to. There 
are no or limited options to discuss the sanction.’ A project with a score of 0 would mean 
that ‘optional sanctions are hardly ever imposed, while obligatory sanctions are avoided as much 
as possible. There would be many examples in the project of sanctions not being imposed, even if 
there was an opportunity to do so.’
Conflict management
The calibration of the condition conflict management is done using a Generic Mem-
bership Evaluation Template suggested by Tóth et al. (2017). This allows us to provide 
a clear overview of the qualitative data on this condition per project. Differences 
between actors can be included in the form. Table A12.3 provides an example of the 
GMET for the condition conflict management.
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Table A12.3 GMET used to calibrate ‘conflict management’
Generic Membership Evaluation Template (GMET)
Membership in the set of ‘good conflict management’
Overall case 
description 
from a ‘conflict 
management’ 
perspective
Here, we give a description of the case in terms of conflict, differences of opinion, and the way the 
partners in the project deal with them.
Dimensions Context-specific 
description

















Early attention for 
potential ‘sensitive 
issues’
Description of the 
presence of this 
dimension in the case
Negative, neutral or 
positive




Here, we include the scores of the respondents in the case based on the statements: ‘Conflicts 
between public and private partners are resolved constructively’, and ‘The partners involved in 
the project succeeded in controlling differences of opinion in an adequate matter.’
Set membership in 
4-value fuzzy set
Here, we insert our score on the 4-value fuzzy set
Reason for fuzzy-set 
attribution score
Give a qualitative explanation for scoring the project with the above-mentioned membership 
score.
Guidelines towards the decision of the set membership score for each project in 
4-value fuzzy set:
1: Overall intense and various positive dimensions - The project had both formal 
and informal agreements on conflict management, the agreements were focused on 
both prevention and solving conflicts, the agreements were made early in the process, 
and there was early attention for potential ‘sensitive’ issues.
0.67: Mostly positive dimensions with a few negative dimensions - For example, a 
project has both formal and informal agreements on conflict management, focused 
on preventing and solving conflicts, and there was some attention to ‘sensitive is-




0.33: Mostly negative dimensions with a few positive dimensions - For example, a 
project has both formal and informal agreements on solving conflicts that have been 
established early in the process. However, there is no early attention for potential 
sensitive issues, and there are no agreements made on how to prevent the rise of 
conflicts.
0: Overall intense and various negative dimensions
Trust
In determining the set membership score for the condition trust, survey data on five 
statements (see below) are used. The statements can be found below:
· To what extent do the partners involved in this project fulfil their agreements?
· To what extent do the partners involved in this project give each other the benefit 
of the doubt?
· To what extent do the partners involved take each other's interests into account?
· To what extent can the partners involved in this project assume that the inten-
tions of the other partner are in principle good?
· To what extent do the partners involved in this project use the efforts of the other 
partner for their own gain (at the expense of joint goals)?
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Results
The result of the calibration procedure is shown in Table A12.4 below.
Table A12.4 Results of the calibration process








Trust (T) Outstanding 
performance (OP)
P1NG 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.00
P2BG 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
P3NTI 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00
P4NG 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.00
P5BTI 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00
P6BTI 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.33
P7NTI 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.67
P8NTI 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67
P9NG 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.33
P10BTI 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33
P11NTI 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.33
P12BG 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33
P13BG 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33
P14NTI 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.67
P15NTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67
P16NG 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33
P17BG 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33
P18NTI 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 1.00
P19BTI 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00
P20NG 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.67
P21BTI 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67
P22BTI 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00
P23NG 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.67
P24BG 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67 1.00
P25BG 0.00 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00
APPENDIX XIII
Additional analysis for the QCA in chapter 6.
Most parsimonious solution term and the intermediate solution term
In the analysis, we also produced the most parsimonious solution term. This includes 
a simplifying assumption on truth table row 7. The most parsimonious solution term 
is only slightly different from the conservative solution term. Based on the theoreti-
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cal expectations that all four conditions in their presence contribute to outstanding 
PPP performance, the intermediate solution term is created. This creation results in 
exactly the same solution term as the conservative solution term presented earlier.
Table A13.1 Most parsimonious solution term
Configurations → Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
T*RA RA*CM T*CM*~S
Consistency 0.845 0.770 0.901
Raw coverage 0.594 0.540 0.485
Unique coverage 0.109 0.054 0.135
Solution consistency 0.784
Solution coverage 0.783
Table A13.2 Intermediate solution term
Configurations → Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
T*RA RA*CM*S T*CM*~S
Consistency 0.845 0.823 0.901
Raw coverage 0.594 0.377 0.485
Unique coverage 0.109 0.028 0.135
Solution consistency 0.823
Solution coverage 0.757
Cluster analysis for different countries, project types, and government levels
To check the results for existing clusters in our data, we performed additional analysis 
to see if the results vary over the different clusters. For the clustering based on country 
both the pooled consistency and the cross-sectional consistency for each individual 
country in the set is rather high (see also table A13.3 below). Only the consistency 
for the Dutch cases in the configuration RA*CM*S is below the generally accepted 
threshold of 0.75 (see also Ragin 2008). Important is also the distance between the 
between consistencies, and the overall consistency. If this distance is close to zero, 
this indicates that the consistencies are (almost) identical between the countries 
(Garcia-Castro & Arinõ 2016). The results show that most configurations hold for 
both the Dutch as well as the Belgian cases. The differences in terms of consistency 
are limited. For the first two configurations (T*RA and T*CM*~S) this is close to zero, 
indicating that there are no differences between countries with regard to these con-
figurations. The adjusted distance of 0.112 for the configuration RA*CM*S indicates 
some of heterogeneity across countries. Since all distances between consistencies are 
below 0.2, none of the adjusted-distances suggest the existence of strong differences 
across country in the dataset (Garcia-Castro & Arinõ 2016).
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Table A13.3 Cluster analysis between countries
T*RA T*CM*~S RA*CM*S
Pooled consistency 0.845 0.901 0.823
Consistency for Belgian cases 0.799 0.875 1.000
Consistency for Dutch cases 0.875 0.918 0.727
Distance from between to pooled 0.032 0.017 0.112
For the clustering between types of project (transport versus social infrastructure) 
the analysis shows that the consistency scores are rather good, except for the consis-
tency for the transport infrastructure PPPs in the configuration RA*CM*S. With 0.726, 
this is just below the threshold of 0.75. Only the adjusted difference for the configura-
tion RA*CM*S shows some heterogeneity, but none of them suggests the existence of 
strong differences between the two types of cases.
Table A13.4 Cluster analysis between project types
T*RA T*CM*~S RA*CM*S
Pooled consistency 0.845 0.901 0.823
Consistency for social infrastructure PPPs 1.000 0.857 1.000
Consistency for transport infrastructure PPPs 0.789 0.924 0.726
Distance from between to pooled 0.084 0.026 0.112
Finally, we also tested for differences between the local and the national level. All 
consistency scores, both the pooled consistency and the between consistencies are 
above the threshold of 0.75. Moreover, none of the adjusted distances indicates het-
erogeneity. There is no sign of differences between the cases on a local and national 
level.
Table A13.5 Cluster analysis between cases on local and national level
T*RA T*CM*~S RA*CM*S
Pooled consistency 0.845 0.901 0.823
Consistency for national level PPPs 1.000 1.000 1.000
Consistency for local level PPPs 0.809 0.883 0.785
Distance from between to pooled 0.075 0.044 0.085
Robustness tests
Despite all efforts to provide a solid calibration of the conditions used in this study, 
the risk of potential measurement errors remains. As most conditions in this study are 
calibrated using qualitative interview data and in-depth case knowledge, it is hard to 
artificially determine different thresholds. Moreover, alternative calibration without 
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harming the underlying (theoretical) principles is not always possible. However, in 
order to test for potential measurement errors, we performed two robustness tests 
using different calibrations of the conditions ‘trust’. The conditions trust is only based 
qualitative survey data, which allows us to change the threshold more easily. In the 
first robustness test the same five indicators for trust are included, but the thresholds 
are altered. The cross-over point of 0.5 in the original condition trust (T) was set at 
30,5. In the alternative calibration of trust (T2), we altered the cross-over point to 
33. The threshold determining the difference between a membership score of 0 and 
a score of 0.33 changed from 25,25 to 22. The threshold determining the difference 
between a membership score of 0.67 and 1 remained at 40. Using these thresholds, 
we performed a new analysis. The analysis of necessity had the same results as the 
original analysis. The truth table displayed a few differences. Truth table row 10, 11, 
12 were not regarded as sufficient for the outcome in the analysis using T2 due to 
inclusion cuts below 0.8. As we excluded row 10 and 12 in the original analysis due 
to the presence of deviant cases consistency in kind, not including row 11 remains 
the only difference. Although the set membership score of the case in row 11 remains 
the same, the inclusion cut for this row drops below 0.8. This results in a different 
solution formula (see Table A13.6) in which the third path disappeared. This can be 
explained easily, as the case covered in truth table row 11 was the only uniquely 
covered case in path 3. Path 1 and 2 remain exactly the same.
Table A13.6 Conservative solution term, using T2 instead of T.
Configurations → Path 1 Path 2
T*RA RA*CM*S
Consistency 0.845 0.823
Raw coverage 0.594 0.377
Unique coverage 0.245 0.028
Solution consistency 0.821
In the second robustness test we included only four indicators for trust. These four 
indicators were formulated in a positive way. The only statement that was formulated 
in a negative way was excluded, as respondents might overlook the negative phrasing 
of this statement and score it similar as the four positive statements. As the maximum 
score now changed from 50 to 40, we also altered the thresholds. The cross-over point 
of 0.5 in the original condition trust (T) was set at 30,5. In this alternative calibration 
using only four indicators (T3), the cross-over point is 28. The threshold determining 
the difference between a membership score of 0 and a score of 0.33 changed from 
25,25 to 19.9. Finally, the threshold determining the difference between a member-
ship score of 0.67 and 1 changed from 40 to 34. Using T3 as an alternative calibration 
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of trust, the results of the analysis were almost identical to the original analysis. Both 
the analysis of necessity and the conservative solution term in the analysis of suf-
ficiency are identical to the original analysis. The only difference is that some of the 
truth table rows had a slightly higher inclusion cut, but as the same rows remained 
included in the analysis, this is not a substantial change.
Table A13.7 Conservative solution term, using T3 instead of T.
Configurations → Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
T*RA RA*CM*S T*CM*~S
Consistency 0.845 0.823 0.901
Raw coverage 0.594 0.377 0.485
Unique coverage 0.109 0.028 0.135
Solution consistency 0.800
Solution coverage 0.757
Based on the results of the robustness tests as described above, we would argue that 
the results of our analysis are fairly robust. The changed calibration of the conditions 
trust had no major effect as the results are close to the original. The use of the altered 
condition T3 resulted in an identical conservative solution formula. It displayed the 
same INUS conditions. The results for the analysis using T2 were not as good, but still 
satisfying as the new solution did not contradict the old one. Moreover, the new solu-
tion formula was a subset of the original conservative solution formula. Therefore, 
both solutions are in a set relation, which indicates that the results are fairly robust 








Vandaag de dag worden publiek-private samenwerkingen in veel landen gebruikt om 
publieke goederen en diensten te realiseren. Het gebruik van publiek-private samen-
werkingen – die we kunnen omschrijven als een vorm van samenwerking tussen pu-
blieke en private partijen met een duurzaam karakter, waarin de actoren gezamenlijk 
werken aan de ontwikkeling van een product of dienst en risico’s, kosten en baten 
gedeeld worden – vraagt van publieke organisaties dat zij hun rol in het realiseren 
van publieke dienstverlening opnieuw overdenken. Ze moeten nadenken over de ma-
nier waarop ze met hun partners willen samenwerken en over de manier waarop ze 
sturing binnen samenwerkingsverbanden en partnerschappen willen vormgeven. De 
zoektocht naar antwoorden op deze vragen roept voor publieke organisaties interes-
sante dilemma’s op tussen autonomie en controle, zekerheid en flexibiliteit, en risico 
en meerwaarde. Eén van de belangrijkste dilemma’s waar publieke organisaties in 
publiek-private samenwerkingen mee om moeten gaan is de spanning tussen controle 
en samenwerking. Dat laatste impliceert in zekere zin immers een bepaalde mate van 
loslaten.
Publiek-private samenwerking als contractvorm
Dit sturingsvraagstuk speelt ook bij de ‘long term infrastructure contracts’ die centraal 
staan in dit proefschrift. Deze vorm van publiek-private samenwerking is gebaseerd 
op langdurige contractuele samenwerking tussen publiek en private partners en inte-
greert verschillende projectfasen in één contract: zowel het ontwerp, als ook de bouw, 
de financiering en het onderhoud worden gebundeld om zoveel mogelijk lifecycle 
optimalisaties mogelijk te maken. Een typisch kenmerk van deze contractvorm is 
dat de risico’s verdeeld worden tussen de publiek en private partner op basis van het 
principe dat de risico’s belegd worden bij de partner die ze het best kan beheersen. 
In de praktijk leidt dit er nog wel eens toe dat het overgrote deel van de risico’s bij 
de private partij terecht komt. Onder andere in Nederland wordt dit type publiek-
private samenwerking vaak gebruikt, onder de naam DBFM of DBFMO, refererend 
naar de verschillende projectfasen die in het contract vervat zitten: design (D), build 
(B), finance (F), maintain (M) en eventueel operate (O).
Contractuele versus relationele sturing
Het gebruik van contracten in publiek-private samenwerking, zoals DBFM, is een 
bekende sturingsvorm en bouwt voort op bekende economische theorieën over trans-
actiekosten en de principaal-agent relatie tussen opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer. 
Deze theorieën gaan uit van rationeel en mogelijk zelfs opportunistisch gedrag van 
partners - waarbij partners een situatie in hun eigen voordeel zullen benutten - en 
zien het contract als een geschikt instrument om het gedrag van beide samenwer-
kingspartners te sturen en opportunistisch gedrag te voorkomen. Een belangrijk en 
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inherent nadeel aan het gebruik van deze contracten is echter dat contracten nooit 
compleet zijn. Ze zijn niet in staat om rekening te houden met alle mogelijke omstan-
digheden. De complexiteit van publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten en het lang-
durige karakter van dergelijke projecten maken dit des te meer een onmogelijkheid.
Relationele sturing is een sturingsvorm gebaseerd op heel andere uitgangspunten. 
Het gaat uit van het idee dat publiek-private samenwerkingen ingebed zijn in so-
ciale relaties, die gekenmerkt worden door wederzijdse afhankelijkheid tussen de 
partners. Partners hebben elkaar nodig en moeten daarom samenwerken. Sturings-
mechanismen ontstaan in dit geval op basis van de waarden en processen in deze 
relatie, en krijgen de vorm van onder meer informatiedeling, open communicatie, 
en het gezamenlijk oplossen van problemen. Deze vorm van sturing probeert sa-
menwerking en het streven naar win-win oplossingen te stimuleren. Ondanks de 
positieve connotatie die velen hebben bij deze sturingsvorm, kent ook relationele 
sturing nadelen. Het vraagt om een grote investering in de vorm van tijd en middelen 
om deze sturingsvorm te ontwikkelen en consequent toe te passen. Tijd en middelen 
die partners op dat moment niet kunnen investeren in kerntaken. Het is bovendien 
niet altijd eenvoudig om gezamenlijk een oplossing voor een probleem te formuleren. 
De verschillende agenda’s, tegenstrijdige belangen, verschillende machtsbronnen, 
en de complexiteit van onderliggende issues hierbij een uitdaging. Het bereiken van 
overeenstemming met behulp van deze sturingsvorm kan daarom tijdrovend zijn, 
waardoor de vordering van het project soms traag te noemen is.
Wat is de hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift?
Hoewel vaak gepresenteerd als twee tegengestelde vormen van sturing, kunnen we 
contractuele en relationele sturing zien als de uiteinden van een spectrum, waarbij 
het mogelijk is om beide vormen met elkaar te combineren. Eerder onderzoek heeft al 
aangetoond dat contractuele en relationele sturing elkaar niet uitsluiten, maar elkaar 
juist goed kunnen aanvullen (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Bij het dilemma tussen controle 
en loslaten dat publieke organisaties ervaren in publiek-private samenwerking, speelt 
de balans tussen contractuele en relationele sturing een grote rol. De keuze voor 
een sturingsvorm, of een mix van sturingsvormen, heeft effect op de prestaties van 
publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten. In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik de manier 
waarop publieke organisaties contractuele en relationele sturing kunnen combineren 
voor een succesvolle publiek-private samenwerking. Daarbij wordt ook aandacht 
besteed aan de kwaliteit van de relatie tussen projectpartners. In eerder onderzoek 
wordt gehint op de mogelijkheid dat de kwaliteit van de relatie in staat is om de 
relatie tussen sturing en performance te verklaren (Zheng et al., 2008). Het is immers 
niet alleen het gebruik van sturingsmechanismen, maar ook de reactie van project-
partners op het gebruik daarvan die het uiteindelijke succes van de sturing bepaalt. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Pogingen tot relationele sturing hebben wellicht minder effect als wantrouwen tussen 
projectpartners ertoe leidt dat ze zich niet volledig aan deze sturingsvorm willen com-
mitteren. Strikte contractuele sturing in een relatie van matige kwaliteit kan leiden 
tot verdere verslechtering van die relatie, waardoor deze vorm van sturing uitmondt in 
eindeloze discussies over de interpretatie van contractvereisten. Omgekeerd kunnen 
hoogwaardige relaties tussen projectpartners leiden tot acceptatie van de toegepaste 
sturingsstrategie, waardoor het waarschijnlijker wordt dat deze mechanismen hun 
beoogde effect zullen bereiken. In dit onderzoek wordt daarom relationele kwaliteit 
meegenomen als mediërende variabele in de relatie tussen sturing en performance. 
Dat leidt tot de centrale onderzoeksvraag in dit proefschrift:
Hoe kunnen contractuele en relationele sturing de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerkin-
gen beïnvloeden en wat is de rol van relationele kwaliteit daarin?
Om deze onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, zijn er vier deelvragen geformuleerd, die 
in de verschillende empirische hoofdstukken beantwoord worden. De eerste deelvraag 
richt zich op de sturingsvoorkeuren van de professionals die in dergelijke projecten 
werken: Wat zijn de verschillende percepties van professionals werkzaam in publiek-private sa-
menwerkingsprojecten met betrekking tot de sturing van publiek-private samenwerking? Hoofd-
stuk 2 van dit proefschrift analyseert hun percepties en belangrijkste overwegingen 
met betrekking tot het gebruik van verschillende sturingsmechanismen. De tweede 
deelvraag richt zich op het ontwikkelen van een beter begrip van het concept ‘relati-
onele kwaliteit’: Wat is relationele kwaliteit en welke determinanten zijn van invloed op de rela-
tionele kwaliteit in publiek-private samenwerkingen? Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 pogen een antwoord 
te formuleren op deze deelvraag. De derde deelvraag richt zich ook op relationele 
kwaliteit, maar dan in relatie tot de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerkingen: 
Welke invloed heeft relationele kwaliteit op de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerkingen? In 
hoofdstuk 5 wordt de veelvoorkomende aanname dat hoogwaardige relaties de pres-
taties van samenwerkingen verbeteren getest. De laatste deelvraag gaat over het effect 
van sturing op de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerkingen. Deze deelvraag 
richt zich daarbij expliciet op het combineren van verschillende sturingsvormen 
en heeft tot doel te identificeren welke combinaties van contractuele en relationele 
sturing aanwezig zijn in goed presterende publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten: 
Hoe verhouden contractuele en relationele sturing zich tot elkaar in succesvolle publiek-private 
samenwerkingsprojecten? Zowel hoofdstuk 5 als 6 besteden aandacht aan deze laatste 
deelvraag.
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Waarom is dit proefschrift relevant?
De wetenschappelijke waarde van dit onderzoek ligt zowel op theoretisch als me-
thodologisch vlak. Allereerst reageert dit proefschrift op de roep om meer aandacht 
voor relationele aspecten in het onderzoek naar publiek-private samenwerkingen. 
Met name in het onderzoek naar door contracten gestuurde publiek-private samen-
werkingsprojecten is de aandacht voor relationele ‘zachte’ aspecten beperkt. Dit on-
derzoek richt zich juist op die elementen en draagt zodoende bij aan meer inzicht in 
en begrip van het belang van deze relationele factoren in dergelijke samenwerkings-
projecten. Een tweede theoretische bijdrage ligt op het gebied van de literatuur over 
sturing. Hoewel inmiddels bekend is dat verschillende sturingsvormen gecombineerd 
kunnen worden in meer hybride vormen van sturing, biedt dit proefschrift heel con-
creet inzicht in hoe contractuele en relationele sturingsvormen gecombineerd kun-
nen worden en welke specifieke combinaties een rol spelen bij succesvolle projecten. 
Een laatste wetenschappelijke bijdrage ligt op methodologisch vlak. Onderzoek naar 
publiek-private samenwerkingen wordt gedomineerd door kleinschalige casusstudies 
en kwantitatief vragenlijstonderzoek. Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift is uitgevoerd 
met meer geavanceerde onderzoeksmethoden, zoals Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis en Q-methodology. Deze methoden worden tot op heden weinig gebruikt worden 
in onderzoek naar publiek-private samenwerkingen. Het gebruik van deze methoden 
leidt tot het ontstaan van nieuwe kennis over publiek-private samenwerking en draagt 
tegelijkertijd bij aan de methodologische ontwikkeling van dit onderzoeksveld.
Naast wetenschappelijk waarde, levert dit proefschrift ook waardevolle inzichten 
op voor de samenleving. Steeds vaker ontmoeten publieke en private professionals 
elkaar in het publieke domein om publieke goederen en diensten te leveren. Die 
ontmoetingen leiden niet altijd tot succesvolle samenwerking. Dit proefschrift biedt 
handvaten voor samenwerkende professionals ten aanzien van de sturing van de 
samenwerking en de relatie tussen professionals werkzaam in deze samenwerking. 
Het biedt inzicht in de mogelijkheden om verschillende sturingsvormen met elkaar te 
combineren, benadrukt het belang van een goede relatie, en toont aan welke factoren 
kunnen bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van een goede samenwerkingsrelatie. Deze in-
zichten vormen belangrijke puzzelstukjes voor publieke organisaties en professionals 
die worstelen met de puzzel van sturing in publiek-private samenwerking.
Wat zijn de kernbevindingen van dit proefschrift?
Om een antwoord te geven op de hoofdvraag, bevat dit proefschrift vijf empirische 
hoofdstukken die elk een deel van de hoofdvraag helpen te beantwoorden (hoofdstuk 
2 tot en met 6).
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
1.  De sturingsvoorkeuren van professionals verschillen, maar 
zijn meestal hybride vormen van sturing, waarin verschillende 
sturingsmechanismen gecombineerd kunnen worden.
Op basis van het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 naar de percepties van publieke en private 
professionals op de sturing van publiek-private samenwerking, kunnen we vier ver-
schillende profielen onderscheiden. Deze profielen zijn clusters van professionals die 
een soortgelijk beeld hebben van de manier waarop sturing in publiek-private samen-
werking eruit zou moeten zien. Elk profiel vertegenwoordigt een andere voorkeur op 
het gebied van sturing. In het onderzoek valt op dat de percepties van professionals 
vrijwel altijd een combinatie zijn van bestaande theoretische paradigma’s over stu-
ring. Hun sturingsvoorkeuren kennen een hybride karakter, waarbij contractuele en 
relationele sturingsvormen gecombineerd kunnen worden. De profielen verschillen 
voornamelijk in de mate van controle versus samenwerking en de mate waarin de 
private partner de ruimte krijgt om het project te managen. Het eerste profiel combi-
neert een voorkeur voor controle met beperkte ruimte voor de private partner om zijn 
eigen besluiten te nemen. De private partner moet leveren volgens de voorgeschreven 
performance indicatoren, en de publieke opdrachtgever controleert dat vervolgens. 
Elke partner heeft zijn eigen taken en verantwoordelijkheden volgens duidelijk vast-
gelegde afspraken. Samenwerking is alleen mogelijk zolang dit geen invloed heeft op 
de verdeling van taken en verantwoordelijkheden. Het tweede profiel richt zich juist 
sterk op samenwerking en benadrukt het belang van openheid en vertrouwen. Er is 
geen sprake van veel ruimte voor de private partner, omdat besluiten bij voorkeur 
in gezamenlijkheid genomen worden. Het derde profiel biedt meer ruimte voor de 
private partner om zelf besluiten te nemen ten aan zien van het management van het 
project. Aangezien veel risico’s overgedragen worden naar de private partner, is al te 
veel invloed van de publieke partner onwenselijk. De publieke partner bepaalt slechts 
de kaders waarbinnen de private partner moet werken. Binnen het vierde en laatste 
profiel domineert opnieuw het idee dat de private partner de ruimte moet krijgen om 
zijn eigen besluiten te nemen. In tegenstelling tot het vorige profiel, hechten profes-
sionals hier minder belang aan publieke controle. De private partner wordt gezien 
als de partij met voldoende expertise om het project te realiseren, terwijl de publieke 
partner zich schikt in een rol als facilitator. Elk profiel bestaat uit een mix van pro-
fessionals met verschillende culturele, organisatie- en persoonlijke achtergronden. 
Desondanks valt wel op dat sommige profielen in een bepaald land dominanter zijn 
dan in het andere land. Nederlandse professionals hechten bovengemiddeld vaak 
waarde aan het tweede profiel, waarin samenwerking centraal staat, terwijl Canadese 
professionals meer neigen naar een vorm van sturing gebaseerd op contracten en 
prestatie-indicatoren. De Deense professionals neigen het meest naar het vierde pro-
fiel, waarin veel ruimte gegeven wordt aan private partijen binnen de samenwerking. 
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Ook de ervaring van de professional en de organisatie waarvoor iemand werkt, lijken 
een rol te spelen. Meer ervaren professionals kiezen, net als professionals werkzaam 
voor private organisaties, in verhouding vaker voor een vorm van sturing waarin 
meer ruimte gelaten wordt aan de private partner.
2.  Relationele kwaliteit bestaat uit meer dan alleen vertrouwen. 
Openheid, communicatie, respect en toewijding zijn eveneens 
relevante kenmerken van hoogwaardige relaties.
De literatuur review in hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat eerder onderzoek naar relationele 
kwaliteit in publiek-private samenwerkingen nog relatief beperkt is. Het concept 
relationele kwaliteit lijdt bovendien nog aan conceptuele vaagheid. Het onder-
zoeksgebied kan in dit verband leren van de bestaande literatuur over gerelateerde 
onderwerpen, zoals sociaal kapitaal, relationship marketing en de literatuur over 
netwerken en samenwerking. Hoofdstuk 3 biedt een eerste conceptualisering van het 
begrip relationele kwaliteit in publiek-private samenwerking. Het concludeert dat 
relationele kwaliteit gaat over de staat van relaties, die gedefinieerd kunnen worden 
als langdurige, interpersoonlijke, sociale banden tussen actoren. Deze relatie wordt 
onder andere gekenmerkt door vertrouwen, een van de meest onderzochte aspecten 
van relationele kwaliteit. Hoofdstuk 3 onderscheidt daarnaast ook andere elementen 
van sociale relaties tussen projectpartners: de aanwezigheid van openheid, commu-
nicatie, respect en toewijding zijn eveneens relevante kenmerken van hoogwaardige 
relaties. Dit nodigt ertoe uit om bij het onderzoeken van relationele kwaliteit naar 
meer te kijken dan alleen vertrouwen. Er bestaan complexe en wederkerige relaties 
tussen deze vijf verschillende kenmerken. Zo kan openheid bijvoorbeeld van invloed 
zijn op vertrouwen en vice versa. Daarnaast is relationele kwaliteit een dynamisch 
concept, aangezien de kwaliteit van de relatie in de loop der tijd kan veranderen. Dit 
levert uitdagingen op bij het meten van relationele kwaliteit. De literatuur review 
identificeert daarnaast een aantal mogelijke determinanten die de kwaliteit van de 
relatie kunnen beïnvloeden. Deze determinanten bestaan op individueel (ervaring, 
personeelsverloop), project- (management, gedeelde waarden) en organisatieniveau 
(leiderschap).
3.  Een eerlijke risicoverdeling, netwerkmanagementactiviteiten 
en ervaring kunnen in verschillende combinaties een bijdrage 
leveren aan het bouwen van goede relaties.
Het vierde hoofdstuk uit het proefschrift test een aantal van de determinanten die in 
de literatuur review geïdentificeerd worden, namelijk netwerkmanagement, de risico 
allocatie van publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten, ervaring, en de communicatie 
voorafgaand aan de start van de bouw. Met behulp van een Qualitative Comparative 
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Analysis onderzoeken we hoe deze condities voorkomen bij 25 publiek-private samen-
werkingsprojecten in Nederland en Vlaanderen. De analyse toont drie combinaties 
van condities, ook wel configuraties genoemd, die voorkomen bij publiek-private 
samenwerkingsprojecten waarvan de projectpartners een goede relatie hebben.
a. Een combinatie van netwerkmanagementactiviteiten en ervaring;
b. Een combinatie van een eerlijke risicoverdeling en ervaring;
c. Een combinatie van netwerkmanagementactiviteiten en een eerlijke risicoverde-
ling.
Op basis van deze resultaten kunnen een aantal conclusies getrokken worden. Al-
lereerst toont dit onderzoek aan dat er een kern van waarheid schuilt in de uitspraak: 
‘een goed begin is het halve werk’. Immers, zowel de risicoverdeling als de ervaring 
van de professionals wordt in dit onderzoek voorafgaand aan het project bepaald. 
Een eerlijke verdeling van risico’s en ervaren medewerkers zijn blijkbaar goede uit-
gangspunten voor hoogwaardige relaties in een samenwerking. Daarnaast toont dit 
hoofdstuk het belang van netwerkmanagementactiviteiten. Deze activiteiten helpen 
om de relatie te behouden gedurende het project. Aangezien netwerkmanagementac-
tiviteiten, met name de activiteiten gericht op het verbinden van actoren, beschouwd 
kunnen worden als vorm van relationele sturing, zien we hier ook een indicatie van 
de relatie tussen sturing en relationele kwaliteit. De derde configuratie laat ten slotte 
zien dat contractuele sturing – in de vorm van risicoverdeling – en relationele sturing 
– in de vorm van netwerkmanagement – niet op zichzelf staan, maar elkaar kunnen 
aanvullen bij het realiseren van hoogwaardige relaties in publiek-private samenwer-
kingsprojecten.
4.  Goede relaties doen ertoe: vertrouwen leidt tot betere 
samenwerking en betere prestaties.
Hoewel er zelden getwijfeld wordt aan het belang van goede relaties, is het belang van 
een sterke vertrouwensband tussen partners in publiek-private samenwerkingen niet 
uitgebreid onderzocht. Op basis van een vragenlijstonderzoek onder professionals 
werkzaam in publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten in Nederland concludeert 
hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift dat vertrouwen en netwerkmanagement belangrijk 
zijn voor de samenwerking in en de gepercipieerde performance van publiek-private 
samenwerkingsprojecten. Zo toont het onderzoek aan dat zowel vertrouwen als 
netwerkmanagement een significante relatie hebben met de gepercipieerde perfor-
mance van publiek-private samenwerkingen. Daarnaast is er ook een significante 
relatie tussen vertrouwen en samenwerking. Netwerkmanagement is in deze analyse 
niet significant. De correlatietest laat echter wel zien dat management samenhangt 
met vertrouwen. Het is daarom mogelijk dat er een indirect verband ligt tussen 
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netwerkmanagement en samenwerking, via vertrouwen. Dit is een indicatie voor 
de mediërende rol van relationele kwaliteit (in dit hoofdstuk getest in de vorm van 
vertrouwen) in de relatie tussen relationele sturing (in dit hoofdstuk in de vorm van 
netwerkmanagement) en performance (hier: samenwerking).
De bevindingen benadrukken het belang van relationele kwaliteit in publiek-private 
samenwerking. Gezien de complexiteit van dergelijke projecten en hun sterke relatie 
met de omgeving, en dus met andere betrokken stakeholders, is dit niet verwonder-
lijk. Publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten hebben een lange looptijd en er kunnen 
in die tijd onverwachte dingen gebeuren. Dat betekent dat constante aandacht voor 
de samenwerking, het vermogen om om te gaan met onverwachte gebeurtenissen die 
niet gespecificeerd zijn in het contract, en het beheren van relaties cruciaal zijn voor 
het succes van het project.
5.  Succesvolle publiek-private samenwerkingen combineren 
contractuele en relationele sturingsmechanismen tot een hybride 
vorm van sturing.
Het laatste hoofdstuk bouwt voort op het onderzoek van Poppo en Zenger (2002) die 
suggereren dat contractuele en relationele sturing elkaar niet uitsluiten, maar juist 
aanvullen. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 6 bevestigen dit en toont bovendien aan welke 
mix tussen beide sturingsvormen mogelijk is. In dit hoofdstuk wordt geconcludeerd 
dat, hoewel succesvolle PPS-projecten vaak een mix van sturingsmechanismen verto-
nen, in enkele projecten sommige sturingsinstrumenten andere mechanismen lijken 
te vervangen. Niet alle contractuele en relationele sturingsmechanismen hoeven 
aanwezig te zijn in een publiek-private samenwerking. Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert drie 
specifieke combinaties van contractuele en relationele sturingsmechanismen die 
kunnen worden aangetroffen in goed presterende publiek-private samenwerkingen:
a. Een combinatie van vertrouwen en een eerlijke risicoverdeling;
b. Een combinatie van een eerlijke risicoverdeling, strikte toepassing van sancties, 
en conflictmanagement;
c. Een combinatie van vertrouwen, conflictmanagement, en het ontbreken van een 
strikte toepassing van sancties.
Uit deze drie configuraties kunnen enkele conclusies worden getrokken. De eerste 
conclusie is dat contractuele en relationele sturingsmechanismen complementair aan 
elkaar kunnen zijn. De eerste twee configuraties zijn concrete voorbeelden waarop 
deze sturingsvormen gemixt kunnen worden en leveren daarmee duidelijk bewijs 
voor het idee dat een hybride sturingsvorm noodzakelijk is. De tweede conclusie 
is dat duidelijke afspraken belangrijk zijn om de prestaties van publiek-private sa-
menwerkingen te verbeteren. Ze verminderen onzekerheid en bieden richtlijnen 
249
Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
als het moeilijk wordt. De vraag of deze afspraken tot stand zijn gekomen met 
behulp van contractuele of relationele sturingsmechanismen is wellicht van minder 
belang, aangezien zowel de afspraken die in een contract zijn vastgelegd - zoals af-
spraken over de risicoverdeling - als de afspraken die zijn gemaakt via relationele 
controlemechanismen - zoals conflictbeheersing - te vinden zijn in bovenstaande con-
figuraties. Een derde conclusie is dat het effect van de strikte toepassing van sancties 
als sturingsmechanisme niet eenduidig is. In de tweede configuratie zien we de aan-
wezigheid van strikte toepassing van sancties, terwijl de derde configuratie juist de 
afwezigheid van strikt opgelegde sancties benadrukt. Dit suggereert dat het gebruik 
van een specifiek sturingsmechanisme goed moet aansluiten bij de andere mechanis-
men die worden gebruikt in de sturing van publiek-private partnerschappen om het 
gewenste effect te hebben. Een laatste conclusie betreft de derde configuratie, waarin 
relationele sturingsmechanisme dominant zijn. Hoewel de verklarende waarde van 
dit pad laag is, lijkt het erop te wijzen dat goede prestaties kunnen worden bereikt 
met uitsluitend relationele sturingsmechanismen. Dit onderstreept de belangrijke rol 
van relationele sturing in publiek-private samenwerkingen.
Putting the pieces together: wat zijn de belangrijkste conclusies van dit proefschrift?
In antwoord op de centrale onderzoeksvraag in dit proefschrift: Hoe kunnen contractuele 
en relationele sturing de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerkingen beïnvloeden en wat is de 
rol van relationele kwaliteit daarin? kunnen we stellen dat contractuele en relationele 
sturingsvormen complementair aan elkaar zijn. Het is de mix van sturingsvormen 
die ertoe doet en belangrijk is in goed presterende publiek-private samenwerkingen. 
Dit resulteert in een hybride vorm van sturing (zie hoofdstuk 2 en 6). Contractuele 
sturingsmechanismen dwingen af dat eerder gemaakte afspraken over rollen, risico’s 
en verantwoordelijkheden nageleefd worden  en geven duidelijkheid aan de betrok-
ken partners. Relationele sturingsmechanismen zijn ontworpen om de bereidheid 
van partners te vergroten om rekening te houden met de unieke omstandigheden van 
het project, empathie voor hun projectpartner te tonen, en tijd te nemen voor een 
gezamenlijke afweging van elkaars behoeften en belangen.
In sommige gevallen lijkt dit proefschrift erop te wijzen dat relationele sturingsme-
chanisme de dominante sturingsvorm (zouden moeten) zijn. Geen van de goed preste-
rende publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten in deze dissertatie maken uitsluitend 
gebruik van contractuele sturing, maar er zijn er wel enkele die voornamelijk bouwen 
op relationele sturing (zie hoofdstuk 6). Dit benadrukt het belang van relationele stu-
ring voor het functioneren van publiek-private samenwerkingen. Dit wordt bevestigd 
in hoofdstuk 5, dat het positieve verband aantoont tussen relationele sturing (in de 
vorm van netwerkmanagement) en de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerking. 
Dat laatste wordt daarbij niet uitsluitend gemeten in termen van efficiëntie, maar ook 
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aan de hand van de balans tussen kosten en baten, de integrale aard van de oplossing 
en de tevredenheid van alle partners die bij het project betrokken zijn. Bovendien 
heeft relationele sturing een positieve correlatie met relationele kwaliteit. Omdat 
relationele kwaliteit – gemeten aan de hand van het belangrijke kenmerk vertrouwen 
– de samenwerking beïnvloedt, leidt dit tot de conclusie dat: relationele sturing (a) 
een direct, positief effect heeft op de prestaties van publiek-private samenwerking en 
(b) een indirect, positief effect op samenwerking van dergelijke projecten. Relationele 
kwaliteit heeft daarnaast ook een significant, positief effect op de ervaren prestaties. 
De kwaliteit van de relaties in publiek-private samenwerkingen vormt daarmee een 
mediërende variabele in de relatie tussen relationele sturing en de performance van 
publiek-private samenwerkingen. Sturingsmechanismen spelen een belangrijke rol bij 
het opbouwen van hoogwaardige relaties in publiek-private samenwerkingen. Zowel 
netwerkmanagement als een eerlijke risicoverdeling zijn aanwezig in hoogwaardige 
relaties (zie hoofdstuk 4). Dit betekent dat zowel relationele sturing - in de vorm van 
netwerkbeheer - als contractuele sturing - gekenmerkt door een focus op risicoverde-
ling - van belang zijn voor het opbouwen van goede relaties. Voor dat laatste geldt 
dit alleen als niet alle risico’s worden overgedragen aan de private partner. Zolang 
de risicoverdeling als eerlijk wordt beschouwd, kunnen contractuele afspraken ook 
leiden tot meer openheid, meer vertrouwen en meer respect.
De consequenties van dit onderzoek voor de praktijk
Het combineren van contractuele en relationele sturingsmechanismen kan voor 
managers dilemma’s creëren. Enerzijds moeten zij in staat zijn om verschillende 
sturingsmechanismen te gebruiken, deze te combineren, en de juiste balans te vinden 
voor een bepaalde situatie. Tegelijkertijd moeten ze duidelijkheid verschaffen aan de 
betrokken partners over de ‘governance’ van het project. De verwachtingen van pro-
jectpartners met betrekking tot de sturing van het project moeten worden afgestemd, 
zodat beide partners weten wat ze kunnen verwachten. Er lijkt in dit opzicht een dunne 
lijn te zijn tussen flexibiliteit en voorspelbaarheid. Managers moeten de vaardigheid 
bezitten om een  dialoog over het gebruik van sturingsmechanismen te faciliteren en 
verschillende sturingsmechanismen te combineren. De Q-methodologie, die zijn nut 
heeft bewezen als instrument om de percepties en voorkeuren van professionals te 
achterhalen, zou in dit opzicht ook een nuttig instrument kunnen zijn voor profes-
sionals die bij de uitoefening van hun beroep te maken krijgen met publiek-private 
samenwerkingen. Informatie afkomstig van een Q-study kan een startpunt bieden 
voor een dialoog over governance en de balans tussen contractuele en relationele 
sturing in publiek-private samenwerkingen. Het gebruik van met name relationele 
sturingsmechanismen is daarnaast in veel publiek-private samenwerkingsprojecten 
geen standaard werkwijze. Het is daarom belangrijk om deze mechanismen te ver-
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ankeren in het project, waarbij er zowel bij de start van het project als gedurende 
het project expliciet aandacht besteed wordt aan relationele vormen van sturing. Het 
gebruik van simulatiespellen en ‘serious games’ kan hierbij een hulpmiddel vormen. 
Ten slotte kan het gebruik van hybride sturingsvormen uitdagingen oproepen voor 
de (publieke) organisatie. Niet elke organisatie is eraan gewend noch ingericht om 
dergelijke hybride vormen van sturing te accommoderen en te ondersteunen. Het im-
plementeren van een mix aan sturingsvormen vraagt om een organisatie-breed debat 
over hoe een publieke organisatie wil samenwerken met private partners, en wat dat 
betekent voor de organisatie zelf. De Nederlandse Marktvisie, een document waarin 
verschillende publieke en private organisaties de intentie uitspreken om verder te 
kijken dan het contract bij het managen van grote infrastructurele projecten, is een 
eerste stap op weg naar een dergelijke dialoog. De intentie die in de Markvisie wordt 
uitgesproken, zou echter in elk onderdeel van deze organisaties moeten doorklinken. 
Het mixen van sturingsvormen tot een hybride manier van sturing vereist immers 
autonomie en ondersteuning van projectmanagers, zodat ze de ruimte hebben om de 
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